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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I examine how CAM is discursively constructed in four major 
biomedical journals, The Journal of the American Medical Association, Nature, Science, 
and The New England Journal of Medicine, and three widely known women’s popular 
health media sites, The Dr. Oz Show, Women’s Health magazine, and Prevention 
magazine, and argue that risk is a major trope in the construction of CAM. In my 
analysis, I found that medical journals use risk discursively to circumscribe the extent to 
which CAM is accepted in the mainstream medical community and to reinforce 
institutional boundaries. In women’s popular health media, I found that risk is used 
discursively to reinforce the importance of conventional beauty standards while also 
supporting CAM as a valid supplement to conventional medicine by emphasizing how 
using CAM may enhance or improve health. Finally, I argue that although medical 
journals use the risk of CAM to validate professional norms, and women’s health media 
conflate health and appearance using CAM, women’s popular health media also provide 
specific examples of resistance against both the construction of the riskiness of CAM by 
medical journals and the patriarchal discourses that inflect the popular media’s coverage 
of CAM.  
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Chapter One: The Discursive Construction of Risk in Women’s Health 
The July/August 2013 issue of The Atlantic featured a story about the media panic in the 
early 2000s around the drastic decline in women’s fertility after age 35i. The author of the 
article, Jean Twenge, a psychologist who was childless and single at 30, described the 
anxiety she felt when reading this coverage which featured alarmist headlines such as 
“Baby Panic,” (New York Magazine) or “Should you have your Baby now?” (Newsweek). 
When she decided to go to the medical journals herself to mine the data that was 
presented in these magazines she found that the majority of information presented there 
was based on a study which used rates on women’s fertility from birth records dating 
from 1670-1830. When she researched more contemporary studies she found that 
women’s fertility did not significantly decline until after age 40. The media panic over 
women’s fertility was by no means innocuous to women’s lives, as Twenge points out. In 
her description of her own experience and of women’s online discussions about 
childbearing after age 35, she observed that many women discussed either scaling back 
careers to have children earlier, or had fewer children than they wanted to because of the 
seemingly daunting task of conceiving in their late 30s. Twenge’s story illustrates some 
of the main points that I make in my dissertation: scientific studies are selectively chosen 
by the media, and many of these present stories about health risks that are often not based 
on the best available scientific research. In addition, these manufactured risks can and do 
function in the oppression of women.  
 The second story I use as a springboard to my topic connects to my specific area 
of study—Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM)—and is a bit more abstract. 
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My Cuban-born grandmother is a devout Catholic and often used to pray to San Dimas 
(Saint Dismas) to help her find lost things. Dimas is a saint not officially canonized by 
the Catholic Church or named in the Bibleii, but one who was recognized among some in 
Cuba. The prayer also involved a ritual: she would tie a string around a piece of furniture, 
pray to Dimas and promise to do some good deed (such as give money to the poor) when 
the item was found. Although there was no “proof” that Dimas was intervening, Abuela 
always seemed to find what she was looking for, at which point she would fulfill her 
promise and cut the string tied to the furniture. I use this example to illustrate how people 
negotiate uncertainty in their lives and how they may use rituals, prayer, or other methods 
that do not fall within a rationalist objective framework in order to make sense of their 
lives. I argue this may be even more widespread when it comes to health, as people are 
often willing to try various methods, CAM included, in order to be healthy.  
In this dissertation, I examine how CAM is discursively constructed in medical 
journals and women’s popular health media and argue that risk is a major trope in this 
construction; moreover, at times, risk functions to oppress women by conflating health 
with appearance or emphasizing the individual mediation of risks to the exclusion of 
social causes of illness. In my analysis, I found that medical journals use risk discursively 
to circumscribe the extent to which CAM is accepted in the mainstream medical 
community and to reinforce institutional boundaries. In women’s popular health media, I 
found that risk is used discursively to reinforce patriarchal assumptions about 
conventional beauty and slimness being important for women to attain, while at the same 
time they support CAM as a valid supplement to conventional medicine by emphasizing 
3 
 
 
how using CAM may enhance or improve health. Finally, I argue that although medical 
journals use the risk of CAM to validate professional norms, and women’s media conflate 
health and appearance using CAM, women’s popular health media also provide specific 
examples of resistance against both the construction of the riskiness of CAM by the 
medical journals and the patriarchal discourses that inflect the popular media’s coverage 
of CAM, therefore risk functions in ways that are both repressive and productive.  
This project contributes to critical/cultural health communication studies because 
while critical/cultural health communication scholars have examined how power and 
ideology function in health messages, the ways in which power and ideology function in 
the discursive construction of CAM in medical journals and women’s popular health 
media has not been analyzed. CAM is an important site to examine at this historical 
moment given its exploding popularity. In addition, it is important to analyze both 
women’s popular health media and medical journals together to interrogate how they 
work in conjunction, as well as in opposition, to one another in their construction of 
CAM and health. These discourses, when analyzed together, provide insight into how 
CAM is being discussed in relation to women’s health at this historical moment. Finally, 
there has been no extensive analysis of CAM within feminist media studies. CAM is 
important for feminist scholars to study given the historical association between the first 
and second wave feminist movements and CAM, and analyzing how it is constructed in 
the popular media provides valuable insight into how it is being constructed for mass 
audiences of women.  
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Popular media are important sites of analysis as the media are central to meaning-
making—including meaning making about health—in contemporary society. As feminist 
media scholar Mary Douglas Vavrus (2002) notes: “The media construct particular views 
of the world, and through continuous interactions with these views, we mold and shape 
our own perspectives and orientations toward reality” (p. 3). In addition to analyzing 
popular media it is also important to look at medical professionals’ discursive 
constructions of CAM because analyzing them provides a full context for understanding 
the influence of CAM on contemporary allopathic medicine, and thus provides a robust 
picture of how medical professionals understand CAM. It is particularly important to 
study CAM from a feminist perspective because it has been historically associated with 
women—in the United States dating to at least the colonial era (Ehrenreich & English, 
2005). CAM is also used more frequently by women (NCCAM, 2011), and has a long 
historical association with the women’s health movement. For example, in the United 
States, the Popular Health Movement, which began in the 1830s, closely coincided with 
the emerging feminist movement of the timeiii (Ehrenreich & English, 2010); the 
women’s health movement of the 1960s and 1970s also aligned with the objectives of the 
second wave feminist movement (Bix, 2004). Because CAM has traditionally been 
associated with feminism and women’s movements, analyzing how it is constructed by 
women’s popular health media will help uncover how CAM is constructed for women 
today. This is important given that narratives about women’s health help to construct the 
available range of meanings offered to women in negotiating their own health 
(Dubrwiny, 2013). I argue that CAM, though traditionally aligned with feminist 
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movements in the United States, is constructed in women’s popular health media in 
problematic ways (for example, articulating appearance with health), and may thus be 
used to oppress women. By uncovering some of the patriarchal ideologies informing 
these discursive constructions, new ways of constructing discourse about CAM may be 
formulated. However, women’s popular health media also at times provide feminist 
critiques of gender discrimination in healthcare, thus women’s popular health media also 
provide a forum for challenging some of the oppressive tendencies they reproduce. 
Therefore, my project provides a feminist study of CAM that is important to the politics 
of women’s health. Before I proceed further, I first briefly identify what I define as CAM 
in this project.  
Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM) 
Today, CAM is gaining widespread popularity, and women are its main consumers. Since 
the early 1990s, CAM has secured federal funding, been covered by some insurers, and 
been increasingly integrated in hospital regimens. However, CAM is a broad term used to 
encompass many different treatments and therapies. The National Center for 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) defines CAM by separating it into 
two categories: natural products (herbs, vitamins, minerals, and probiotics) and “mind 
and body practices” (acupuncture, meditation, massage, movement therapyiv, relaxation 
techniquesv, spinal manipulation, Tai Chi, qi gong, yoga, healing touch and 
hypnotherapy). They also mention some CAM therapies that fall outside of these two 
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categories, including traditional healers, Ayurvedic medicine, traditional Chinese 
medicine, homeopathy and naturopathy (NCCAM, 2013).   
The broad scope of the NCCAM’s definition of CAM illustrates the multiplicity 
of CAM practices used by the U.S. public. The public’s increasing interest in the topic is 
also reflected in how quickly the CAM industry is growing. The NCCAM itself was 
created in 1998, and an increasing number of hospitals provide CAM therapies such as 
massage, acupuncture, and Reiki. Recent news coverage highlights this trend: one USA 
Today article published in 2008 reported that 37% of hospitals in the country provided 
CAM services. In 2012, only four years later, that number had risen to 42%, according to 
a national survey published in The Los Angeles Times (Andrews 2012, Paragraph 2).  
Although CAM therapies still are not usually covered by insurers (due to their lack of 
scientific efficacy), the NCCAM notes that insurers are beginning to cover some 
therapies such as chiropractic services, acupuncture and massage (NCCAM, 2011, 
Paragraph 5). Another study found that those three services were usually the only CAM 
therapies covered by insurance. However, CAM has become a money-making business: 
the NCCAM reports that consumers often pay for CAM out of pocket (Cleary-Guida, et. 
al., 2001), creating a nearly $20 billion dollar a year consumer industry.  
Clearly the use of CAM is becoming mainstream and it is thus pertinent to 
explore why it is becoming popular now. Although people in the United States have a 
long history of CAM use, I argue that part of the public interest in CAM has to do with 
the ubiquity of risk discourses embedded in the media’s coverage of health stories, 
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including those on medical errors, risks of screening technologies, and distrust of doctors 
and pharmaceutical companies. Before I elaborate on CAM further, I briefly explicate the 
main theoretical terms I use in this project: risk, risk society, choice, individualization, 
and reflexivity.  
Risk and Risk Society 
As a result of the various developments that have shaped late modernityvi, including an 
increasingly global capitalist economy which is accelerated by the speed with which 
information travels (Boden, 2000) and a detraditionalization of the social world, in which 
social class and familial obligation no longer meaningfully determine an individual’s life 
pathvii (Lash, 2000), the Western world has been labeled by Ulrich Beck (1992) a “risk 
society.” The thesis of the risk society is that risk has become a central component of 
intellectual, structural, and political rationalities, and that these rationalities are connected 
by multiple threads of discourse that express the crises of modernity (for example the loss 
of conventional mores associated with the traditional life plan, such as marriage and 
stable employment) and industrial society (environmental pollution related to industry) 
(Lash & Wynne, 1992, p. 3). Modernity is a loaded term with several possible meanings, 
in this dissertation (unless otherwise specified) when I refer to modernity I am using 
Beck’s understanding of the word, which refers to a time period beginning around 1900 
and continuing into the present marked by the scientific (such as biomedicine) and 
technological (such as the invention of the Internet) developments that have accelerated 
8 
 
 
contemporary life both in the creation of new knowledge and the ability for media to 
circulate this new knowledge instantaneously.  
Other scholars such as Rose (2001), take an even broader perspective on the 
influence of risk on health discourse, arguing that it has been central to biopolitical 
rationalities for at least the past 150 years. Rose draws on Foucault’s (1976) concept of 
biopolitics which provides a framework for understanding how medical discourses have 
been used as tools of governance to maximize life. By this, Foucault means that the 
modern state has had an interest in maintaining and expanding the health and hygiene of 
a nation, but he asserts this has not been imposed on the citizenry; rather, the discourse of 
health and hygiene necessitates persuading subjects to actively, willingly participate in 
these regimes. In this way, biopolitics is constituted by both individual activities and self-
surveillance, as well as by public health initiatives, often driven by quantified information 
about the health of the population. Rose, too, sees risk as an informing principle in health 
discourse, and uses Foucault’s concept of self-governance to explicate how individuals 
internalize risk rationalities and then take up practices (one of his examples is genetic 
counseling) that they believe mediate risks to themselves or close others. Although 
Rose’s work contributes to my understanding of how health risks function in discourse, 
the risk society thesis has been most extensively elaborated by Beck (1992, 1999) and 
Anthony Giddens (1999). I reference Beck most frequently in this dissertation because I 
analyze media and he grants the mass media a prominent role in the construction and 
dissemination of risks of all kinds: personal, professional, medical, and so forth (Cottle, 
2008).  
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Beck defines risk as characterized by, “a peculiar, intermediate state between 
security and destruction, where the perception of threatening risks determines thought 
and action” (1999, p. 213). These risks emerge from a society that relies heavily on 
expert knowledge to construct reality, and in which information about risks is in a sense 
“manufactured” (Giddens, 1990, 1995, and Beck, 1999) by scientists and experts. In 
Foucauldian terms, as a discourse, risk shapes medical knowledge and in turn helps to 
form particular subjectivities informed by risk. These insights are important to 
understanding the constructed nature of risk. For example, Beck argues that those who 
claim to have expert knowledge about varying risks such as scientists, business people, 
and politicians, are able to construct some risks as more meaningful than others as well as 
set the agenda for how to control and measure risks, thus creating a market for risk 
mediation. In addition, their claim to special knowledge about risks perpetuates social 
inequalities:  
As the risk society develops, so does the antagonism between those afflicted by 
risks and those who profit from them. The social and economic importance of 
knowledge grows similarly, and with it the power over the media to structure 
knowledge (science and research) and disseminate it (mass media). The risk 
society is in this sense also the science, media and information society. Thus new 
antagonisms open up between those who produce risk definitions and those who 
consume them (Beck, 1992, p. 46).  
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Because the risks of modern life are shaped by particular experts, risks are not 
ideologically neutral, but work to benefit varying stakeholders (Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982, Nelkin, 1989, and Lupton, 1993). For example, the manufacturers of products who 
may be polluting the environment have an interest in constructing their waste disposal 
methods as not risky by using data from scientists that show the chemical they are 
disposing of does not have deleterious effects on living things or the natural environment.  
However, risks are not only social constructions. Thus, Beck (1999) argues that 
risks are hybrid: “Risks are man-made [sic] hybrids. They include and combine politics, 
ethics, mathematics, mass media, technologies, cultural definitions and perception; and, 
most important of all, you cannot separate these aspects and ‘realities’, if you want to 
understand the cultural and political dynamics of the world risk society,” (p. 221). One 
example that exemplifies Beck’s quote is the case of phthalates, a chemical used in many 
cosmetic products and children’s toys. In the early 2000s, the public became concerned 
about the potentially toxic effects of phthalates on human health because of scientific 
studies covered in the media that showed that they could cause liver problems in rodents. 
Although another group of scientists later determined that children’s exposure to 
phthalates was low enough that it would not cause health problems, public pressure led to 
political support for banning the chemical from those products (Hamilton, 2009). In this 
case, although scientists did not agree on the toxicity level for humans, the media’s 
coverage led to public concern, which in turn led to political action. This example 
illustrates the multiplicity of stakeholders in risk construction (the company, scientists, 
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and the media) and shows how risk construction in the media is an important factor in 
influencing public action and legislation.   
Individualization, Reflexive Modernity, Choice and Reflexivity  
Beck argues that one of the consequences of the shift between first modernity (stable 
nation-states, family structures, secure employment, etc.) and late modernity is 
individualization. This is a movement that he describes as a sort of “liberation” from 
family, class and social structure in the West, a process in which people are free to make 
their own life plansviii and thus are, in a sense, free agents in the global labor market. 
Beck’s individualization may also be understood as neoliberal, “Neo-liberalism is a form 
of rule which involves creating a sphere of freedom for subjects so that they are able to 
exercise a regulated autonomy” (Petersen, 1997, p. 194). Within neoliberalism, this tends 
to focus on an individual as an entrepreneurial subject, free to exercise autonomy within 
the market. This ideology also tends to de-legitimize the need for social services by 
emphasizing personal success and failure, while obscuring the structural relations that 
enable and constrain personal actions (Vavrus, 2002).  
Beck argues that because of the loss of the metanarratives of progress that were 
essential to first modernity, the assumptions of modernity (a set social structure  
emphasized familial bonds, the relative stability of institutions, such as the authority of 
the state, and truth claims generated by science, such as the acceptance of objectivity to 
the exclusion of contingent factors, among others) are called into question by both 
experts and lay people (this process he terms reflexive modernity). In the following 
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section, I elaborate each term in-depth (although they function together so their 
descriptions overlap to a certain extent).  
Reflexive Modernity 
Beck argues that as a result of both experts and lay people questioning many previously 
taken for granted assumptions about social, political, and economic life, the position of 
experts (such as scientists) is precarious: they are needed to construct knowledge about 
risks, yet the public is skeptical of institutional authority (including doctors and the 
medical establishment). Beck traces this skepticism of science and authority to the early 
twentieth century when intellectual threads such as ideology critique and fallibilism (or 
the idea that science is not the sole arbiter of “Truth”) in the theory of science emerged, 
using science’s assumptions of objectivity and the contingency of truth against itself to 
question the truth claims produced by science. In addition, scientific developments such 
as the creation of the nuclear bomb revealed that even as science promised progress, it 
also revealed its possibly disastrous negative consequences (Beck, 1992, p. 156).  
I argue that this skepticism of institutional authority—science in particular—
points to one reason CAM is experiencing popularity at this time:  
In the United States, scandals regarding FDA-approved drugs have made the 
public leery of the link between business and health care. Researchers report that 
both those with and those without health insurance are increasingly turning to 
alternative medicine or supplements to treat their own illnesses. Patients with 
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chronic illness often research their diseases online to educate their physicians 
about alternative therapies (Wiley, 2008, p. 2).  
Lupton echoes this sentiment, “In a climate where concerns about iatrogenic disease, the 
self-serving financial interests of orthodox doctors and the high costs of medical 
technology have been placed prominently on the agenda for public discussion, alternative 
therapies appear a refreshing and radical alternative which offers a sensitive, caring 
attitude and personal contact with healers” (1994, p. 125). Thus the public’s interest in 
CAM may be attributed in part to the tendencies of reflexive modernity. The critique of 
institutions also fits clearly with the concept of individualization because if people are 
free to construct their own life plans, they must also question how institutions function in 
the interest (or not) of fulfilling that plan. Foucault (1976) along with Rose (2001) terms 
this reflexive approach care of the self, or a form of self-governance; however, I will be 
using Beck’s concept of reflexivity more extensively as a way to illustrate that critiques 
of these institutions are not just about self-management, but importantly, are also about 
the desire for social changeix.  
Individualization  
Public skepticism of scientific knowledge in late modernityx means that people no longer 
unquestioningly rely on expert advice. In late modernity, Beck (1992) argues that people 
are required to make individual decisions about their life path, including job, relationship, 
and other personal choices that are less dependent on the past strictures of loyalty to 
one’s family, employer, or other dominant institutions, such as medicine. This emphasis 
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on an individual making choices without the necessity of consulting others, and with only 
their own future in mind, is what Beck (1992) terms individualization, a “’categorical 
shift’ in the relation between the individual and society,” (p. 127) characterized by three 
general factors: 1) liberation (or not being constrained by social conventions), 2) loss of 
stability (or no longer being able to rely on concrete knowledge and normsxi), and 3) 
reintegration (or a new social commitment to the individual). To exemplify each point, 
Beck provides examples of this shift beginning with the loss of status-based classes (such 
as the European bourgeoisie) at the beginning of the twentieth century, the women’s 
movement (liberation), the loss of traditional forms of family for the middle classesxii, 
and the flexibility of work hours and decentralization of work sites (loss of stability). All 
of these trends, he argues, are dependent on the post-war labor market:  
The individual situations that come into existence are thoroughly dependent on 
the labor market. They are, so to speak, the extension of market dependency into 
every corner of (earning a) living, they are its late result in the welfare state phase. 
They arise in the fully established market and labor market society, which barely 
remembers traditional possibilities of support any longer, if at all (Beck, 1992, p. 
130).  
Beck’s individualization thesis directly reflects the neoliberal turn in Western society that 
emphasizes personal responsibility over institutional safeguards: “Neo-liberalism calls 
upon the individual to enter into the process of his or her own self-governance through 
processes of endless self-examination, self-care and self-improvement” (Petersen, 1997, 
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p. 194). Although the emphasis on an individual creating their own life plan is one of the 
central tenets of individualization, Beck’s thesis differs slightly from the idea that 
individuals are required to rely solely on their own entrepreneurial qualities to succeed 
because he also argues that the dependency of the individual on the labor market has 
resulted in greater institutional dependency than in the past:  
The liberated individuals become dependent on the labor market and because of 
that, dependent on education, consumption, welfare state regulations and support, 
traffic planning, consumer supplies, and on possibilities and fashions in medical, 
psychological and pedagogical counseling and care. This all points to the 
institution-dependent control structure of individual situations. Individualization 
becomes the most advanced form of societalization dependent on the market, law, 
education and so on (Beck, 1992, p. 131).    
Therefore, in Beck’s conception of individualization, people are compelled to actively 
make decisions about career paths, relationships, and any other number of personal life 
choices, but they are, due to lack of traditional social support, dependent on social 
institutions to help them achieve these goals (Rose, 2007 makes a similar assertion). This 
is an important point because it shows that discourse between individuals and institutions 
is dialectical. For example, in the realm of women’s health, feminist health activists since 
the 1960s have succeeded in shaping the medical agenda. The establishment of the Office 
on Women’s Health, created in 1991, and a part of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, illustrates that women’s health has become an important issue in 
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mainstream medicine and health policy, yet doctors writing in the medical and scientific 
journals I analyze still circulate ideas that reinforce patient compliance and ignorance, 
thus reinforcing the assumptions that played a large role in women’s historical 
subordination within medicine.  
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault uses individualization somewhat differently. 
He theorized a process of individualization achieved through the examination, where 
individuals came into being or were able to be known through this process. Foucault 
described the examination as an important development in the exercise of power across 
varying social sites including the prison, school, and modern hospital: 
The examination as the fixing, at once ritual and ‘scientific’, of individual 
differences, as the pinning down of each individual in his [sic] own 
particularity…clearly indicates the appearance of a new modality of power in 
which each individual receives as his status his own individuality, and in which he 
is linked by his status to the features, the measurements, the gaps, the ‘marks’ that 
characterize him and make him a ‘case’ (1977, p. 192).  
Foucault’s thesis of individualization, which he argues contributes to normalization, has 
been well documented in critical examinations of health. Rather than elaborate on those 
here, I discuss Foucault’s concept of individualization because it contributes to an 
understanding of how medical discourse serves to normalize a standard image of what a 
healthy female body should look like, and as I will argue in chapter three, this includes a 
slim, youthful, and oftentimes conventionally attractive person. In chapter three, I will 
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argue that the examination is constructed by women’s popular health media as a means of 
self-surveillance that contributes to this normalization.  
Choice  
Choice is a concept that feminist scholars have elaborated both in sociological 
investigations of health ethics (Sherwin et. al., 1998) and in feminist theory that explores 
its problematic aspects in a society that increasingly places blame on individuals for 
making poor choices (McRobbie, 2009 and Baker, 2010). For example, McRobbie (2009) 
advances a theory that she terms “female individualization,” as a means to discuss how 
individualization leads to an emphasis on individual blame and obfuscates the patriarchal 
biases in society that weakens the solidarity between young women and older feminists. 
As she notes in her discussion of female individualization:  
Individuals must now choose the kind of life they want to live. Girls must have a 
life-plan. They must become more reflexive in regard to every aspect of their 
lives, from making the right choice in marriage, to taking responsibility for their 
own working lives and not being dependent on a job for life or on the stable and 
reliable operations of a large scale bureaucracy, which in the past would have 
allocated its employees specific, and possibly unchanging, roles…Beck and 
Giddens are quite inattentive to the regulative dimensions of the popular 
discourses of personal choice and self improvement. (McRobbie, 2009, p. 19)   
I agree with McRobbie’s criticism that Beck does not sufficiently attend to popular 
culture or gender in his analysis (Brannen & Nilsen, 2005 make a similar assertion), so 
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my project helps elaborate his work with attention to these issues. However, Beck does 
acknowledge the increasing difficulty of making the “right” choice in an era of 
competing expert knowledge claims, when experts (such as scientists) may come to 
opposite conclusions about the same issue (Beck, 1992, and McKechnie & Davies, 1999). 
In addition, as I noted above, he also grants institutions a great amount of power in 
determining individuals’ achievement of their life plans, and thus does account for the 
influence of social structure (though I agree he does not take this quite far enough).  
McRobbie (2005) also critiques the individualization thesis for not adequately 
addressing how to forge linkages between classes to achieve social change. For example, 
in her discussion of contemporary imperatives for middle-class, Western, young women 
to succeed in education and the labor force, she argues that the focus on individual 
success encourages them to ignore the barriers of working-class and/or non-Western 
women who often have a more difficult time achieving these goals. McRobbie’s criticism 
of Beck’s inattention to class is valid. Yet, Beck also argues that reflexive modernity is 
marked by a deep criticism of institutional and social rules. I argue that this criticism also 
extends to the differences in opportunity between classes (this topic frequently comes up 
in education reform debates); thus, Beck provides a vision of how progress may be 
achieved in the risk society (even within a neoliberal context), “Only when medicine 
opposes medicine, nuclear physics opposes nuclear physics, human genetics opposes 
human genetics or information technology opposes information technology can the future 
that is being brewed up in the test-tube become intelligible and evaluable for the outside 
world,” (Beck, 1992, p. 234). In other words, Beck (1992) argues that the self-critical 
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nature of reflexive modernity is how meaningful criticism is taken into account in order 
to transform social institutions and politics. Now that I have outlined reflexive modernity 
and individualization, I will more fully elaborate Beck’s reflexivity thesis.  
Reflexivity  
Beck (1992, 1999) argues that the process of individualization in late modernity leads to 
reflexivity by both institutions and the public. He suggests that because of competing 
knowledge claims about risks created by different experts, lay people must constantly 
question experts’ political motivations. This is necessary because Beck argues that in late 
modernity people have become aware of the contradictory nature of expert knowledge: 
Here is one of the reasons why risk societies can become self-critical societies. 
Different agencies and actors, for example, managers of chemical industries and 
insurance experts contradict each other. Technicians argue that: ‘there is no risk’, 
while the insurers refuse insurance because the risks are too high. A similar 
debate is currently taking place within the realm of genetically engineered food. 
(Beck, 1999, p. 218)  
What Beck is pointing to here is that the proliferation of risk discourses and the varying 
stakeholders in the construction of risks have different agendas, and at times, these 
agendas conflict with public interest. For instance, in the phthalate example, the plastic 
producers do not want risks to be found with the chemical since that will mean spending 
time and money to find a different chemical to include in their products; thus they use 
scientific evidence that shows phthalates cause no harm in humans. On the other hand, 
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parents of children who have had serious childhood illnesses look for explanations for the 
disease, perhaps researching environmental causes of illness and determining that studies 
conducted by scientists that show phthalates cause health problems in humans are 
accurate. The public’s interest usually leans to being exposed to as little environmental 
health risks as possible. Therefore, they will tend to err on the side of wanting more 
chemical regulations. Regardless of the “real” nature of the risks of phthalates, public 
pressure did change legislation, thus illustrating how reflexivity may function in the 
service of social change in the neoliberal risk society.  
However, reflexivity is not a panacea when it comes to challenging the status quo 
(Kerr & Cunningham-Burley, 2000). For example, as Kerr and Cunningham-Burley point 
out (2000), reflexivity may be used by institutions to bolster authority and minimize any 
outside interference. In chapter two, I use their critique to help explain how the medical 
institution uses reflexivity to secure institutional norms and forestall change. In addition, 
it is not possible to understand in advance the outcomes of reflexivity. For example, 
stories on medical errors may lead to an increased in doctor’s and patient’s emphasis on 
evidence-based medicinexiii; I argue in chapter two that this sequence forecloses other 
ways of seeing health and illness.  
Yet, following Dutta and de Souza (2008) I argue that reflexivity should be 
considered both a framework and a tool used to question how practices may work in the 
service of domination because it allows for the constant envisioning of alternatives: “In a 
reflexive sense, the task of criticism is never really complete; the grand narrative never 
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comes to closure, as we continuously question the ways in which our practices serve 
hegemonic interests” (Dutta & de Souza, 2008, p. 329). In other words, a theoretical 
engagement with reflexivity is constructive because it provides an example of how social 
change can be achieved within the existing social framework. Reflexivity, as Dutta and 
de Souza point out, should always also be self-critical, and used to question its own 
assumptions. This will be imperative to my analysis as I show some of the ways in which 
reflexivity functions negatively: in chapter two how it is used by physicians to set the 
terms of debate about the acceptability of CAM using the randomized controlled trial 
(RCT); in chapter three, how reflexivity is used by the media to acknowledge and then 
coopt women’s unease with unrealistic beauty standards; and in chapter four, how Dr. Oz 
uses reflexivity to sell his brand at the same time his public critiques of conventional 
medicine downplay the patriarchal elements of his show.   
Rationale/Justification for Study  
Using risk, individualization, choice, and reflexivity as theoretical tools for analyzing the 
discursive construction of CAM in medical journals and in women’s popular health 
media is an important project because risk is a major trope of contemporary health 
discourse (Nettleton & Burrows, 1995, and Petersen & Bunton, 1997)—particularly 
women’s health discourse (Dubrwiny, 2013); analyzing how risk is used in the 
ideological construction of CAM is imperative to understanding how it functions both in 
gender oppression as well as in constructing resistance to how problematic assumptions 
about women’s health are portrayed in the media. While many feminist health scholars 
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have discussed how risk is used in constructions of women’s health (Dubrwiny, 2013, 
Inhorn & Whittle, 2001, Robertson, 2001, and Ruhl, 1999), there has been insufficient 
attention paid to how medical journals’ constructions of risk work dialectically with 
popular media to construct women in relation to medical doctors. In addition, there has 
been scant work on CAM in critical/cultural health communication studies.  
Utilizing reflexivity as a theoretical framework is helpful for theorizing social 
resistance, which can lead to the improvement of women’s health, a goal that Annandale 
(2009) claims is often overlooked by feminist analyses that deal with health through 
theories of the body: “the fault lines between feminist theory and health and illness are 
particularly stark. It is common enough to refer to developing ‘theory through the 
body’…, but the body in question is rarely anchored in vital matters of life and death” 
(Annandale, 2009, p. 3). Following Annandale, I argue that it is consequential to consider 
how the construction of health in women’s popular health media and by medical 
professionals has material consequences for women’s health. For example, Dubriwny 
(2013) argues that media discourses about women’s health may help women construct 
identities or coherent narratives of their own experiences based partially on those 
representations. Williams and Calnan also (1996) highlight the importance of reflexivity 
in late modernity in challenging some of the assumptions of dominant and powerful 
institutions such as medicinexiv: “It is in this context that lay views towards science and 
technology, including modern medicine, come to comprise a shifting dialectic of trust and 
doubt, certainty and uncertainty, reverence and disillusionment” (p. 1613). Through 
reflexivity then, dominant institutions that have traditionally oppressed women, such as 
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allopathic medicine, may be challenged. My study provides specific examples of how 
reflexivity is showcased in the media in ways that illustrate how resistance to 
conventional medicine is articulatedxv I identify instances both when it works and when it 
does not.  
It is also important to study how the media construct risks: in late modernity 
experience is increasingly mediated (Beck 1992, Williams & Calnan, 1996) and the 
media often emphasize risks in their coverage of health stories (for example in stories on 
medical errors and how undergoing a medical process, such as surgery, may cause 
illness) (Seale, 2002). The media also help to constitute the “field of meanings” that are 
dominant in any given culture (Hall, 1977) and this is no different for health. In his 
discussion of the importance of the media in providing available narratives from which 
people make meaning about health, Seale (2002) notes:  
Perhaps the greatest repository of stories in late modern societies is made up from 
the various organs of the mass media—television, newspapers, magazines, radio 
and, increasingly, the Internet. Here, people find a rich collection of resources to 
draw upon in telling the story of their selves. When people get sick, or make 
decisions about health, or visit their health service providers, or decide what to 
think and vote about health care policy and finance, their behavior may be 
formulated in large part from resources drawn from various mass media (p. 2).   
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Health information presented in the media therefore helps to establish what counts as 
good or bad health for women and may also influence what medical treatments they 
pursue. As Lupton (1994) points out: 
The mass media are important in portraying medicine, health care, disease, illness 
and health risks in certain ways, from the soap opera’s kindly doctor to the news 
bulletin’s account of medical miracles, contributing to people’s understanding of 
these phenomena, especially when they have little or no direct experience of them 
(p. 17).  
Furthermore, the media play a significant role in the social construction of risk: “Whether 
rejected, accepted, or modified, comments by expert risk definers contained in news 
accounts serve as points of departure for personal conversations” (Stallings, 1990, p. 81). 
Stallings and Seale (2002) also illustrate that media perspectives are multiple, reflecting 
the views of varying stakeholders. Seale (2002) for example, discusses how corporations 
such as pharmaceutical companies use the media to target consumers by encouraging 
them to ask their doctors for their products. Yet, as both Stallings and Beck note, the 
media do not determine in advance the political outcomes of their coverage: “risk is not 
the outcome of media and public discourse, but exists in and through processes of 
discourse” (Stallings, 1990, p. 82). Therefore, analyzing specific media, including major 
medical journals, allows a more focused reading of how risk is constructed in health 
discourses in specific media sites. Analyzing these discursive constructions and tracing 
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the increasing influence of CAM on conventional medicine will help illuminate how the 
media have contributed to the current popularity of CAM.  
Not only do the media help construct what counts as health, analyzing health 
discourse in the media is important because the public views the media as credible 
sources of health information (Friedman, 2004). In a 1998 nationwide poll conducted by 
the National Health Council, 40% of those polled cited television as their primary source 
of health information, leading doctors by almost 5%. In addition, almost 60% of people 
changed their behavior or took action because of a health story from the media and 42% 
looked for more information based on a health story in the media (Friedman, 2004, p. 2-
3). Popular media, such as talk shows, are also instructive about health. In his study of 
entertainment-education media (or the placement of educational messages in 
entertainment content), Dutta (2007) found that those who watched health-oriented talk 
shows became more interested in health after watching the shows; this will be important 
to my study since I am analyzing the health talk program, The Dr. Oz Show. In addition, 
media coverage of health risks, such as the supposed risks of childhood vaccinations, 
may have implications for public health (Ratzan, 2004). Therefore, it is pertinent to 
interrogate how the media presents health information and which health stories they 
choose to cover because their selection illustrates which health risks are considered 
worthy of attention, thus uncovering which ideological beliefs about illness and health 
are being most widely circulated.  
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Lastly, the media are important objects of study because they can be vehicles for 
social change (Beck, 1992). As Beck (1992) notes, “the consequence for politics is that 
reports on discoveries of toxins in refuse dumps, if catapulted overnight into the 
headlines, change the political agenda” (p. 197). While Beck’s claim of the power of the 
media may be overstated, his point that the media are integral parts of contemporary 
social change is a valuable insight. Because the media have become important platforms 
utilized by politicians, business people, and scientists in order to get their viewpoints 
across to the public, they function in some ways to convey expert opinions. However, 
despite their ability to be used by powerful stakeholders, popular media also provide 
coverage that identifies institutions and corporations as sources of risk (Beck, 1992), 
oftentimes featuring stories about how, for example doctors make medical mistakes.   
The importance of media I outlined above extends to women’s popular health 
media. I proceed with this project cautiously, keeping in mind, as Green, Thompson and 
Griffiths (2002) point out, that “women” must not be a category abstractly applied to all 
women at all times; instead, how women make health decisions should be considered 
historically and contextually. And of course, women are not a homogenous group but 
embodied individuals with a range of experiences. I am limiting my scope primarily to 
North American, middle-class, educated women (as they are the group using CAM most 
frequently)xvi. In addition, health discourses that rely heavily on risk may be targeted 
toward white middle-class women most because they are less subject to overt state 
control than low-income women (through, for example, subsidized housing or welfare 
programs). “Indeed, it is precisely well-educated, white, middle-class women who most 
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fervently endorse what I refer to as ‘the individualized riskxvii’ model of pregnancy and 
birth. This characterizies risk society in general, and holds true when specific sub-groups, 
in this case women, are implicated” (Ruhl, 1999, p. 112). Ruhl essentially argues that 
white, middle-class women voluntarily subscribe to risk mediation activities during 
pregnancy (such as caffeine restriction), but that the ideology of individual risk mediation 
in the prenatal context can be problematic. For example, when doctors imply that women 
who follow their advice will have healthy babies, women may feel shame or distress if 
they follow all the rules and still have a child with a health problem.  
In addition, as Lupton (1994) suggests, middle-class norms of appearance and 
demeanor (she places these in the context of Bourdieu’s habitus) emphasize youthfulness 
and slimness more than do the norms of appearance for working-class women. Thus, she 
argues middle-class women typically participate in exercise and weight-reduction 
activities more than working class women do (p. 40). Because of the white, middle-class 
women assumed to be the CAM consumer and the individualistic focus on health 
empowerment that permeates media constructions of risk, the discourses about CAM 
targeted towards this group of women are in a sense postfeminist at the same time they 
are neoliberal. Indeed, as Vavrus (2012) notes, one of the reasons that postfeminism and 
neoliberalism are compatible as ideologies is that they emphasize individualism to the 
exclusion of social action. This will be important in chapter three, where I discuss the 
articulation between beauty, slimness, and health in women’s popular health media.  
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Rationale for Media Selection  
Popular health media do not feature medical stories arbitrarily, but have a symbiotic 
relationship with medical journals (Friedman, 2004). For example, medical journals often 
preview important articles for media outlets before they are published and medical 
researchers view the media as important sources of information. One study found that 
articles from The New England Journal of Medicine that were covered in The New York 
Times were cited 72.8 % more in other medical journal articles after being featured in the 
media (Friedman, 2004, p. 3). Considering the symbiotic relationship between medical 
journals and the media illustrates that popular media such as newspapers, magazines, and 
television programs exist in a structurally meaningful relationship to medical journals, 
rather than serving as mere channels through which medical messages are transmitted. 
Because the media often glean health information from medical journals, it is important 
to analyze the discourses of both sites in order to understand how they work together in a 
mutually constitutive fashion. For example, as I discuss further in chapter four, some of 
the doctors who express criticism about CAM in the medical journals I analyze also 
discuss Dr. Oz in news stories or appear on his show to defend their positions.  
In this dissertation, I analyze both popular media sources—The Dr. Oz Show, 
Women’s Health and Prevention magazines—and opinion pieces in biomedical journals, 
specifically The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), The New England 
Journal of Medicine (NEJM), Science and Nature. I chose the Dr. Oz Show because, as I 
will discuss in chapter four, Dr. Oz has become one of popular culture’s most credible 
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sources of health information. I focus primarily on his television program because of the 
limited scope of this project, which would be unable to account for his vast media 
presence in conjunction with the rest of my empirical materials. In addition, television is 
where he began his career in media and serves as the hub in the mediated empire he has 
created.   
Another reason I analyze The Dr. Oz Show is because of his relationship to the 
women’s health magazines I analyze. These two media sites may share a more 
interconnected audience than his other media platforms. “It helps that his [Dr. Oz] 
television viewers also read magazines. His show attracts a following of women aged 25 
to 54 who are, according to one study, 126 percent more likely than the average person to 
read women’s magazines” (Haughney, 2012). In addition, Oz helps to sell magazines 
such as Women’s Health on his television program (for example, by featuring an editor 
from the magazine on the show), an indispensable benefit to publishers who are facing 
increasing difficulties finding cover stars who will help sell magazines. Dr. Oz is 
currently one of the most popular magazine cover stars, and is the first man to appear on 
four women’s magazine covers (Haughney, 2012).This is relevant because as I will 
discuss in chapter four, the presence of a shared audience base is also important to the 
expansion of Oz’s brand, which he links closely with CAM. 
In addition, women’s health magazines are important to analyze because as health 
scholar Stephanie Roy (2008) notes, they are a unique source of health information, 
blending anecdotes with studies from medical journals; feminist health educators have 
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also found women’s magazines to be an effective means to promote safe sexual practices 
among women (McRobbie, 1997). Finally, college women who read health and fitness 
magazines were more likely to be concerned with body size and shape than those who 
read fashion magazines (Thomsen, 2002, p. 1000). The sum of research indicates that 
women’s magazines offer useful health information to readers as well as shape how they 
view body size, an important element to consider given the conflation of beauty with 
health that I describe in chapter three.  
I chose Prevention and Women’s Health magazines for different reasons. First,  
Prevention’s circulation was significantly higher than any other women’s health and 
wellness publication. In 2011, The Huffington Post, using data from the Audit Bureau of 
Circulation, ranked the 20 most popular magazines for the first half of 2011; Prevention 
ranked sixth overall. This is significant because the list included both woman-targeted 
publications such as Oprah and Family Circle, as well as publications targeted toward 
men such as Maxim and Sports Illustrated. Notably, it was the only women’s health and 
wellness magazine on the list.  In addition, when Dr. Oz was featured on Prevention’s 
2012 cover, sales increased 45 percent from the year before (Haughney, 2012). I chose 
Women’s Health magazine (WH), because it was one of only three magazines with a wide 
circulation (including FamilyFun [a family oriented magazine] and People StyleWatch [a 
celebrity magazine]), which increased the last half of 2009 (overall magazine 
subscriptions and newsstand sales were down over 9% its circulation increased 21.5%). 
This is significant because like Prevention, WH fared well among all magazines, not just 
those that were targeted to women or health-focused (Clifford, 2010).  
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Both Prevention and WH frame CAM as a valid means to promote health or treat 
minor ailments. The coverage in both magazines is also mainly supportive of CAM 
therapies, though they often cover therapies that are acceptable in the allopathic medical 
community (which include using CAM for pain management). However, in 2011 both 
magazines featured articles that explored the placebo effect and provided a critique of 
science-based medicine that I would consider feminist for the respect it showed for 
women’s subjective experiences of health. For example, Prevention profiles a woman’s 
personal experiences with CAM use (acupuncture) and validates the woman’s experience 
of pain, situating allopathic medicine as unable to provide her with an adequate solution.   
Literature Review  
One of the difficulties with my project is that it is engaging with interdisciplinary 
scholarship, a feature that makes limiting my literature review very difficult. As Lupton 
(1994) notes, “An interdisciplinary perspective, while exciting and stimulating in its 
breadth, poses its own problems. When one is integrating research and scholarship from a 
number of disciplines, it can be very difficult to know where to draw the boundaries” (p. 
2). With that in mind I have organized this review to include, first, a broad look at why 
critical/cultural health communication is important and next, to provide a review of 
scholarship that has engaged with critical analyses of media and health. This survey will 
not be exhaustive but is representative of the type of work that is currently being done in 
the field. Lastly, I provide specific literature that applies my chosen analytical concepts: 
risk, individualization, choice, and reflexivity to health and gender.  
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Much of current critical/cultural health communication has been informed by the 
work of M.J. Dutta (2010), a scholar who has interrogated the rationale, methodology, 
and assumptions guiding health campaigns in non-Western countries, such as India. 
Other communication scholars such as Zoller (2005) interrogate how health activism 
should be critically analyzed to see how health activism movements are influenced by 
power and inequality. Both Dutta’s and Zoller’s analyses highlight the importance of 
analyzing power and ideology in the study of health communication. My project asks 
similar questions about power and ideology but adds to the literature because it takes a 
different theoretical approach by incorporating Beck’s risk society thesis. In addition, my 
research includes the perspectives of medical doctors: this is different from most work 
that has been done in critical/cultural health communication studies, which has not 
sufficiently attended to the opinions of medical doctors. 
My work also adds to feminist health literature on choice. The current feminist 
scholarship on choice in the health contextxviii primarily addresses how women’s health 
suffers in the context of neoliberalism. For example, Lippmann (1999) argues that the 
expansion of consumer health care choices does not meaningfully improve women’s 
healthxix but merely expands consumer options, while Robertson (2000) argues that risk 
mediation tends to be discussed in terms of individual solutions to illness (such as diet 
and exercise) to the exclusion of social causes, such as environmental pollution, thus 
emphasizing individuality and limiting the likelihood that social movements designed to 
challenge social causes of illness will be organized. Similarly, Dubrwiny (2013) points to 
the rhetoric of choice as a significant contributor to an emphasis on individualism within 
33 
 
 
women’s health discourses. I use Lippmann’s (1999), Robertson’s (2000), and 
Dubrwiny’s (2013) work and extend their critiques to argue that the neoliberal tendencies 
they identify are occasionally challenged in women’s popular health media through the 
media’s reflexivity.  
Other feminist scholarship on choice in health-decision making critically assesses 
the concept of informed consent in bioethics to argue that women’s decision-making in 
health should be considered more complexly with attention to how women’s choices are 
made contextually and imbricated in unequal power relations (Sherwin, et. al., 1998). I 
add to the feminist literature on choice, because like Dubriwny (2013), I include the 
media as influences on how women make choices about health and which decisions they 
see as viable.  
My work will also add to the literature on women’s health and risk. The current 
body of scholarship tends to focus on how the discourse of risk serves a disciplinary 
function, for example in how it regulates women’s health behaviors in prenatal care 
(Ruhl, 1999). Dubrwiny (2013) also analyzes risk discourses. In her example, she argues 
that the public and advertising discourse about the Gardasil vaccine used risk to suggest 
that girls were both vulnerable (because they needed to be protected from the risks of 
sex) at the same time they were empowered (by being able to reduce the risk of cervical 
cancer by receiving the vaccine). My dissertation adds to the literature because I use 
Foucault’s concepts of discipline and biopower to complement my theoretical 
perspective, which deeply engages the work of Beck rather than uses it as a starting point 
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for critique. My project also provides an in-depth study on how the media influence, and 
are shaped by, prevailing discourses on risk in the health context. Finally, my project 
offers a comprehensive look at how CAM is discursively constructed by women’s health 
media and medical journals, a project that has not been undertaken in critical/cultural 
health communication.  
Critical/Cultural Approaches to Health Communication 
Deborah Lupton’s (1994) germinal article on critical analyses of health communication 
explores the importance of discourse as an element structuring how health information is 
presented. “Discourse, in this usage, can be described as a pattern of words, figures of 
speech, concepts, values, and symbols that is organized around a particular object or issue 
and that can be located in wider historical, political, and social processes and practices” 
(Lupton, 1994, p. 61). Her article explores the importance of critical/cultural studies to 
the application of health, arguing that health is not a neutral term must therefore be 
examined for how it is being used and to what ends. For example, she points out the 
historical tendency in health communication research in studying compliance in health 
campaigns and argues that these studies tend to neglect the power differentials and 
cultural contexts between health officials and their target populations. Her article opened 
up the field of critical/cultural health communication by asking questions about the 
discursive construction of health, arguing that health is not a simple or straightforward 
concept, but is a cultural construction.  
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 Following her work, Dutta has been an important influence in the field. Dutta’s 
(2010) article, “The Critical Cultural Turn in Health Communication: Reflexivity, 
Solidarity, and Praxis,” addresses four assumptions made in traditional health 
communication scholarship that have subsequently been challenged by critical-cultural 
health communication scholarship: 1) assumptions of universality that rely primarily on 
Western understandings of science and healing (Dutta points out that the ways in which 
healing is understood is intricately connected with value systems that are often not 
acknowledged by public health officials seeking to meet health outcomes); 2) 
assumptions of effectiveness that ignore social and cultural barriers (such as poverty) to 
the achievement of health goals, the sustainability of public health interventions, and the 
political and economic structures that influence public health campaigns; 3) assumptions 
of innovation that fail to understand how “innovations” are understood in various cultures 
as well as fail to recognize the political and economic implications for how interventions 
are framed to varying target populations (Dutta explains that a goal for critical/cultural 
health communication scholars is to make sure that community members are active 
participants in assessing the value and need for health interventions within their 
communities); and 4) assumptions of criteria that question how grants for public health 
initiatives are selected (for example, why might a grant for reducing obesity in poor 
urban areas be selected over other projects?), what questions or goals are determined as 
criteria for these campaigns, and how are those questions or goals imbricated in unequal 
power relations. Dutta’s first two assumptions (of universality and effectiveness) underlie 
the point I make in chapter two about the universal
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medical journals’ and media’s erasure of social and structural influences on health. Now 
that I have surveyed why critical/cultural work in health communication is important, I 
briefly outline the critical/cultural scholarship that has addressed health discourse in the 
media and medical journals.  
Dubriwny’s (2013) book The Vulnerable Empowered Woman: Feminism, 
Postfeminism, and Women’s Health, provides an insightful look at how narratives about 
women’s health are constructed in the media. She argues that current narratives about 
women’s health emphasize postfeminism and neoliberalism to the near exclusion of 
discourses of collective empowerment and the critique of medicine that was a part of the 
women’s health movement. She claims that these narratives result in a “vulnerable 
empowered” (p. 8) woman, one who is constructed as autonomous through making health 
choices, such as exercising but who is also vulnerable to all manner of health problems. 
She highlights the dominance of risk as an organizing principle in health discourses 
targeted to women, though she takes a slightly different approach than I do. Dubrwiny 
does not engage with Beck’s risk society thesis; instead, she uses the work of Foucault to 
understand risk as a rationality: “I understand risk through a governmentality perspective 
that draws from the work of Michel Foucault in which risk becomes a practice, technique, 
or rationality through which governing is accomplished and authority is exercised” (p. 
27). There are two main reasons I do not use Foucault’s governmentality thesis to explain 
risk: first, Dubriwny, as well as other health scholarsxx have already done a quite 
thorough job of incorporating his work in the study of health and risk; second, I want to 
theorize agency (or reflexivity), so that I could think through how popular resistance is 
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working to temper the negative implications of risk discourses discussed by the scholars 
above. I am not arguing that Foucault’s theories have been exhausted in relation to risk 
and gender in the health context (I will be using some of his theories to explicate my 
points), but given that there are already very good examples of this work, using his work 
to complement Beck’s theory could help broaden the theoretical approaches to the topic, 
thus contributing to a richer understanding of how risk discourses function in women’s 
health. In addition, while I wholeheartedly agree with Dubriwny’s take on risk discourses 
being deployed to emphasize neoliberal, postfeminist principles, I also discuss risk in the 
context of how the media construct medical institutions and doctors as risky, thus 
contributing to reflexivity within contemporary medicine.  
Literature that takes a Critical Approach to Health in the Media and Medical Journals 
In their essay of interpretive frameworks of medical news in the British media, Entwistle 
and Sheldon (1999) provide a comprehensive look at how health and media scholars have 
identified major interpretive frameworks for news coverage of health stories since the 
1970s. They discuss the work of Karpf (1988) as providing, during the 1980s, an 
important framework for categorizing how health news was presented. Karpf provides 
four main categories of this coverage—including the medical approach—which idolizes 
the potential of modern medicine, the consumer approach, which posits a conflict 
between the power of the doctor and the interests of the patient; the look-after-yourself 
approach, which emphasizes individual decision-making in health; and the environmental 
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approach, which highlights the environmental and social causes of illness. My analysis 
shows that Karpf’s frameworks still hold true, especially the latter three.  
Next, Entwistle and Sheldon survey the work of Bury and Gabe (1994), whose 
scholarship is important for my study because it provides an example of how the mass 
media actively participate in the critique of conventional medicine. For example, Bury 
and Gabe analyzed news stories that critiqued pharmaceutical companies for producing 
Lorazepam (a potentially addictive drug used for treating anxiety) and blamed physicians 
for overprescribing the medication while not providing assistance to patients who were 
trying to stop taking it. Bury and Gabe’s work illustrates that the mass media have 
participated in such questioning of the medical establishment since at least the 1990s; this 
will be important to my analysis because I revisit in chapter four how the media 
participate in questioning the allopathic medical community.  
Following their survey of Bury and Gabe’s work, Entwistle and Sheldon conclude 
that the power and prestige of doctors and medical institutions is now routinely called 
into question by the media and argue this has partially given rise to evidence-based 
medicine (a trend that I argue in the next chapter is not conducive to testing CAM 
therapies). This is an important point, given that I am analyzing how reflexivity in the 
media may lead to institutional changes within conventional medicine. In their example, 
they argue that critique of medicine by the media (reflexivity) has influenced health 
research (or the increasing importance of evidence-based medicine) in order to partially 
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assuage public critique of conventional care. This example also illustrates that the 
outcomes of reflexivity may not necessarily result in positive social change.  
In his edited collection, Media and Health, Clive Seale (2004) brings together the 
scholarship of sociologists of health and media studies in order to address the question of 
“how cultures construct personal experiences of illness and health” (Seale, 2004, p. ix). 
Among other topics, the book addresses how the media construct health by using certain 
frames, such as victim/villain scenarios. Seale’s book is important to my project because 
one of the frames he identifies is, “the dangers of modern life” (p. 9). Although he 
doesn’t use the term risk, his summation of this category is that it emphasizes the risks of 
everyday life, such as genetically modified (GM) foods, environmental pollution, and 
contraceptive pill scares, among others, thus illustrating how risk is one of the important 
constructs in how health is discussed in the news media.  
Seale also identifies the need for medical sociologists and media scholars to work 
together and provides some good examples of how the media help to construct people’s 
understanding of disease. One particularly interesting example in this edited collection is 
Kroll-Smith’s (2004) article on how excessive daytime sleepiness has been constituted as 
a disease by the media. Kroll-Smith argues the media help construct lay experiences of 
disease as real, even if they fall outside the bounds of what is considered real by 
institutional medicine. This is important to my analysis because many symptoms that are 
not considered “real” diseases or afflictions by the medical profession, such as 
fibromyalgia, affect women disproportionately, thus illustrating both a diagnostic bias 
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toward women patients and how the media may validate patients’ subjective experiences 
of illness (I discuss this extensively in chapter four).  
 In chapter four I also analyze how Dr. Oz constructs his brand. To fully 
understand how Oz is successful at constructing his persona as a caring, sympathetic, 
doctor it is important to consider how doctors have historically been portrayed on 
television. Thus, the work of Joseph Turow (1989) on the history of how doctors and the 
medical establishment have been portrayed on television is valuable because it provides 
insight into cultural mythologies about doctors. Turow analyzed shows such as M*A*S*H 
and ER, and argued that among other elements, television shows tended to portray 
doctors as heroic while ignoring institutional inequities by making health care seem as if 
it is free and accessible to all. 
 Finally, Lester Friedman’s (2004) edited collection on medicine and the media 
brings together the work of critical/cultural scholars of health communication and the 
media, providing a broad survey of different media forms such as print media, ads, film, 
and television with a look at how the media help construct meaning about medicine, a 
question that I also interrogate throughout this dissertation.   
In my survey of the literature, I located just one article that analyzed medical 
journals from a discursive perspective. In his analysis of how often the term “risk” was 
used in medical journals, Skolbekken (1995) argues that though the life expectancy rate is 
higher in Europe and North America than ever in history, the focus on the risks of 
everyday life to our health has increased exponentially (1995, p. 291). Skolbekken’s 
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work addresses how the term risk has appeared increasingly in medical journals and how 
it has become taken-for-granted in healthcare. Based on searches in the Medline database 
between 1967 and 1991, Skolbekken looked at U.S. (JAMA, NEJM), British, and 
Norwegian medical journals to analyze how often the term was used. The term was so 
pervasive that Skolbekken termed it a “risk epidemic,” highlighting how it serves an 
ideological function in the medical journals: 
The most vital contribution to the “risk epidemic”, then, has come from the 
development of scientific thinking itself. Within this thinking there has been a 
movement from a paradigm of monocausal determination towards a paradigm of 
multiple causes and effects, accepting uncertainty as a vital factor (1999, p. 298).  
Skolbekken argues that risk calculations may be used by physicians to help people feel as 
if they have some measure of control over health and illness and to confirm optimism 
about what can be achieved through science. Among the other implications of the 
discursive use of “risk” in medical journals are that it expands the healthcare industry 
(because risk factors for diseases become diseases in themselves and thus worthy of 
treatment) and it moves medicine more firmly into the realm of science. Among the other 
criticisms of what he terms “the risk epidemic” in medicine, Skolbekken mentions the 
possibility that humans are not linear systems and that chaos theory might better be 
applied to understanding human health. “If we are to believe the epidemiological risk 
constructions, there seem to be few, if any, things in life that are purely healthy or 
unhealthy” (p. 302). Finally, Skolbekken highlights the profoundly Western nature of the 
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risk epidemic: “It [the risk epidemic] is reflecting the socially constructed reality of a 
particular culture at a particular time in history. In a global and historical context it may 
be seen as a luxury problem of the richest part of the world” (p. 302).  Although I agree 
with Skolbekken’s assessment that risk discourse works to expand the market for 
technological medicine, I believe that the interest in CAM represents a small pushback to 
that expansion. However, the discursive use of risk does expand the market for other 
health related services, such as CAM therapies. In the next section, I illustrate how the 
term “risk” is not gender neutral, but is used in health discourses to perpetuate gender 
inequity in healthcare.  
Risk, Health and Gender  
Like Chan and Rigakos (2002) I argue that risk is not gender neutral, but instead is 
inherently gendered. “A recognition of risk as gendered relies on acknowledging that 
there can be no essential notion of risk; that risk is variable; risk itself is of more than one 
type. Our argument is that gender is one important constitutive determinant of how risk is 
negotiated and understood” (p. 756). I argue that many health risks are also gendered. For 
example, some health topics that rely heavily on risk discourses, such as prenatal health, 
are experienced only by women, whereas those concerning prostate cancer and the PSA 
test are experienced only by men.  
In her analysis of how pregnant women are regulated by risk and responsibility 
discourses Ruhl (1999) notes, “Responsibility is equated with the capacity to behave 
rationally; the term presupposes a calculation of expected benefits and risks, and a 
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decision to follow the path with the greatest possibility of benefit with the least risk. In 
this sense, responsibility talk within liberal regimes is also morality talk; behaving 
responsibly is a moral act” (p. 96). Therefore, when women are unable or unwilling to 
participate according to the recommended behaviors during pregnancy, they may be 
subject to self or social critique. As Ruhl (1999) notes, “This conception of health is an 
extreme departure from more conventional views in which good health is something one 
is born with; positing health as something that an appropriately motivated individual 
could achieve, if only they worked hard enough, raises the inevitable question of whose 
fault it is when illness occurs” (p. 111).  
In Ruhl’s example, while pregnancy is experienced only by women and is thus 
gendered in that sense, there is a broader way in which women’s individual responsibility 
for pregnancy has important gendered components. For example, as she points out, 
oftentimes women are not (even if they wanted to) able to follow the advice in pregnancy 
manuals. She argues that women are expected by doctors and the medical establishment 
to be individually responsible for their behavior, while outside factors such as domestic 
violence and poverty, which affect women more than men, are not taken into account. 
Although men also experience health advice that emphasizes individualism, as Ruhl 
points out, the very strict behavioral regulations that pregnancy advice manuals 
recommend for women before, during, and after pregnancy—including quitting caffeine 
and alcohol to name just a few—may encompass several years of a woman’s life. This 
sort of extensive self-surveillance is not experienced to the same extent in health 
recommendations given to otherwise healthy men.  
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Robertson (2000) makes a similar assertion about how health risks are constructed 
by the medical community as the responsibility of individual women based on her focus-
group interviews that asked about breast cancer risk. In her interviews she found that 
women identified individual behaviors, such as eating healthfully, not smoking, and 
limiting alcohol as key components in managing their risk of getting the disease. 
Although the women interviewed acknowledged the possible environmental causes of 
disease such as food additives and contaminated water, Robertson points out that the 
women did not consider collective action to try to change policies as a strategy to lessen 
risk, partially because of the public health discourse that emphasizes individual behavior 
as a means to mediate risk. She further argues that risk discourses may serve to make 
women feel as if they can never be normal or healthy (Linnell, et. al., 2002 and Clarke, 
et. al., 2010, make a similar assertion). “To the extent that risk represents a warning to the 
individual of potential future illness, this may become a lived or experienced state of ill 
health” (Robertson, 2000, p. 222).  
As most of the aforementioned feminist scholars argue, risk is gendered in these 
contexts because the women’s health movement (which  fought for women’s 
participation in their own health) has been deployed in medical discourse in a neoliberal 
individualistic context that has, instead of leading to empowerment, contributed to 
women’s self-surveillance (Ruhl, 1999). While men’s health discourse is also 
individualistic, because of the history of women’s struggle for rights within the medical 
context and the subsequent ways in which individual responsibility for health has been 
sold to women as an example of health empowerment is particularly problematic.  
45 
 
 
Beck-Gernsheim (2000) similarly argues that responsibility plays a prominent 
role in the medical discourse about managing health risks (Dubriwny, 2013 makes a 
similar assertion). Discussing prenatal and genetic testing, she highlights the ways that 
taking responsibility can easily slide into blaming patients for not doing the “right thing,” 
such as deciding not to give up a child with a disability. In addition, her observation that 
patients have obligations not just to society, but to other family members, children, and 
oneself, means that making decisions may affect multiple people in different ways: “The 
more levels of responsibility, the more sources for reproach, for social and moral 
pressure, the more potential for blame. This prepares the way for taking the tests. For 
instance, take those women who are labeled as ‘risk group’ [in pregnancy] because of 
their age” (p. 132). Along with highlighting the ideology of individualism in achieving or 
maintaining health, these articles also reveal the socially constructed nature of risk, and 
foreground gender as an important component in the construction of risk discourses.  
In their discussion of the socially constructed nature of risks, Nelkin (1989), and 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), argue that evaluating risk is a social process. For 
example, there are clearly health risks, but even when those risks are aggregated into 
numbers or percentages they may still be contested among experts: 
Scientific judgments about risk are often constrained by inadequate evidence, 
relatively primitive diagnostic techniques, and limited understanding of the 
mechanisms by which hazards may affect human health. The cumulative and 
synergistic effects of multiple exposures to combinations of substances are poorly 
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documented. Moreover, drugs and chemicals may affect different people in 
different ways (Nelkin, 1989, p. 98).  
Thus, while risks do exist, as Nelkin points out, science is often poorly equipped to make 
estimations that have a high degree of certainty about how different risks affect any given 
person. Because risks are ideological, both in how they are gendered in health contexts 
and in their emphasis on personal responsibility, it is important to analyze how medical 
institutions as well as media construct risks in order to see what ideologies are in play. 
Now that I have established the way risk is used in health discourses often relies on 
individual solutions for maintaining and improving health, I discuss the literature that 
illustrates how this trend affects women’s health more broadly.  
The Expansion of Risk Discourses: Implications for Women’s Health 
In their discussion of the shift from medicalization originally theorized by Irving Zola in 
1972 (i.e., aspects of life that do not fall under the category health become subsumed as 
health problems or issues) to biomedicalization— “the increasingly complex, multisited, 
multidirectional processes of medicalization that today are being both extended and 
reconstituted through the emergent social forms and practices of a highly and 
increasingly technoscientific biomedicine”—Clarke, Shim, Mamo, Fosket and Fishman 
(2010, p. 47), argue that the biomedicalization of health risks (or the use of technology 
and science to study, measure and aggregate health risks) leads to increasing surveillance 
of the public by health officials. They argue that this expansion of surveillance also 
allows for the more precise calculation of risks, thus creating a cycle of risk construction 
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that necessitates surveillance in order to mediate risks. As a result of this cycle, they point 
out that it becomes almost impossible not to be at risk for something, and instead of 
categorizing populations as risky or non-risky, both individuals and populations are 
treated by public health officials based on degrees of risk (Armstrong, 1995 makes a 
similar assertion).  
 Such surveillance, Shim (2010) argues, also leads to targeting certain “high risk” 
groups as epidemiologically worthy of surveillance (Rose, 2001 makes a similar 
assertion). For example, some illnesses, such as heart disease, affect racial minorities 
more than whites, thus legitimating increased surveillance of these groups. In her 
interviews of those with heart disease, Shim (2010) found that racial minorities often 
attributed their increased risk of the disease to social causes (such as their lack of access 
to employment, housing, and discrimination), while epidemiologists tended to conflate 
race with cultural difference, thus obscuring structural causes.  
Some social epidemiologists, however, critique the traditional epidemiological 
model and believe that social and structural issues factor into disease. For example, 
among Inhorn and Whittle’s (2001) critiques of conventional epidemiologists are those 
who: 1) blame individuals for health by constructing risk as a lifestyle choice; 2) limit 
understanding of prevention and disease by ignoring meaning as important to human 
behavior; 3) do not question social hierarchies; and 4) ignore how a nation’s policies 
affect the health of a nation (p. 554). In order to remedy these shortcomings, Inhorn and 
Whittle (2001) advance a feminist epistemology that they argue have the potential to 
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change the assumptions of the field. They suggest that this method includes interrogating 
the following factors of conventional epidemiology: 1) problem definition and knowledge 
production in women’s health; 2) biological essentialization of women as reproducers; 
and 3) decontextualizaiton and depoliticization of women’s health risks (p. 557)xxi. They 
argue that the methods of epidemiology must also be questioned as part of a feminist 
analysis:  
Today, part of the reason why women’s voices continue to be excluded from 
problem definition and knowledge production has less to do with consolidation of 
professional power and authority in biomedicine than with disciplinary 
boundaries and methodological approaches that are exclusionary and continue to 
divide the intellectual landscape in women’s health research (p. 558).  
Inhorn and Whittle’s work is important to my project because I also interrogate how the 
dominance of scientific methodologies is used by doctors in medical journals to reinforce 
traditional models of medicine to the exclusion of alternative methodologies and models, 
thus limiting the scope of what sort of medical research is conducted and what treatments 
are considered viable within conventional care.  
In her discussion of how risk can help set the agenda for treatment options and 
research (Fosket, 2010), uses the example of chemoprevention in women at risk for 
breast cancer and argues that once everyone is constructed as “at risk,” risk becomes an 
informing principle of health research. “Once the idea that everyone is potentially ill 
becomes part of common discourse, the next step is to determine what the signs or 
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symptoms of that potential illness might be—risk factors. The tasks of specifying risk 
factors that might lead to future illnesses then become part of health research” (Fosket, 
2010, p. 332). She argues that preventive measures encouraged by health professionals 
such as eating healthful foods, exercising, and avoiding excessive alcohol as a means to 
reduce breast cancer risk are unproven, but seen to be an unquestioned good, because 
they are healthy in general (Fosket, 2010). Yet, this advice may be problematic given that 
if women fail to follow a “healthy” lifestyle, they may feel blame or social censure if they 
do become ill. An emphasis on prevention and a healthy lifestyle is also central to the 
discourses surrounding CAM in the women’s popular media that I analyzed. My analysis 
shows that The Dr. Oz Show, WH and Prevention conflate diet and exercise with disease 
prevention, making beauty and fitness desirable side effects of enhanced health; this 
process thus masks the underlying social imperative that women conform to dominant 
beauty standards at the same time it imposes a tyranny of guidelines women feel obliged 
to follow in order to stay healthy. In this sense, then, suggestions about preventive health 
may serve a somewhat disciplinary function (Rose, 2007).  
The above section has illustrated how risk proliferates in health discourse, 
becomes an informing principle in medical research, and has expanded risk groups to 
include everyone. At the same time, the expansion of risk also legitimates the close 
monitoring of those deemed to be high risk—often women and racial minorities. Finally, 
the solution to risk mediation often forwarded by public health officials has been a focus 
on individual behaviors rather than social factors, thus obscuring social and structural 
causes of illness and perpetuating a neoliberal ethos. In the next section, I interrogate the 
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concepts of responsibility and choice as they are articulated to women’s health decision-
making and argue they are not simple and straightforward concepts in the context of the 
risk society.  
Choice in Women’s Health 
“Choice” as it has been conceptualized in women’s health has been a central tenet of the 
women’s health movement as well as an important guiding principle of Western 
biomedical ethics. Both Lippmann (1999) and Giddens (1999) argue that choice is 
intimately tied to risk. For example, as Giddens (1999) argues, discourses that rely on 
risk are not just about avoiding hazards but are also about the expansion of choice. In the 
medical context this can be understood as an expansion of medical treatments, therapies, 
and technologies all of which expand medical options, but do not necessarily lead to 
patient empowerment (Lippmann, 1999). Dubriwny (2013) has argued that the rhetoric of 
choice in women’s health has been used to enhance neoliberalism rather than assist 
communal activism: 
Broadly speaking, then, women’s health is currently being discussed, researched, 
and publicized in a cultural context in which all individuals are increasingly held 
responsible for their own health and well-being; consumption has replaced 
political action; negotiating risks means taking responsibility for those very risks; 
and equality is applauded but economic policies continue to reify (and indeed 
enlarge) disparities in the economic, political, and health conditions of diverse 
groups. (p. 23-24)   
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This passage illustrates how the rhetoric of choice in women’s health can contribute to 
the continuation of health disparities between women at the same time it emphasizes 
individual responsibility—a point that I argue is clearly present in women’s popular 
health media constructions of managing health risks.  
In addition, making choices about any given treatment is not generally made 
using a “rationalist” framework based on probability, but is heavily impacted by social 
factors and mediated by messages about disease, risk, and probability based on 
information gleaned from doctors, family members and the media. In this section, I touch 
on two main difficulties with the concept of choice as empowering: first, I illustrate how 
autonomy is an illusion in decision-making about healthcare because even when one is in 
a position of relative social power, the information about health risks are contested and 
changing; and second, the same health care choices are not equally accessible to all 
women, thus exacerbating health disparities in women from different social classes.   
Autonomy as Illusion  
True autonomy in decision-making is never fully possible, given the multiple social and 
structural factors that influence how individuals make decisions: “This model [freely 
choosing, autonomous] of choice eschews psychological complexity by refusing to 
address how power works in and through subjects, not in terms of crude manipulation, 
but by structuring our sense of self, by constructing particular kinds of subjectivity” (Gill, 
2007, p. 76). What Gill points to in this quote is that power shapes and influences 
personal decision-making in subtle ways. It is not necessarily obvious to the person in 
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question, but may instead influence what someone feels are the available options, 
foreclosing some, while advancing others. For example, in a health decision-making 
context, someone who has never had health insurance might choose very different 
treatment options for the same condition than an individual who is insured. In addition, 
just as with anyone else, women are not isolated from the influences of close others. This 
complicates the understanding of choice as a purely autonomous act:  
There is a tendency in much biomedical literature to locate (all) 
influences/constraints on choice internally and to assess an individual’s 
knowledge, competence, emotional state, understanding, and so on, as potential, 
and self-changeable impediments to her ability to choose. But overwhelming any 
such influences, and generally ignored are powerful external influences and 
constraints on women’s choices, with service availability, relationships with and 
responsibilities to others prominent among these. (Lippmann, 1999, p. 283)  
Lippman’s insight is important because it highlights the interconnectedness of women 
and the varied relationships they have with others in their lives that powerfully factor into 
individual choices. Therefore, the model of individuality assumed by a rational subject in 
the biomedical context is fundamentally altered when people are considered relationally 
(Sherwin & McLeod, 2000). Not only does the assumption of a freely choosing, rational 
individual fail to recognize the social relationships of women, it glosses over differences 
in access to similar choices by different women (Lippmann, 1999).  
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Differential Access to Choice  
In the context of healthcare, rational choices about decision-making have usually been 
reduced to informed consent (Dodds, 2000, and Sherwin, 1998). Yet agency to make 
choices is never equally distributed among all women, and the ideal of “choice” can 
function to perpetuate oppression: “seeing choice as gender (class, race or otherwise) 
neutral hides the operations of power that construct choices, reaffirms existing privileges 
in society, and in general, glosses over the many differences between women that matter” 
(Lippmann, 1999, p. 281, Dubrwiny, 2013 makes a similar assertion). For example, a 
recent immigrant to the U.S. who speaks no English and has an elementary school 
education will not be able to make the same sort of informed decision about health as an 
educated and financially secure middle-class woman.  
Even if women did have the same opportunities to make decisions about health, as 
Dodds (2000) points out, many other factors may come into play in the decision-making 
process: “For many people, health-care decisions are made in a state of confusion, and 
the chooser is influenced by a number of internal and external pressures, including pain, 
discomfort, worry, and concern for others” (Dodds, 2000, p. 217). Furthermore, choice 
may function to place the burden of responsibility on the person making decisions. 
Therefore, if a woman makes the wrong choice, it may induce guilt:  
Choice is surely, within lifestyle culture, a modality of constraint. The individual 
is compelled to be the kind of subject who can make the right choices. By these 
means new lines and demarcations are drawn between those subjects who are 
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judged responsive to the regime of personal responsibility, and those who fail 
miserably. (McRobbie, 1999, p. 19)  
In McRobbie’s example, even those women who are better able to make educated 
decisions could make the “wrong choice,” thus leading to feelings of failure. This is an 
important point because as I will argue in the coming chapters, when competing 
knowledge claims about the same health risks circulate in the media and medical 
journals, making choices about health is difficult.   
However choice is complicated; as Lippmann (1999) points out, we cannot do 
away with the concept of choice, especially in regard to women’s health decisions. Yet 
the way in which it is deployed in the current healthcare context is not liberating: “Choice 
remains a fundamental necessity: it is both a basic civil right and a fundamental social 
right for all women. It does not reduce to having a menu of biomedical options for 
treating or preventing disease or for detecting susceptibilities, nor to a list of actions 
individuals could take to avoid so-far hidden diseases” (p. 287). Therefore, according to 
Lippmann’s assertion, the emphasis on preventive health and the activities women may 
participate in to possibly prevent illness (including CAM practices and conventional 
screening techniques) is not inherently good for women’s health: it simply demands that 
women participate in one more seemingly necessary activity.  
Taking into account the assertions made by Dubriwny (2013), Gill (2007), 
McRobbie (2005) and Lippmann (1999), I agree that class and culture are erased in 
health discourse as important factors in the ability to make choices in healthcare and that 
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decision-making in that context is never truly autonomous. Further, I argue that even 
when one does have relatively substantial resources at their disposal, the conflicting 
information on health risks in reflexive modernity makes decision making difficult. 
However, reflexivity provides one escape from this paradox. In the following section, I 
elaborate my theoretical commitment to reflexivity and discuss how it may provide a 
release from the oppressive aspects of risk and choice as they are discussed within the 
context of a neoliberal society.  
Theoretical Commitment: Reflexivity  
As should be clear by now, reflexivity is a word with multiple meanings among the 
scholars I have cited; it is used conceptually as both framework and tool. I use reflexivity 
purposely because it has been used by scholars to discuss late modernity (Beck 1992, 
Dutta & de Souza, 2008)—as opposed to postmodernityxxii—and it provides a theory that 
makes agency and ethics central, something that in my experience has not been 
sufficiently elaborated by postmodern theorists.  
However, as a scholar who has been influenced by Foucault, I briefly sketch how 
Foucault’s ideas can contribute to my project: in particular I will be using his concepts of 
discipline (specifically achieved through the self-examination) and biopower. I realize 
that some of the phenomena I analyze in my dissertation may be described using 
Foucauldian language and theoretical concepts. When this is appropriate, I use his theory 
to help explicate my point, and illustrate where his work makes a contribution to my own. 
However, I maintain that it is important to use the concepts he provides to go beyond 
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destabilization and critique, in order to propose how women’s health may be improved. 
Indeed, Sawicki (1991) and many other feminist scholars—have pointed out that 
Foucault himself was ambivalent about identifying his contribution to critical theory. She 
suggests, like many other feminist scholars, that his work is best used as a theoretical tool 
for critique rather than as a wholesale vision.  
For example, as Bartky (1988) argues, Foucault’s ability to identify how docile 
bodies are produced by institutions is an important theoretical contribution, but because 
he fails to differentiate the stark contrast in how female and male bodies have been 
subject to docility, it is important to examine the difference in how docility produces a 
specific form of feminine disciplinarity that is rooted in restriction and self-denial. For 
example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault aptly notes about exercise, “Exercise, 
having become an element in the political technology of the body and of duration, does 
not culminate in a beyond, but tends towards a subjection that has never reached its limit” 
(1977, p. 162). Yet, as Bartky points out, exercise as a technology shapes female bodies 
to a difficult-to-attain level of slimness (a figure that she argues defies a majority of adult 
women’s bodies), which is different from how it is used to produce male bodies (to 
produce bulk and strength). Bartky concedes that muscularity in women has also become 
fashionable, but observes the social norm maintaining that women remain smaller and 
less powerful than their male counterparts remains largely intact. Both Foucault’s and 
Bartky’s observations on the way that power works through a discourse that emphasizes 
discipline in diet and exercise practices will be important in my discussion of the 
connection between beauty and health that I analyze in chapter three.  
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Foucault’s theory also has a contribution to make in this project in his theorization 
of power as not just repressive, but productive. Power produces bodies—in my study, 
women’s bodies—through social and medical standards that establish a norm for a 
healthy female body, which leads to self-surveillance and ultimately, helps to produce 
certain behaviors such as exercise and diet habits that assist women in conforming to this 
norm. However, I also understand power as productive in the sense that the production of 
a normalized, fit, youthful body may, in some cases, be experienced by women as 
positive; for example, in the social rewards and the feelings of personal accomplishment 
or physical well-being these women may experience that cannot be simply written off as 
repressive (Heyes, 2007 discusses this in the context of Weight Watchers and Rose 2007, 
discusses this in the context of genetic counseling).  
These disciplinary practices contribute to Foucault’s concept of biopower because 
the individual decisions people make about their health then have consequences for 
public health and contribute to  state initiatives that have an interest in maintaining and 
promoting the health of the population (such as programs designed to curb obesity). 
Initiatives such as these are targeted to the public through health campaigns (Gastaldo, 
1997). This combination of individual self-monitoring and state interest in the welfare of 
populations is termed “biopower” by Foucault (see Foucault 1976, Nadesan, 2008). 
Biopower is a useful means to theorize how individuals and the state conceive health and 
healthcare management and is also important for analyzing state initiatives designed to 
promote the health of the population. 
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Foucault’s discussion of biopower is also important to my analysis because a 
biopolitical imperative is clearly a part of the discourse on the obesity epidemic. Public 
health initiatives that have specifically targeted the impact of obesity on the U.S. 
population are closely connected with arguments about the fitness of the nation, which 
makes the topic of weight an issue of medical importance deserving of attention in 
popular health media. Thus, in my dissertation, biopolitical imperatives contribute to the 
construction of normality that legitimates the surveillance of appearance and weight 
through the self-examination.  
Although Foucault scholars have much to offer the field of critical-cultural health 
communication, especially in terms of thinking about power in terms of the micro-
practices of individuals pursuing health maintenance or when considering the state 
rationalities of public health initiatives in terms of biopower, I believe that Dutta and de 
Souza’s (2008) astute observation that health campaigns still operate within a logic of 
modernity that reflects very clear differentials in power—especially in regard to health 
campaigns created by governments and directed towards minority cultures (i.e. a top 
down construction of power rather than a dispersed form of power)—is the most useful 
for my rhetorical goal: to point out not only how risk discourses are either restrictive or 
taken up in ways that are pleasurable, but in how improvement in women’s health can be 
accomplished working within the existing social structure. As I mentioned earlier, 
Foucault, too, was a critic who used his writings to destabilize social power relations, but 
his failure to move beyond critique to praxis, makes a wholesale adoption of his 
framework insufficient for the goals of my project.   
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Like Beck (1992), Dutta and de Souza (2008) rely on a thesis of reflexive 
modernity, which they argue is a useful framework for theorizing critical/cultural health 
communication, “the critical self-confrontation inherent in a modernist enterprise, 
[which] captures the dialectical tensions between the modern and postmodern elements of 
contemporary theorizing” (p. 328). In asserting the importance of reflexivity as a guiding 
framework for critical/cultural studies in health communication they argue that, the 
“concept of reflexivity allows a discursive space for conceptualizing tensions between the 
dominant and critical-cultural strands of development communication, and 
simultaneously explores spaces of collaboration between these tensions in campaign 
research” (p. 328).  Although Dutta and de Souza focus on health campaigns, their 
commitment to using the concept of reflexive modernity as a means to foreground the 
dialectical relationship between critical/cultural and dominant approaches to campaign 
development is useful for analyzing health communication in general, especially in 
relation to conventional and alternative approaches to health and healing, which have 
been historically divided by a clear power differential.  
Using reflexivity to analyze health campaigns may also help uncover how 
modernity (in terms of top-down power relationships) still applies to how subaltern 
groups experience health education programs. “In recent years, critical-cultural scholars 
have engaged with this notion of reflexive modernity in response to the need for critique 
in the face of postmodern loss of metanarratives to ground these critiques” (p. 329). What 
Dutta and de Souza illuminate here is that although postmodern theorizing allows for 
conceptualizing power in ways that are more complex than the top-down configuration, 
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the fact remains that many people in the world still experience inequalities in health in a 
way that reflects a top-down power dynamic. For example, according to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), blacks and Hispanics have significantly higher 
obesity rates than whites in the U.S., and are therefore targeted for surveillance in ways 
that whites are not (CDC, 2010). Similarly, because knowledge constitutes reality in the 
risk society, it remains a given that people will have different access to health care 
options and choices in relation to their knowledge about health. This clear power 
differential, which often falls along educational and class lines, illustrates the urgency of 
retaining reflexive modernity as a guiding framework for theorizing health discourses.  
Maintaining self-reflexivity in this project is also key to my political 
commitments. I acknowledge that I am writing from a position of relative power within 
an academic community; therefore, it is imperative that my own assertions be open to 
critical scrutiny. In this spirit, I will try to continue to trouble the assumptions made in the 
discourses I analyze. However, I also hope to offer a vision of resistance, as the goal for 
critical scholarship in health communication is the improvement of health, not just 
criticism for its own sake (Dubriwny, 2013, Dutta & de Souza, 2008).  
 
Methodology  
The methodology for this dissertation is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Because I 
am dealing with texts, both in medical journals and the media, this method helps me to 
uncover how power and ideology function in the social construction of risk. Discourse 
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analysis is an important method for studying how health messages are communicated 
because it uncovers ideologies, a factor not often taken into account as an influence in 
people’s health behaviors by public health officials (Lupton, 1992). However, as I have 
established throughout this chapter, the social construction of health risks by the media 
affect how people view, and act on, health. Therefore, illuminating the ideologies in these 
discourses is important to women’s health.  
The purpose of CDA is to interrogate how language connects with other elements 
of social life and functions in power relations, specifically how it figures in unequal 
power relations (Fairclough, 2001, p. 25). Similarly, my project analyzes how power 
functions in the discourses of the texts that I analyze. Fairclough (2001) also defines 
discourse as not just language, but as an element of social relations that is dialectically 
connected to other social spheres (p. 26). My project also sees language as a significant 
factor in shaping accepted methodologies within allopathic medicine and what is 
constructed as important for, and indicative of, women’s health by media producers. In 
addition, Fairclough (2001) points out that CDA does not begin with texts; rather, it 
begins with social issues (he argues that CDA should be used to analyze how those issues 
are constructed within language). Similarly, I explore how CAM’s entrée into 
conventional medicine is a contemporary health issue and then analyze how ideology 
functions in the discursive construction of CAM within the texts I analyze.  
Finally, Fairclough’s (2001) method aligns with my commitment to reflexivity 
because he asserts that the purpose of CDA is not just to be critical of how language 
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functions in social life, but to try to envision a more positive type of semiosis used as one 
tool in social struggle (p. 26). In addition, as a critical health communication scholar, it is 
important to not only criticize how health is discursively constructed or which type of 
healing system is dominant, but to interrogate how constructions of health and socially 
sanctioned forms of healing function to oppress women in order to illustrate that there is 
the potential to discursively construct health in different ways.  
Statement of Purpose 
My dissertation deals with two sites. First, I analyze U.S. medical journal opinion pieces 
to interrogate how experts construct knowledge about CAM for other professionals. 
Second, I analyze women’s popular health media in order to interrogate how they 
discursively construct CAM. I analyze both sites with an eye to how risk and reflexivity 
function discursively through these sites.   
Guiding Questions 
In this project, I consider the following guiding questions: 1) How is CAM discursively 
constructed in both medical journals and women’s popular media using risk discourses as 
a justification to use (or not use) CAM?  2) How is CAM articulated to the politics of 
science both in the medical literature and in popular women’s health media, and how is 
CAM articulated to the politics of science by both professional stakeholders in the 
medical journals as well as in the popular press? 3) Does the framework of risk and the 
necessity of choice presented in women’s popular health media mask patriarchal values 
underlying CAM’s constitution in women’s popular media? 5) How can conventional 
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ways of understanding medical knowledge (such as the randomized controlled trial) and 
the individualization bias be challenged in reflexive modernity? During the course of my 
analysis I found that the concept of risk, which plays a large role in popular women’s 
health media discourses on health and CAM, necessitates “choice”—a  politically 
charged concept that positions women differentially according to their level of 
knowledge. When risk and choice are used as key constructs in the discursive 
construction of health by women’s popular health media and the medical community, 
making meaningfully contextual choices about health is difficult, even for educated 
women, due to the multiplicity of competing knowledge claims. Yet, reflexive modernity 
also allows for the formation of new ways of envisioning and describing health and this is 
reflected in the way popular women’s health media cover the placebo effect and gender 
discrimination in the healthcare encounter.  
Chapter Outlines  
In chapter two I argue that CAM, although seen as a threat to conventional expertise in 
some of the editorials in medical journals, is also gaining more popularity within 
conventional medicine, and is thus becoming increasingly mainstream. However, even 
within the medical community that supports CAM, the potential health risks to 
uneducated patients who use CAM inappropriately is policed in such a way that it allows 
little leeway for significantly challenging modernist assumptions and methodologies that 
inform medical research. Because I am interested in what the application of CAM means 
for this moment in women’s health, I also interrogate the politics of science that have 
64 
 
 
been used to discursively construct the debate about CAM in the medical journals I 
analyze. I found that CAM is constituted in the medical journals and women’s popular 
health media as politically significant as well as politically divisive. I found that CAM is 
becoming a driving force in conventional medicine and that women, because they are the 
primary consumers of CAM, are being targeted by the media and the journals as a group 
in need of guidance on how to make the right choices on CAM in order to minimize the 
risk they will choose sham therapies by differentiating which work and which do not. 
However, the basis on which this determination is made often relies on scientific 
methodologies, which reinforce objectivity and which, according to critics of applying 
these standards universally, are not amenable to testing CAM therapies. 
Chapter three details how CAM is articulated to patriarchal beauty standards in 
women’s popular health media, for example by emphasizing beauty and slimness as key 
indicators of health. I argue that women’s voiced anxieties over vanity in these media are 
mediated by risk discourses that emphasize longevity and health—rather than 
appearance—as an end goal, thus obscuring the emphasis placed on beauty and slimness 
as an important indicator of health in these media. When these media use risk discourses 
in this way, it leads to a focus on individual behaviors as a means to lessen the risk of 
health problems and thus downplays the social and structural causes of disease.  
In chapter four, I argue that women’s popular health media provide a forum for 
the reflexive exploration of the limits of medicine and science in ways that are arguably 
resistant to the dominance of scientific methodologies in medicine articulated above. I 
65 
 
 
show that there is at least one example in which these media challenge the 
methodological assumptions made by conventional medicine, thereby challenging how 
the medical journals circumscribe CAM. Along this trajectory, I argue that women’s 
popular health media are actively involved in the critique of modern medicine, 
particularly medical doctors. I show that Dr. Oz validates this critique by positioning 
himself in opposition to other doctors and aligning himself both with women audiences 
and with CAM. Given his vast influence in the popular media, this association with 
women and CAM also works to construct and expand his personal brand. I argue that Oz 
teaches his audience to be reflexive by alerting them to fraudulent products, such as 
tainted supplements, and letting them in on doctor secrets, such as their apparent belief 
that women are crazy. Finally, I provide an example of how Oz’s revelation that gender 
oppression is a problem in medical care is productive for women’s health. I end the 
chapter with a look at what women’s popular health media might contribute to a feminist 
health project that engages reflexively with health discourse. At its best, women’s 
popular health media opens up a space for discussion on the limits of scientific medicine 
and provides institutional critiques that address the discrimination of women in 
healthcare, thereby allowing the subjective experiences of women a place of privilege.  
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Chapter Two: The History of CAM and its Discursive Construction in the Medical 
Community  
 
In effect, the role of an expert in a ‘risk society’ is to claim knowledge, expertise and an 
ability to control that which seems out of control (Gard and Wright, 2001, p. 538).  
By managing uncertainty, the expert becomes central to the construction of a sense of 
control over the risks we live with (Gard and Wright, 2001, p. 538).  
 
Increasingly, health consumers are turning to CAM as a replacement for, but more often 
as a supplement to, conventional care. According to the National Center for 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), Americans spend $22 billion each 
year on, “classes, self-help relaxation guides and herbal supplements” (Mohr, 2012, 
Paragraph 1). CAM has become prevalent in the United States, with frequent estimates 
citing around 40% of the adult population having used some form of CAM (Cohen, 
2012). The use of CAM has also increased substantially in conjunction with conventional 
care options over the last few yearsxxiii. In a study conducted by the American Hospital 
Association, 42% of 714 hospitals surveyed offered a CAM therapy in 2010, compared 
with 27% in 2005 (Fallis, 2012).  
CAM use is particularly prevalent among women; according to the NCCAM, 
(citing findings from a comprehensive survey conducted by the National Institutes of 
Health [NIH] on the use of CAM in the United States) 48.9% of women versus 37.8% of 
men have used some CAM therapy. The study also found that women tend to be more 
health conscious than men as well as serve as “domestic health care managers” in their 
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families more often than men, thus affecting the overall use of CAM (NCCAM, 2005). 
This is consistent with historical associations between women, the home, and the 
management of health for their families (Craddock, 2001). In addition, as Doel and 
Segrott (2003) note in their analysis of the construction of CAM in British lifestyle 
magazines, women are assumed by media producers (in their case major magazine 
editors) to be more interested in health than men. Health consumers who use CAM come 
from a variety of backgrounds, ages, races, and genders; however, women tend to use and 
pursue these therapies more often than men (NCCAM, 2008). Research has also shown 
that women spend about 70% more time on healthcare activities than do men (Krueger, 
2009). In addition, women seek preventive care earlier than men, thus making them the 
main consumers of healthcare in general, and CAM therapies in particular (Pear, 2012).  
In this chapter, I argue that the ongoing debate in the medical community about 
the efficacy of CAM—as evidenced in the journals I examine: The New England Journal 
of Medicine (NEJM), The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), Science, 
and Nature—relies heavily on the concept of risk (that is, risks to the public for using 
these therapies), and that this risk is discursively mediated by advancing the randomized 
controlled trial (RCT) as the only parameter by which to judge therapeutic value. By 
foregrounding the importance of the RCT, medical and scientific journals use risk 
discursively to reinforce their own institutional boundaries, as the RCT is the gold 
standard used to test therapeutic value in medical science. In addition, by ignoring the 
context in which CAM therapies are used, the journals also reinforce rationalist 
objectivist assumptions about the body as a biological organism isolated from mental, 
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social, and structural influences on health. The assumption that the RCT is the only 
methodology by which to judge efficacy therefore erases gender, race, and class as 
structural factors that create and sustain health inequities, despite a great deal of evidence 
that these factors play large and important roles in health. I also argue that because 
women use CAM more frequently than men, editorials in medical journals that discuss 
the users of CAM implicitly reference a female audience, thus situating women as 
subordinate to the medical profession and gendering both CAM issues and medicine. At 
the end of the chapter, I analyze how the incorporation of CAM into conventional 
medicinexxiv is seen as a politically significant issue in the medical community and the 
broader public. Using Beck’s (1992) theorization of reflexivity and Fairclough’s (1999) 
critical discourse analysis (CDA), I analyze how discourses in the medical journals I 
examine function ideologically in the maintenance of professional norms. Before I 
analyze the journals, in the following section I briefly outline the contemporary 
construction of CAM in the medical community.  
CAM in the Medical Community  
The efficacy and safety of CAM is contested in the medical community. Although most 
physicians encourage the use of techniques such as massage for relaxation or eating 
healthful foods and exercising as a means to maintain or improve health, many doctors 
argue that treatments such as acupuncture provide no superior pain relief over 
conventional medications, that supplementation can be useless or even harmful, and that 
CAM therapies are not able to withstand the rigors of a randomized controlled trial 
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(Sampson, 2005). While proponents of CAM (including some physicians who support it) 
argue that these therapies are not amenable to being tested using Western standards 
(Chan, 2008), debate continues about whether some CAM therapies are useless, 
dangerous, or should be studied for efficacy at allxxv.  
 However, there is a growing movement among many physicians to endorse CAM 
as a valid supplement to conventional medicine. For example, according to Fallis (2012), 
writing in the Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ), American health care 
workers personally use CAM more than the general population (83% compared to 63%). 
This approach is termed integrative medicinexxvi, which seems to be the term preferred by 
medical professionals when discussing CAM in a positive light because it indicates that 
alternative therapies are being used in addition to, rather than instead of, conventional 
medicine. The increasing influence of integrative medicine in conventional healthcare is 
exemplified by the growing number of centers for integrative medicine in medical 
schools across the country, including such prestigious institutions as the medical schools 
at Columbia University and the Mayo Clinic. According to medical historian James 
Whorton (2002), more than half of medical schools in the country now have courses in 
“unconventional medicine.” Johnston argues that CAM’s acceptance by conventional 
doctors may, for the first time in American history, mark an era of “medical pluralism” 
(p. 24). Johnston (2004) also suggests that the current interest in CAM allows for the 
greatest diversity in healthcare options since “the establishment of modern medical 
authority in the early 1900s” (Johnston, 2004, p. 1). Yet critics argue that the increasing 
integration of CAM into the hospital system is a reflection of the market driven model of 
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healthcare that characterizes American medicine, and that patient demand for CAM 
services should not outweigh evidence of efficacy (Fallis, 2012).  
CAM in American Medical Journals   
In order to illustrate the evolving debate about CAM in the medical community, I 
examine every single opinion piece that discusses CAM substantively from The New 
England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), Science, Nature, and JAMA between the years 
1983 and 2013, in order to provide a broad perspective on how CAM is viewed in the 
medical and scientific communities. I chose NEJM, Science, and Nature because they are 
the three highest impact biomedical journalsxxvii and sometimes feature the same authors, 
arguing with each other across these publications about whether CAM therapies should 
be incorporated into conventional medicine. Although varying sources rank high impact 
medical journals differently (Bloom, Sambunjak & Sondorp 2007), I chose to use Eugene 
Garfield’s list of the highest impact biomedical journals for two reasons: 1) his piece on 
high impact biomedical journals was published in JAMA (the other journal I am 
analyzing), and 2) the journals he selected include both medical journals and scientific 
journals, thus offering a broader view of how the wider scientific community views 
CAM. I also analyze editorials in The Journal of the American Medical Association 
(JAMA). I selected JAMA because according to their website, it is the most widely 
circulated medical journal in the world, thus offering a perspective from a journal 
accessible to many practicing physicians.  
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When I searched “complementary and alternative medicine”xxviii in NEJM, there 
were 163 items returned, with 30 labeled as opinion pieces (the rest were study results, 
letters to the editor or book reviews). Out of the 30 opinion pieces, only ninexxix dealt 
with CAM as the main topic, rather than just referencing it in passing. Nature had six 
opinion pieces on CAM, out of 146 articles that were labeled as opinion, not including 
letters to the editor or book reviews. Science had nine opinion pieces—out of 73—that 
dealt with CAM. Two of these were letters to the editor, which I included because they 
were responses to anti-CAM articles published in the journal. Finally, JAMA yielded the 
most results: out of 147 results total, there were 25 that dealt with CAM from an opinion 
perspectivexxx. Thus, the set of materials I analyze in this chapter consists of 50 articles. 
Those that I excerpt in this chapter are representative of the opinions expressed across the 
journals.  
The dates these articles were published are salient. The first article that deals with 
CAM in NEJM was in 1983, and then none appears until 1992, one year after the creation 
of the Office of Alternative Medicine (OAM). The dates in Nature also show the 
escalating importance of CAM over time: the first article I found was published in 1990, 
with the remaining six articles all published after that year. Science and JAMA did not 
start publishing opinion pieces on CAM until significantly later. The first piece published 
on CAM in both of those journals was in 1998, the same year the OAM was elevated into 
a National Institute of Health (NIH) branch—the National Center for Complementary and 
Alternative Medicine (NCCAM)—illustrating that the creation of the OAM and the 
NCCAM were crucial moments for the movement of CAM into conventional medicine. 
72 
 
 
Finally, there was a significant linguistic shift in the journals, from referring to 
alternative medicine as “quackery” to defining it as CAM or integrative medicine. This 
shift appears to have happened in the early 1980s. The last time “quackery” was the term 
used in opinion pieces in NEJM and Nature was in 1983, in JAMA it was a bit later, in 
1988, and in Science it was earlier still: 1965. My research does not reveal that the early 
1980s was a turning point for CAM; however, one article authored in Science links the 
loss of prestige of conventional doctors with the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s 
and ‘70s. In the article, Burnham (1982) argues that proponents of those movements 
challenged doctors’ authority, in some cases accusing them of overmedicating patients 
with little concern for patient harm. The timing of this article, published in a reputable 
journal, may help indicate when doctors began seriously taking into account public 
critiques of conventional medicine and also may help illuminate why definitional shifts of 
alternative medicine might have occurred in the 1980s. The late 1980s is also when the 
term “alternative medicine” became part of popular lay usage, according to the White 
House Commission on CAM Policy. It appears that the linguistic shift from quackery to 
CAM preceded the creation of the OAM, and occurred simultaneously with a crisis of 
professionalization for doctors of conventional medicine. Each of the journals I analyzed 
contained coverage that was positive, negative or mixedxxxi on CAM; however Science 
and NEJM had the highest percentage of negative coverage at 66% and 55% respectively, 
compared with an equal balance of positive and negative articles in Nature, and with 48% 
of the articles in JAMA having mixed coveragexxxii.  
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In order to contextualize these articles within the broader framework of the events 
that have precipitated the emergence of CAM as a viable topic of discussion within the 
medical community, I use Fairclough’s (1999) definition of CDA, a method that analyzes 
how discourses both shape and are shaped by reality. This is an appropriate methodology 
for this project, given that the discursive shift from quackery to CAM appears to have 
preceded the creation of government funded institutes on alternative medicine. 
Fairclough’s approach also fits nicely within the context of Beck’s (1992) and Giddens’ 
(1999) argument that late modernity is characterized by the frequent discursive use of 
risk; they argue that this discourse works to inform individuals’ and institutions’ views of 
and responses to modern life.  
In addition, Fairclough uses late modernity as a framework and engages with 
Giddens specifically. He references reflexivity (in the same way that I am using Beck’s 
concept of reflexivity throughout this dissertation) and points out that CDA provides the 
methodology for analyzing the increasing importance of discourse in late modernity:  
These theories [Giddens’ among them] create a space for critical analysis of 
discourse as a fundamental element in the critical theorization and analysis of late 
modernity, but since they are not specifically oriented to language they do not 
properly fit that space. This is where CDA has a contribution to make (1999, p. 
4).  
Likewise, my project is attending to language in order to analyze how risk discourses 
function in  the medical literature for audiences who are mainly medical and scientific 
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professionals. How the medical and scientific communities make sense of CAM, and how 
that is connected with institutional power, is also a question that CDA can help to answer. 
“CDA assumes that power relations are discursive. In other words, power is transmitted 
and practiced through discourse” (Fairclough & Chouliaraki, 1999, p. 4). The discursive 
turn in the medical community from using “quackery” to using “alternative medicine,” 
indicates the influence of the lay population’s skepticism of institutional power and 
illustrates the power of this skepticism to shape institutional agendas in reflexive 
modernity. Yet, as I will argue later in the chapter, the institutional boundaries of 
conventional medicine (even among those doctors who support CAM) are still protected 
by discourses that emphasize scientific objectivity. Thus, the rationalist objectivist 
framework of biomedicine still strongly informs the profession. Before I discuss the 
journal articles in depth, I briefly outline the history of CAM in the United States to 
provide a context for the contemporary discursive construction of CAM.  
History 
CAM first became popular in Western cultures in the 1700s when the dangers of 
conventional medical treatments (such as leeching and raising blisters) led people to seek 
alternative healing that often had fewer or no side effects (Whorton, 2002, p. 6). The 
invasive and sometimes dangerous practices of the time were termed “heroic medicine” 
by doctors, because rather than letting nature take its course, doctors were active agents 
in the patient’s “recovery” process. Whorton (2002) notes that for many years 
conventional doctors had subscribed to one of the important principles of Hippocratic 
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medicine—that the body is capable of self-healing—but with the advent of heroic 
medicine, this ideal was lost. “The self-reparative powers of the body had ever since been 
held in high regard by physicians, though by 1800 that regard had become largely 
theoretical. Practitioners’ true enthusiasm was for the heroic interventions that took the 
work of cure out of nature’s hands and placed it in physicians’” (Whorton, 2002, p. 6). 
Similarly, in contemporary times, the public’s concern over the possible harmful side 
effects of contemporary Western treatments such as prescription medications also form 
part of the picture of why consumers choose to use CAM therapies prior to, or in addition 
to, using Western medicine (Reinberg, 2013).  
According to Wharton (2002) the 19th century marked a time of great interest and 
growth in CAM therapies, including the introduction of chiropractic therapies, 
hydrotherapy, and homeopathy in the United States. The mind-body connection—a 
philosophy that informs CAM—also experienced a resurgence during this period with the 
invention of Christian Science by Mary Baker Eddy in the 1870s and the rise of 
Mesmerism in the late 1700s. This period was also particularly important in the 
development and standardization of conventional medical care in the United States. As 
Whorton notes, this time was marked by debates over the legitimacy of CAM manifest in 
the conflict between conventional practitioners and so-called “irregulars.”  
In addition to being historically positioned in opposition to conventional 
medicine, CAM in the United States has also historically been connected with women. 
According to Dror (2004), alternative health practices have long been coded feminine. In 
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his discussion of how the concept of emotion helped to structure the difference between 
alternative and conventional medicine in the 1930s, Dror argues that alternative health 
practices that were more gentle and noninvasive were set up against the more masculine 
and active “heroic” medicine of the time (2004, p. 73). “These associations between 
emotion, women, the feminine, and oppositional knowledge ultimately congealed in the 
particular late-nineteenth-century political constellation that grouped alternative medicine 
together with the animal protection and anti-vivisection movements, the anti-
vaccinationists, and women” (Dror, 2004, p. 73).  
Women were not only rhetorically associated with CAM, they also had a long 
history of actively participating in the CAM movement in the United States. As 
Ehrenreich and English (2005) and Bix (2004) explain, colonial women were healers in 
their communities before the establishment of conventional medicine, but were pushed 
out of their role as healers once the professionalization of medicine took root in America 
in the 1800s. Ultimately, the professionalization process worked to prevent women from 
practicing medicine while simultaneously aligning them with “irregulars” and the 
Thompsonian movement (which sought to retain herbal remedies and traditional healing 
knowledge that was developed in opposition to the dangerous practices of regular doctors 
in the United States).  
Meanwhile, conventional doctors were trying to standardize and professionalize 
American medicine; they hoped to model American medicine on what had evolved in 
Europe: a class-based, gentlemanly profession, open only to elite men who could afford a 
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medical education (Ehrenreich & English, 2005). Yet, professionalization of regular 
doctors was not an easy feat: they faced staunch competition from the Popular Health 
Movement, which was aligned with the feminist movement of the time and also espoused 
alternative healing practices (Ehrenreich & English, 2005). Another roadblock to be 
overcome on the path to professionalization was that posed by middle and upper-class 
consumers who were often the patrons of alternative medicine, such as homeopathy; 
without the patronage of those patients, regular medicine would not have been able to 
succeed. Ultimately, however, with the rise of the popular belief in biological science—
what Ehrenreich and English (2005) term a “secularized religion”—along with funding 
for an institute for medical research designed to explore scientific medicine paid by the 
Rockefellers, scientific medicine gained the authority and funding to become the 
dominant and widespread accepted form of healing in the United States.   
Despite the dominance of men in practicing conventional medicine, women 
remained active in practicing and at times administering alternative treatments after the 
professionalization of American medicine. In her essay on the survival of homeopathy 
during the prominence of the American medical establishment (from 1930-1970), Anne 
Taylor Kirschmann (2004) points out that the history of homeopathy and the history of 
feminism as a political project were quite compatible. She argues that women who were 
excluded from mainstream medicine were able to remain active practicing homeopathy, 
and notes that prominent first-wave feminists such as Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton had homeopathic doctors (Kirschman, 2004). Bix (2004) notes that not 
only were the majority of homeopathic patients in the 1800s women, The American 
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Institute of Homeopathy allowed women as  members in 1869—46 years before the 
American Medical Association did. The extension between feminist health activism and 
homeopathy is still valid. In her interview with female homeopathic practitioners in 
Britain, Scott (2001) found that many of them identified as feminist and also believed 
that homeopathic treatments, with their roots in subjectivity (of the patient’s experience) 
and holism (emphasizing the mind-body connection), could be a springboard for effecting 
larger progressive social changes for women’s health because they fully attend to 
structural causes of disease (such as social oppression).  
Although conventional medicine remained the dominant healing system in the 
United States until the middle of the twentieth century, by the late 1960s alternative 
medicine experienced a resurgence as a result of the concomitant cultural movements of 
the time (Kirschmann, 2004). “The embrace of homeopathy by the counterculture of the 
sixties and seventies reflected a desire to revitalize, purify, and unify the individual body 
as well as the body politic” (Kirschmann, 2004, p. 35). Alternative medicine was also 
closely aligned with the women’s health movement of the 1960s and ‘70s, which 
challenged the male dominated medical field and the biological essentialism that was 
imposed on women by conventional male doctors. In response, the women’s health 
movement organized self-help groups designed to challenge the values of mainstream 
medicine, which tended to value clinical, objective knowledge over patients’ subjective 
experiences of health (Kirschmann, 2004, Scott, 2001, and Lupton, 1994).  
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Women health activists in the 1960s also preferred alternative medicine to conventional 
medicine for political and social reasons in addition to medical reasons (Bix, 2004). 
“Advocates rallied women to stand fast, defending their interest in alternative treatments 
against scorn and criticism from the male-dominated health care establishment” (Bix, 
2004, p. 144). During this time, the creation of the Boston Women’s Health Collective 
and the publication of Our Bodies, Ourselves, occurred, the latter being a groundbreaking 
women’s health publication that offered a perspective on women’s health that did not 
view women’s bodies as pathological (as much of conventional medicine had done) (Bix, 
2004, p. 148). Instead, Our Bodies, Ourselves provided frank discussions about women’s 
health, covering topics such as sexual health and menstruation without moralization, 
shame, or obfuscation (as they had been covered in the past by conventional doctors).  
By the 1980s, women’s health activists were raising concerns about gender 
differences not being addressed in, for example, the risks and symptoms of heart disease, 
because medical education tended to use a male body as a standard (Bix, 2004). Perhaps 
not coincidentally, just one year before the creation of the OAM in 1991, the NIH 
established an Office of Research on Women’s Health (Bix, 2004). Likewise, Bix (2004) 
argues that the revised editions of Our Bodies, Ourselves, released in the 1980s and ‘90s 
emphasized some holistic approaches to health and female experiential knowledge.  
Alternative practitioners and alternative healing systems likewise align with 
feminist health objectives that emphasize patient subjectivity and acknowledge social and 
cultural influences in the creation or absence of good health (Scott, 2001). Alternative 
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practitioners’ sensitivity to women’s subjective experiences may also explain the appeal 
that some contemporary alternative practitioners—such as Andrew Weil and Christiane 
Northrup—have for women; Northrup and Weil promote themselves as uniquely able to 
sympathize with the health concerns of modern women who are pulled between career 
concerns, care of children and aging parents, and the ensuing stress from those roles that 
can affect overall health and wellbeing. Bix (2004) argues that when alternative 
practitioners such as Weil and Northrup emphasize the stresses women face and suggest 
natural remedies such as meditation and yoga to ease health woes, women are offered a 
perspective that not only acknowledges life’s stressors as having an effect on personal 
health, but provides simple and straightforward solutions to help manage stress. 
However, acknowledging stress as a factor in health is not only recognized by alternative 
medicine practitioners: according to the Mayo Clinic, conventional doctors are beginning 
to acknowledge the influence of stress on overall health as well (The Mayo Clinic, 2011).   
 Despite the contentious history of CAM in the United States, it is no longer on the 
medical margins: an increasing number of Americans use CAM, many medical centers 
integrate CAM therapies into conventional treatment regimens, and now a large, federally 
funded institute (NCCAM) is devoted solely to researching CAM therapies. However, a 
vigorous debate is occurring within the medical and scientific communities about how 
CAM should be evaluated and incorporated into modern medicine.  
Even well-known CAM advocates such as Weil and Northrup are also trained as 
conventional doctors, and like the doctors in the medical journals I analyze, they 
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advocate an integrative rather than alternative approach. For his part, Weil maintains that 
the science behind any treatment’s efficacy is important to consider. The section on his 
website about integrative medicine makes a point of asserting that he is not a blanket 
proponent of CAM, but a supporter of integrative therapies, which, his site argues, uses 
the best scientifically validated conventional and alternative approaches to treatment 
(Lemley, 2013). Northrup’s site does not have a special section on CAM, but her profile 
page on the website notes that she, “is a leading proponent of medicine that 
acknowledges the unity of mind, body, emotions, and spirit” (N.A., 2013). Both Weil’s 
and Northrup’s legitimacy and popularity is due in no small part to their impressive 
conventional credentials. Northrup received her M.D. from Tufts University Medical 
School and has held varying clinical academic appointments, and Weil, a Harvard 
graduate, is a clinical professor of medicine and public health at the University of 
Arizona. Weil’s and Northrup’s conventional credentials and their adherence to 
conventional medicine in addition to CAM shows that proponents of CAM are not 
necessarily anti-science, as some staunch critics of CAM argue in the editorials I analyze. 
Indeed, I argue Weil’s and Northrup’s conventional credentials are what lends them 
widespread credibility in CAM. In the next section, I analyze medical journals as a means 
to discover how a reliance on a biomedical model grounded in scientific objectivity still 
undergirds many physicians’ support of CAM.  
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The Medical Journals: Policing the Boundaries of Medicine  
Perhaps because the audiences for the medical journals that I analyze are presumed to be 
medical and scientific professionals, their editorial content about CAM often references 
the tensions between authenticity and quackery. The discourse is structured around a 
paternalistic fear of the risks patients assume when using CAM—a tension mediated by 
suggesting that CAM therapies tested using the RCT will help differentiate “safe” from 
“unsafe” treatments. This discourse informs doctors’ attitudes towards CAM as well as 
reflects conventional medicine’s historical relationship to CAM. As Fairclough (1993) 
notes, discourse is a form of action, and is historically and socially situated as well as 
socially constitutive. Therefore, the paternalism of the discourse in the journals both 
reflects the historical relationship between doctors and women patients, as well as 
constructs what counts as the socially acceptable attitude for doctors to have towards 
patients in the medical encounter.  
The authors of the editorials in the medical journals I analyze advance two 
arguments in their debates. The first is that CAM therapies should not be tested at all 
because they are not effective, whereas the second argument supports testing CAM 
therapies, but primarily through the use of the RCT. I argue that CAM’s entrée into 
conventional medicine is characteristic of reflexive modernity as it shows how popular 
interest in CAM and public criticism of allopathic medical expertise comes to influence 
and re-shape a dominant institution, in this case medicine.  
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In his discussion of how reflexivity functions in late modernity to challenge 
experts, specifically scientists, Beck (1992) notes that the, “consciousness of 
modernization risks has established itself against the resistance of scientific rationality. A 
broad trail of scientific mistakes, misjudgments and minimizations leads to it. The history 
of the growing consciousness and social recognition of risks coincides with the history of 
the demystification of the sciences” (p. 59). For example, many advertised prescription 
medications have a long list of side effects, whereas most CAM therapies do not. One 
example of this is a new finding that links statins (cholesterol lowering drugs used to 
prevent heart disease) to an increased risk of musculoskeletal injuries or diseases 
(Reinberg, 2013). Conversely, CAM therapies such as yoga and massage, which have no 
negative side effects, have also been found to alleviate anxiety and lower blood pressure, 
and thus minimize the risk of heart disease (Bulgarelli, 2013). Whereas, doctors would 
not suggest replacing statins with yoga, for example, the risks linked to statins might 
encourage those at moderate to low risk of heart disease to use CAM instead of the drug. 
However, the fear of patients’ risks of using CAM expressed in the medical journals, 
might, for example, reflect concern that a patient at high risk of heart disease would use 
CAM instead of statins, thus putting them at imminent risk of a heart attack.  
Although public criticism of medical science may result in the incorporation of 
alternative therapies into conventional medicine, the institutional reflexivity of the 
medical profession allows for the incorporation of alternative therapies while still 
policing the boundaries of acceptable methodologies. In this case, doctors who author 
articles in these journals acknowledge the popularity of CAM and re-frame it as 
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acceptable if it meets institutional norms such as the RCT. Kerr and Cunningham-
Burley’s (2000) discussion of the new human geneticsxxxiii, shows that those who are 
invested in the new human genetics, including public health officials, scientists, and 
medical professionals, limit the social and ethical concerns they consider valid in order to 
enhance professional status and continue to legitimize the field; I argue that the discourse 
used in medical and science journals about CAM is similar, in that the focus on RCTs 
limits the extent to which CAM epistemologies, such as holism, may be incorporated to 
broaden methodological possibilities. For example, a view of the body as holistic, in 
which mind, body, and spirit are integral to overall health, is simply not amenable to 
testing using the RCT. Instead, methodologies that include patient’s subjective 
experiences, such as healing that seems to be a result of the placebo effect, would need to 
be accommodated. “Setting clear boundaries around which areas are and are not open for 
social consideration, also allows professionals, associated with the new human genetics, 
to manage concern without undermining research and practice” (Cunningham-Burley, 
2000, p. 295). Similarly, the editorials in the journals limit the scope of discourse to focus 
on whether CAM should even be tested via RCTs, not whether the process of testing 
CAM therapies should be scrutinized. The discourse in these journals legitimates 
conventional practitioners by not seriously questioning their methodology (which is the 
argument for superiority over CAM); this reinforces institutional norms based on a 
scientific understanding of medicine. Because CDA is concerned with uncovering how 
power dynamics are enacted in the discursive realm, such as that constituted by medical 
and scientific journals, I use it to analyze how CAM is discursively bounded. The main 
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topics of debate in the science and medical journals I analyze include CAM’s movement 
into medical education and the importance of the RCT in maintaining objectivity.  
Medical Education  
In the following section, I analyze the opinion pieces in the journals that discuss whether 
or not CAM therapies should be accepted at all by medicine and science. The opinion that 
CAM therapies should be kept out of medical education is apparent in the discussion of 
CAM’s movement into medical schools and is taken up in both Nature and Science. In 
one Nature article, Dr. David Colquhoun (apparently one of the most prominent CAM 
critics in the U.K.) (Milgrom, 2008), accuses the University of Westminster at London of 
including courses in CAM as a means to increase revenue for the university only because 
students are interested in the subject matter. Colquhoun specifically attacks homeopathy, 
which he claims has changed little since the 19th century. To emphasize his point, 
Colquhoun compares sample test questions from a 19th century medical exam to a 
contemporary exam from a CAM course at the University of Westminster, seemingly to 
illustrate how the introduction of CAM classes in universities signifies that medical 
knowledge is taking a step backwards. His main claim—that CAM practices are “anti-
science”—supports his argument that they have no place in the sciences, but should be 
taught as “sociological history.” “Most Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM) 
is not science because the vast majority of it is not based on empirical evidence. 
Homeopathy, for example, has barely changed since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. It is much more like religion than science. Worse still, many of the doctrines of 
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CAM, and quite a lot of its practitioners, are openly anti-science” (Colquhoun, 2007, p. 
373). By comparing homeopathy to religion, which he suggests is opposed to science, he 
constructs CAM as unable to contribute any benefit to the medical profession, which, in 
Western culture is evidence-based. By reinforcing the institutional standard of empirical 
evidence, Colquhoun effectively positions CAM as a hoax, as only worthy of studying 
within the context of history and culture; he thus reinforces the notion that history and 
culture have no bearing on scientific evidence itself, as if science were outside of these 
realms. However, there is no discourse, including that produced by scientists, that exists 
outside of historical and cultural contexts. According to Ehrenreich and English (2005) 
Colquhoun’s position is not far afield from how regular doctors in the U.S. undermined 
the validity of alternative practitioners in the late 1800s.  
In another commentary criticizing CAM’s acceptance in medical education 
featured in a June 2000 issue of Science, author Eliot Marshall criticizes institutions such 
as Harvard Medical School, Columbia, Georgetown, and Stanford for incorporating 
integrative medicine into the curriculum. Marshall provides a less than positive 
introduction to the topic: “Medical schools across the country are gingerly bringing 
alternative medicine into their hallowed halls--much to the consternation of some faculty 
members” (Marshall, 2000, Paragraph 4). He then turns to Wallace Sampson, a staunch 
critic of CAM, who refers to CAM as a “secular religion.” Sampson claims that CAM 
“poses a threat to scientific medicine that's ‘more serious than anyone realizes’” 
(Marshal, 2000, Paragraph 6) and claims that medical faculty have not challenged CAM 
courses because they are fearful that if they do not support the trend of alternative 
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medicine, their careers will be compromised. Sampson’s assertion is immediately 
followed by a quote from Arnold Relman, former editor of the NEJM, who states that he 
believes that "It is becoming politically incorrect for the movement's critics to express 
their skepticism too strongly in public" (Marshal, 2000, Paragraph 6). Critics of CAM 
thus position themselves as at a political disadvantage by suggesting they are being 
silenced by a popular majority, reinforcing the idea that CAM is a fad rather than a 
meaningful system of healing.   
The article addresses critics’ concerns that CAM is a threat to scientific medicine 
by detailing the popularity of alternative practitioner Dr. Andrew Weil, even highlighting 
Weil’s history of psychedelic drug use. Marshall also includes quotes from doctors who 
find Weil’s approach to health to be incorrect, possibly resulting in patients delaying 
diagnosis from allopathic physicians when they may have a serious illness. Thus, the 
riskiness of CAM in this scenario is proposed as delaying the patient’s participation in 
aggressive technological diagnostic techniques. However, the risks of conventional 
diagnostic techniques such as the radiation from CT scans that could cause cancer later in 
life, are never mentioned. In other words, CAM is selectively constructed to emphasize 
CAM’s risks, not those of conventional medicine.    
The above example illustrates the fundamentally ideological nature of risk 
construction in this context. While Marshall highlights the riskiness of not seeing a 
conventional practitioner he makes no reference to the diagnostic risks often involved 
with participating in conventional medical treatment. As Nelkin (1989) and Douglas 
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(1982) note, the ideological nature of risk construction illustrates which values are 
associated with the construction of risk. In this case, the bias falls on the side of 
technological medicine’s ability to reduce risks. Fairclough (1999) also notes that 
ideologies tend to downplay contradictory perspectives, “Ideologies are constructions of 
practices from particular perspectives (and in that sense ‘one-sided’) which ‘iron out’ 
contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms of practices in ways which accord with the 
interests and projects of domination” (p. 26). In this example, the ideology of scientific 
medicine is used to frame CAM as the only risk.  
Finally, Marshall discusses a conventional doctor who also uses CAM treatments 
and who was fired for encouraging cancer patients to meditate. The editorial ends with 
the claim that the doctor in question—Dr. Lewis Mehl-Medrona, a Native American—
now has a prestigious post at Beth Israel hospital in New York City. Mehl-Medrona 
responds to this criticism in a letter to the editor that both emphasizes his commitment to 
spirituality and religion as a means to help patients, and points out that many 
conventional doctors believe that religious commitments can assist in patients’ healing. 
Mehl-Medrona claims that indigenous means of healing could be used in addition to 
conventional methods with beneficial results:  
My message has been that we in conventional medicine can learn much from 
indigenous healers and healing systems. Some of the most important lessons 
involve the importance of time with the patient and quality of rapport. The 
world’s traditional medicines (including Native American) all stress the 
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importance of all aspects of our lives in creating and healing illness. Traditional 
healers believe that all aspects of the person must be addressed and that major 
illnesses may require major changes in many areas of life. These areas include 
diet, relationships, and even spirituality. Many of us feel that these are important 
issues for conventional medicine to consider. We believe that this is why, as 
Marshall puts it, alternative medicine is finding its way into the “bastions of 
academic medicine. (Mehl-Medrona, 2000, Paragraph 7)   
Although Mehl-Medrona’s response was published, its placement in the letter to the 
editor section shows that those who support CAM courses being taught in medical school 
or university curricula are given voice in less prominent forums than those who oppose 
the incorporation of CAM into medical school curricula. This is also apparent in another 
letter to the editor entitled, “In Defense of NCCAM” (Straus & Chesney, 2006), which 
was published in response to Marcus and Grollman’s (2006), “Review for NCCAM is 
Overdue.” Milgrom (2008) points out that  responses to articles or retractions printed 
later in a publication make little impact compared with the initial story: “Just like the 
sound-bite or the attention-grabbing headline, it is the initial impression that sticks, not 
the more complex retraction buried in the back pages that appears months later” 
(Milgrom, 2008, p. 592). The ideological position of CAM critics is thus reinforced 
through the discursive construction of CAM as anti-science; the placement of the articles 
in the journals also illustrates that this position is the one given more prominent voice.  
Although the above editorials are critical of CAM’s incorporation into medical 
education, one JAMA article in my sample seems to be supportive of the new trend for 
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medical residents to be trained in CAM (Lim & Golub, 2004). The authors of this 
September 1998 commentary assert that the question is not if CAM should be 
incorporated into medical education, but how it should be implemented: “As a profession, 
physicians will increasingly be expected to responsibly advise patients who use, seek, or 
demand complementary and alternative therapies. We believe the development of a more 
consistent educational approach to this provocative area is essential” (Wetzel, Eisenberg, 
& Kaptchuk 1998, Paragraph 37)xxxiv.  
The biomedical journals and JAMA—the more widely circulated journal—offer 
differing perspectives, illustrating that the question over the legitimacy of CAM within 
the scientific and medical communities is not settled. However, the increasing existence 
of medical education programs that include CAM components and the trend toward 
including CAM therapies in conventional medical settings such as hospitals indicate that 
CAM is becoming a legitimate part of medical care. The increasing incorporation of 
CAM into conventional medicine indicates a trend consistent with Beck’s reflexive 
modernity thesis, while at the same time the construction of CAM’s risks in the journals 
reveals an ideology of science that promotes it as objective and culturally and historically 
neutral. Reflexivity thus functions in contradictory ways in this coverage. In the next 
section, I illustrate how the RCT functions as an institutional buffer to reinforce 
professional norms and the expertise of conventional doctors.  
Scientific Objectivity and the RCT  
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The argument that alternative medicine has no scientific merit has long been a reason 
given by conventional practitioners for their stated opposition to CAM (Wharton, 2002, 
p. 16), and illustrates how the importance of the RCT has not been displaced by the 
discursive shift from “quackery” to “alternative medicine.” The ideology of objective 
science in the context of medicine therefore remains in place, even while CAM has 
experienced some institutional recognition. Milgrom (2008), writing on the 
fundamentalism of the sciences in The Journal of Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine, acknowledges the strong objections many scientists still have to CAM: “The 
discourse of evidence-based medicine (EBM) has recently been compared to a ‘fascist’ 
structure for its active intolerance of pluralism in health care systems” (Milgrom, 2008, p. 
589). He uses the term “fascist” to describe evidence-based medicine that uses the RCT 
to indicate the inability of scientists to cede any ground in this terrain: that is, the 
possibility that a treatment could be efficacious without using this method of testing. The 
dominance of the RCT is illustrated both in the anti-CAM and pro-CAM positions. There 
are two exceptions to this perspective that I elaborate on at the end of this section; but 
first I detail the discourse surrounding the use of the RCT in testing CAM and analyze 
how the conversation never seriously challenges this methodology.  
 The discussion of the RCT within the scientific community points to what Beck 
(1992) terms “reflexive scientization”: that is, public critiques of science force those 
within the sciences to respond to, and try to protect the integrity of, the scientific method: 
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In this way, the revelation of the risks of previous modernization necessarily stirs 
up the hornets’ nest of competitive relations between the scientific professions, 
and arouses all the impulses to resistance that a scientific profession will have 
built up over the generations with all of its powers (including its scientific ones) 
against “expansionist encroachment” on its own “pet problems” and on its 
carefully installed “pipeline of research funding. (p. 160) 
Beck argues that reflexive scientization leads to science losing some of its monopoly on 
knowledge production; however, he attests that scientific findings are necessary in the 
construction of knowledge, and those who try to advance oppositional knowledge to the 
sciences (such as in alternative medicine), will be dependent on the creation of 
knowledge through the sciences to prove their point. Because of the dependence on 
science as a means of providing proof, challenging science’s monopoly on knowledge is 
no easy task. One JAMA piece cautious about the incorporation of CAM into 
conventional medicine illustrates the importance of maintaining the status quo in research 
methods. The authors, Fontanarosa and Lundberg (1998), discuss the importance of 
ensuring that all medicine be subjected to rigorous scientific standards:  
Alternative therapies that have been shown to be of no benefit (aside from 
possible placebo effect) or that cause harm should be abandoned immediately. 
Physicians, insurance plans, medical centers and hospitals, managed care 
organizations, and government policymakers should base decisions regarding 
incorporation of and payment for alternative medicine therapies on evidence-
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based research and objective cost-effectiveness analyses rather than on consumer 
interest, market demand or competition, well-publicized anecdotal reports, or 
political pressures from well-organized and influential interest groups. (p. 1619) 
This quote illustrates the primacy of evidence-based medicine as well as the political 
nature of the debate within medicine, which I will discuss further in the last section of 
this chapter. In addition, the connection between the RCT in testing alternative therapies 
is very closely aligned with concerns that federal research dollars are being “wasted” on 
therapies that never show promise. For example, writing in the NEJM, Sampson (2005) 
argues that over a billion dollars have been squandered conducting research on CAM 
remedies that do not have any history of effectiveness and thus should not be subjected to 
randomized controlled trials:  
It is time for reassessment. First, there is an answer to the question, “Why are we 
doing randomized clinical trials of folkway uses of herbs and sectarian 
remedies?” The answer is that proponents and evaluators have excluded 
plausibility from the equation. What is needed is knowledge-based medicine, with 
randomized clinical trials of treatments with histories that indicate some 
reasonable chance of efficacy. This approach mandates a medicine based on 
evidence that has passed through the sieve of plausibility and that is consistent 
with basic sciences, other applied sciences, and history — all molded by wisdom 
and common sense. (Sampson, 2005, Paragraph 11) 
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Sampson’s use of language in this passage such as “folkway” and “sectarian” illustrates a 
strong ideological position against the methods and epistemological basis of CAM 
remedies. The discourse of evidence-based medicine, proved through the RCT, is linked 
to the wider discourse of the healthcare environment—the insurance industry, for 
example—that requires treatments to be proved before they are covered. However, even 
such “proof” is subjective, as those critiquing the results, such as meta-researcher and 
doctor, John Ioannidis, who has devoted his career to proving that data generated from 
clinical trials and published in medical journals is biased,  charge that up to 90% of the 
information published in medical journals is flawed (Freedman, 2010). Interestingly, 
Ioannidis is apparently embraced by the medical community. He has published in 
medical journals and is a popular guest at their conferences, even as he consistently 
accuses them of bias, more specifically, of designing studies that will win them career 
prestige, or secure them research funding: “Researchers headed into their studies wanting 
certain results—and, lo and behold, they were getting them. We think of the scientific 
process as being objective, rigorous, and even ruthless in separating out what is true from 
what we merely wish to be true, but in fact it’s easy to manipulate results, even 
unintentionally or unconsciously” (Freedman, 2010, Paragraph 10).   
Yet even as they acknowledge the flawed research being published in medical 
journals scientists and medical doctors continue to reinforce the scientific method as if it 
generated incontrovertibly substantive proof. For example, in an interview in Science, 
Josephine Briggs, a nephrologist, and the current head of the NCCAM, notes: “the aim 
[of the institution] is absolutely no relaxation in the notion of rigorous science. We’re 
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going to try very hard to continue to support only very top-ranked, careful, rigorous 
science” (Three q.s, 2008). In her assertion of the importance of rigorous science to the 
center, she aligns herself with the institutional affiliation of science. In addition, the 
context for the interview was set by the interviewer who asks her about taking the 
position. The interviewer asks, “NCCAM is probably the most controversial institute at 
NIH. That didn’t deter you?” (Three q.s, 2008, p. 707).  Immediately, the tone suggests 
that taking the position as the head of the Center also would imperil her professional 
reputation. Because the organization has been on the defensive due to criticism from the 
medical profession, the RCT provides a way to secure institutional credibility as well as 
prevents CAM methodologies from threatening the status quo in medicine. When asked if 
she uses CAM herself, Briggs is cautious; she says that she practices yoga and that CAM 
can be used to ease the “symptoms of aging.” She goes on to say that there are “small, 
promising areas,” and that some CAM therapies have some effectiveness. Therefore, even 
the head of the Center aligns herself primarily with scientific medicine, illustrating that 
the agenda of the Center conforms with conventional medicine’s methodological norms.    
In my sample just two articles feature authors who overtly challenge the primacy 
of the RCT: one was in JAMA and the other in Nature. In JAMA, Chan (2008) points out  
the challenges of testing alternative therapies using controlled clinical trials because 
healing may be partially due to either the practitioner-patient relationship (which is hard 
to manufacture in a trial setting) or the placebo effect (Chan raises questions about the 
difficulty of falsely simulating acupuncture, for example).  
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In Nature, Xu’s (2011) opinion piece on the difficulty of using RCTs to study 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), highlights this paradox: “[TCM is difficult to study 
in RCTs] because TCM concoctions are mixtures of multiple active compounds, and a 
typical Chinese medicine is intended to hit multiple biological targets” (Paragraph 10). 
Xu also points out that even when compounds are reproduced and used together, the 
same results may not occur in the laboratory: for example, the herbs may have been 
grown in different environments (in a natural setting as opposed to ones that are grown in 
the laboratory setting). As these authors point out, holistic methods of healing are 
difficult to reduce to Western-centric methods of testing that yield the same, 
generalizable results. But neither author diminishes CAM’s credibility for these reasons.  
 As I have shown, the language, placement of CAM editorials (either for or 
against), and the editorials selected for publication by the journals’ editors, are all key 
factors in understanding the journals’ (and by extension, larger medical community’s) 
perspective on CAM. I have shown that most of the biomedical journal coverage in my 
sample is somewhat skeptical of CAM, but that the perspectives expressed in JAMA 
shows strong professional support for CAM within the United States. Both critics and 
supporters of CAM discuss the public when they talk about why, how, and if CAM 
should be used. In the next section, I discuss how this construction of the public, regarded 
by both sides as in need of guidance and easily misled, is composed mostly of women, 
and discuss the implications of framing the public in this way.     
 
97 
 
 
The Feminine Public  
CAM coverage in medical journals refers to an abstract, CAM-using public; this public, 
as I established in the introduction of the chapter, consists mostly of women. However, 
the fact that women use CAM more frequently than men is not the only way in which this 
public is gendered. Given the historical context of women’s health in the United States 
that I outlined earlier, and the relationship between conventional medicine and the 
oppression of womenxxxv, the discursive construction of this audience is not ideologically 
neutral but reflects persistent patriarchal values that continue to inform conventional 
medicine. In addition, as Adam and Van Loon (2000) (citing Beck [1992]), argue, the 
definition of what is risky and who is at risk necessarily requires interpretation and thus 
becomes malleable to various political agendas. “Analogous of ‘relations of production’ 
Beck points to the importance of risk in terms of ‘relations of definition’. The 
pervasiveness of mediation, the high level of indeterminacy and the inevitability of 
political involvement mean there is no one truth, that there are no facts outside the 
relativizing influence  of interpretations based on context, position, perspective, interest, 
and the power to define and colour interpretation” (Adam & Van Loon, 2000, p. 4). In 
addition, even women scientists acknowledge that the scientific profession does not treat 
women and men equally; as scientist Jennifer Rohn (2010) notes in Nature, “science is 
still inherently sexist” (Paragraph 1)xxxvi.  
Although the patriarchal tone in the journal articles may not be designed to 
overtly manipulate or position women as subservient, the history of knowledge that 
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informs conventional medicine and is rooted in the social oppression of women provides 
a context for medical culture that is still influenced by that knowledge and identifies the 
CAM-using public as “at risk.” In the following section, I analyze how the editorials in 
medical journals construct the CAM-using public as gullible and in need of guidance, this 
discourse also works to contribute to disciplinary solidarity at the same time it creates a 
straw figure of the public. Although the reference to women is implicit, the journals show 
a bias against racial and cultural “others” who are included as part of the public discussed 
in the journals. Therefore, this coverage is not only patriarchal, but includes troubling 
racial overtones.  
Construction of the Public in Medical Journal Editorials 
As I outlined in the last section, even the supporters of CAM in the medical journals 
highlight the importance of the RCT as the means by which CAM therapies should be 
tested. Along with providing validity for these therapies, the authors of the editorials in 
the journals argue that CAM therapies must be tested rigorously because the public is 
gullible and will use the therapies regardless of whether or not they are tested or show 
results. Such paternalism suggests that only benevolent doctors are capable of 
shepherding patients in the correct direction. For example, one NEJM article supporting 
CAM deems the use of herbal medicines a “public health experiment.” “We are in the 
midst of a public health experiment that much of academic medicine has failed to 
acknowledge until recently. In spite of the greatest health and longevity in history in the 
United States and Europe, millions are turning back to traditional herbal medicines in 
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order to prevent or treat a host of illnesses” (Straus, 2002, Paragraph 1). This quote 
illustrates that doctors believe science-based medicine has a direct correlation to 
increased life-span (which it surely has had a hand in); however, discussing this 
achievement in relation to CAM suggests that CAM is the reason for poor longevity in 
the past; the phrase “in spite of the greatest” points to an odd, intractable tendency of the 
public to take supplements regardless of good health. Suggesting that the public uses 
supplements in opposition to conventional care recommendations—ignores how most 
Americans use CAM: in addition to, rather than instead of, conventional medicine.  
In another example of the construction of a gullible public in the journals, 
published in December 1998 in Science, author Jennifer Couzin explores whether the 
public is intelligent enough to believe research that questions the efficacy of CAM. “But 
some critics question whether the public will accept even the most rigorous research if it 
exposes popular remedies as useless. ‘There have been a gazillion studies showing that 
astrology doesn't predict anything at all, and people still use astrology,’ says Ursula 
Goodenough, a Washington University, St. Louis, biologist and a former president of the 
American Society of Cell Biology” (Couzin, 1998, Paragraph 3). The public implicitly 
referenced here, as I mentioned earlier, is composed mostly of women, who also happen 
to believe in astrology more than men (Lyons, 2005). Given that the author of the article 
and the biologist she quotes point to the ignorance of the public without explicitly 
referencing women, the content is not clearly sexist; however, as Fairclough (1993) 
points out, the relationship between causality and determination is often opaque, which 
obscures how discourse is connected with wider structural and cultural ideologies and 
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thus contributes to securing power and hegemony by dominant groups (p. 135). In my 
example, the article works to secure the dominance of scientific expertise over 
supposedly flawed lay perceptions. Because the readers of these journals are medical and 
scientific professionals, these articles function to strengthen affiliation with disciplinary 
norms. The presence of these types of editorials suggests that the popularity of CAM has 
become threatening as it encroaches on a field that used to enjoy relative autonomy. The 
incorporation of CAM into mainstream medicine means a major disciplinary overhaul, 
including adding classes to medical school curricula and making funding for studies on 
treatments and getting patient business more competitive. These are only a few of the 
reasons these antagonisms against CAM play out in professional journals.      
The above example also illustrates how women may participate in undermining 
feminist goals. For example, in her discussion of how feminism can be undermined by 
female individualization (which I defined in my introductory chapter), McRobbie (2005) 
points out that women in positions of privilege may overlook the fact that their own 
opportunities for education are not equally accessible to all women, thus exacerbating 
social inequalities among women. “As well-trained women gain their own more 
independent middle-class status so also are they encouraged to repudiate their social 
inferiors and celebrate their own individualistic success” (p. 72). She specifically alludes 
to how the imperative for young women to succeed in the workforce and in cultivating a 
particular appearance (encouraged by both government policies that reward meritocratic 
educational achievements and cultural institutions, such as the fashion industry), 
heightens divisiveness between women. “This landscape of self-improvement substitutes 
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for the feminist values of solidarity and support and instead embraces and promotes 
female individualization and condemnation of those who remain unable or unwilling to 
help themselves” (p. 73). In the above example the disdainfulness of Goodenough’s 
quote, illustrates that anyone believing in astrology is foolish and not intelligent enough 
to understand the scientific process. Because of the clear divide established by the author 
and scientist in this article and the public—educated, knowledgeable about science versus 
uneducated and, foolish, the article supports an implicit postfeminist position that 
supports a stratification of women along ideological lines.  
Yet, my example is somewhat different from McRobbie’s argument about 
stratification of the classes. As I pointed out in the first and second chapters, CAM 
consumers tend to be white, middle-class women who are also educated; thus, rather than 
being about class stratification, this quote illustrates the ideological divisiveness of the 
debate that pits women scientists against other professional women. In this case too, then, 
the institutional boundaries are protected while the larger issue of how to best approach 
women’s health (both from a scientific as well as holistic perspective) is undermined.  
Concern over the public’s ability to make sound decisions and to discern fact 
from fiction is also highlighted in an editorial in JAMA entitled “Beyond the teachable 
moment.” According to author Dr. Alan Leshner, the public and scientific communities 
have a tense relationship because the public has little understanding of the scientific 
method, is reluctant to ask for evidence based medicine, and is concerned about how 
science is encroaching on personal values and beliefs (Leshner, 2007). To illustrate this 
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point, he equates parents’ supposed reasons for abstaining from vaccinating their children 
with the Gardasil vaccine with creationism. Leshner raises the possibility that patients 
seek alternative therapies because they are frustrated with the slow progress of medical 
science; however, he too, foregrounds the public’s ignorance:  
Frequently, people do not know the difference between evidence-based and non–
evidence-based treatments. Even as the public is reminded that “the plural of 
anecdote is not evidence,” widespread publicity for the purported effectiveness of 
nonscientific treatments perpetuates the trend and undermines the call for 
adherence to the science base. (p. 1326) 
Leshner (2007) follows this statement with a claim that alternative medicine may still 
have a place in conventional care, and reiterates the importance of the RCT by using the 
NCCAM as an example of a valid institution that is doing reputable, science-based 
research in order to discern which alternative therapies are helpful and which should be 
abandoned.  
 Leshner’s piece is not critical of CAM in general, but of the public’s apparent 
blind faith in things that are not science-based. To emphasize his point on public 
ignorance, Leshner provides statistics about the number of Americans who believe in 
extrasensory perception, astrology, and who do not believe in evolution, as if these 
figures provide prima facie evidence of their inability to make rational decisions. He then 
balks at the ignorance of parents (read mothers)xxxvii who oppose the Gardasil vaccine, 
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and groups them together with parents (again, mothers) who are fearful of the link 
between the MMR vaccine and autism:  
In the medical realm, some US parents, fearful of seeming to endorse premarital 
sex, resist providing their daughters with the first human cancer vaccine, although the 
American Academy of Pediatrics describes this vaccine as “highly effective” at 
preventing 4 types of human papillomavirus infection, the major cause of cervical cancer. 
Similarly, rumors of a link between the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine and autism 
remain unsubstantiated, yet public fears persist. (p. 1326) 
While Leshner’s argument seems straightforward, the implications of Gardasil are 
not universally endorsed by the American Academy of Pediatrics for all girls, and there 
are concerns about possible serious side effects, such as seizures or paralysis (Lind, 2013) 
that are unrelated to concerns over teen promiscuity (or the fear that being vaccinated for 
an STD will encourage teen girls to have more, and unprotected, sex) (Fernandez 
Branson, 2012).  
Leshner continues to argue that an “antiscientific” attitude is a public problem and 
compares it to Galileo’s conflict with the Roman Catholic Church. He cites the debate 
surrounding the teaching of creationism or intelligent design alongside evolution in 
schools as an example: “Members of the general public who know little about the nature 
and requirements of science have little chance of realizing that there is no science base 
behind creationism and intelligent design. This complexity reiterates the need for the 
public to better understand the nature of science” (Leshner 2007, p. 1327). Leshner 
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concludes the article by saying that science and religion should not be pitted against one 
another and that biomedical scientists should listen to and learn from the public. 
However, throughout the article Leshner appears to make an argument for how 
biomedical scientists need to better influence and be prepared to argue against the 
ignorant beliefs held by an uneducated public.  
Leshner’s article illustrates how scientists see themselves as different from the 
public. He also constructs a straw-figure argument that assumes parents’ resistance to the 
HPV vaccine is testament to their belief in creationism at the same time he ignores the 
fact that some parents may also be scientists or otherwise capable of doing research on 
the side effects themselves. In his discussion of the politics of knowledge production in 
the risk society, Beck points out the divide between experts who believe they possess 
superior knowledge to that of the lay public:  
This division of the world between experts and non-experts also contains an 
image of the public sphere. The “irrationality” of “deviating” public risk “perception” lies 
in the fact that, in the eyes of technological elite, the majority of the public still behaves 
like engineering students in their first semester. They are ignorant, of course, but well 
intentioned; hard-working, but without a clue. In this view, the population is composed of 
nothing but would-be engineers, who do not yet possess sufficient knowledge. They only 
need be stuffed full of technical details, and then they will share the experts’ viewpoint 
and assessment of the technical manageability of risks, and thus their lack of risk. 
Protests, fears, criticism, or resistance in the public sphere are a pure problem of 
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information. If the public only knew what the technical people know, they would be put 
at ease—otherwise they are just hopelessly irrational (1992, p. 58).   
Beck (1992) continues by noting that there are no external checks to scientific or 
medical innovations; the decisions are scrutinized only within the institutional culture of 
medicine and science. For example, when the risks and benefits of a particular 
treatment—in-vitro fertilization, for example—are assessed by scientists and medical 
professionals, they may leave out ethical and social questions that are important to the 
public, such as the side effects of the treatment, the cost, or the overpopulation of the 
planet. Because scientists rely only on their internal standards that encourage the progress 
of knowledge, they fail to adequately address social concerns about the possible social 
consequences of a new scientific discovery until after the innovation or new technology 
has become used: 
In this way a complete disequilibrium between external discussions and controls 
and the internal definition-making power of medical practice comes in being and 
is preserved. According to scientists, the public sphere and politics are always and 
necessarily “uninformed,” lagging hopelessly behind the developments, and 
thinking in terms of moral and social consequences that are alien to the thought 
and action of medical people (p. 208).  
Beck’s statement is quite broad; however, his assessment of scientists’ perceptions of lay 
people fits well with my analysis of how the public is discursively constructed in the 
journals I analyze and reflects how scientists tend to feel about outside intervention into 
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their research agendas, even as they fail to adequately interrogate not only the ethical 
outcomes of their research but their own research findings:  
University and government research overseers rarely step in to directly enforce 
research quality, and when they do, the science community goes ballistic over the 
outside interference. The ultimate protection against research error and bias is 
supposed to come from the way scientists constantly retest each other’s results—
except they don’t. Only the most prominent findings are likely to be put to the 
test, because there’s likely to be publication payoff in firming up the proof, or 
contradicting it (Freedman, 2010, page 2, Paragraph 8).   
However, as I outline in the next section, many scientists do not feel that they have a 
monopoly on knowledge production; instead, as the above quote illustrates, they are quite 
fearful of the encroachment of political policy on independent research.  
Along with discussion of the public as easily misled and uninformed, in these 
journals’ discussions of the public as patients, there are also negative racial overtones to 
their construction of the public who uses CAM. In one such article, a patient-doctor 
scenario featured a Chinese man who was treating his daughter’s asthma with herbal 
remedies in addition to her inhaler. Although the author does not suggest the herbal 
remedies did any harm to the girl, he emphasizes the need for doctors to correct such a 
patient’s use of CAM as a means to provide better care:   
Once the herbal treatment was revealed, the appropriate use of inhalers could be 
reviewed and reemphasized. In such cases, effective communication may require 
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interpreters, and clinicians must be trained in their use. Key steps in building trust 
include acknowledging patients' concerns, orienting them to the doctor's decision-
making process, noting that many patients are mistrustful of the health care 
system, and offering reassurance. (Betancourt, 2004, Paragraph 9)  
This quote not only illustrates a CAM therapy articulation to an immigrant group—with a  
negative association—but also emphasizes patient compliance over considering a CAM 
treatment as a viable addition to standard Western therapy. The passage is patronizing of 
the public as the previous examples I illustrated, but also reveals a racialized component 
at the same time it shows that doctors are aware of patients’ suspicion of conventional 
medicine and thus must manage and re-direct patient expectations to encourage 
compliance, rather than even hinting at the possibility that the clinician could learn from 
patients here. A similar example in JAMA articulates CAM negatively with non-Anglo 
cultures:  
Despite shared values and goals, alternative medicine and conventional medicine 
differ in important ways. First, many alternative medicine modalities are derived 
from cultures other than the Western one in which conventional medicine was 
developed, and many of the practitioners subscribe to a different worldview. 
Second, by definition, alternative medicine represents a different approach to 
healing. Third, users of alternative medicine tend to perceive these modalities, in 
comparison to conventional ones, in greater concordance with their views toward 
health care. Thus, there seems to be distinct cultures of healing, which is 
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somewhat analogous to situations that conventional medicine encounters in other 
cultures. For instance, what constitutes appropriate research in developing 
countries? Should patients be told about a diagnosis of cancer? Should advance 
directives be discussed with patients whose culture proscribes these discussions? 
How should clinicians respond to requests for female circumcision? In each of 
these cases, just as when clinicians encounter alternative medicine, it is essential 
to determine an appropriate response. When is a laissez-fare approach acceptable? 
When is there an obligation to intervene on behalf of patients? (Sugarman & 
Burk, 1998, p. 1624) 
In this excerpt, CAM is presented as a cultural problem that physicians must be prepared 
to deal with by intervening when necessary. The questions the author raises construct 
other cultures as fundamentally flawed in their approaches to medicine and medical 
ethics and by default, as the last question illustrates, assumed to be not necessarily in the 
patient’s best interest.   
 Although the public is referred to as misguided or easily duped in medical journal 
coverage, it is almost never explicitly gendered. However, in a 2005 JAMA article, Dr. 
Diana Petitti discusses study results that apparently prove that many menopausal 
symptoms experienced by women are actually psychological and not physical. Petitti 
cites a study conducted by the Women’s Health Initiative (WHI) that showed over 40% 
of women experienced moderate to severe menopausal symptoms after they stopped 
taking a placebo. “This ‘placebo withdrawal effect’—combined with the data suggesting 
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that simple lifestyle changes relieve some symptoms in at least some women—raises 
questions about the physiological basis of some of the symptoms that have always been 
associated with the estrogen-deficient state” (Petitti, 2005, p. 245). She cites another 
study showing little causal effect between ovarian aging and the symptoms of 
menopause. Petitti concludes the article by suggesting that menopausal symptoms may 
instead be the result of symptoms of general aging.  
 While the psychosomatic explanation for menopausal women could be read as 
problematic, Pettiti’s ultimate suggestion—that menopausal symptoms are largely 
composed of general aging symptoms—challenges the conventional medical perspective 
that ovarian function is central to the experience of female aging. As Bix (2004, p. 164) 
also points out, many feminists who challenged the validity of HRT therapy criticized 
pharmaceutical companies for defining menopause as an illness and were trying to 
reclaim menopause as a natural process rather than a pathological disease. Ultimately, 
Pettiti’s suggestion that most women should manage menopausal symptoms with simple 
lifestyle changes achieves the ultimate goal for which some feminists opposed to HRT 
were pushing.  
 Regardless of whether the editorials support CAM, the coverage in the three 
biomedical journals and JAMA typically construct the public as gullible and in need of 
professional guidance. Based on the historical connection between women and CAM and 
the current popularity of CAM among women, I argue that the discursive construction of 
a CAM-using public in these editorials references women. Although women are rarely 
110 
 
 
mentioned in the medical journals, it is through these silences that the continuation of 
gender oppression in medicine serves to differentiate women and non-Anglo patients as 
primitive, emotional, or lacking knowledge.  
Yet the construction of women as gullible does not completely strip them of their 
agency. Because women also make up the majority of health consumers, their decisions 
have economic consequences for the direction of healthcare, and their market power has 
the ability to partially determine which therapies become sanctioned through insurance 
coverage. Because of their consumer power, they are thus in a position to potentially re-
shape the contours of accepted treatment options.  
These journals’ construction of a gullible public in need of direction references 
anxieties around the shifting terrain of healthcare therapies, medical education, and 
government funds that are contentious issues in the contemporary medical profession. In 
the next section, I explain how medical journals incorporate CAM into conventional 
medicine as if it were politically significant and divisive. I argue that while the medical 
community views the politics of CAM in terms of its ability to withstand the rigors of 
science, the public crosses traditional political divides between Republican and Democrat 
in order to organize around a politics that fights to include CAM in mainstream medical 
care. Thus, the divide between CAM and allopathic medicine is not necessarily between 
political conservatives and liberals, but between a wide swath of the public and a segment 
of professionals within medicine and the sciences who believe CAM threatens the 
reputability of conventional medicine.  
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The Politics and Sub-Politics of Medicine            
In his discussion of the differences between politics and sub-politics, Beck (1992) argues 
that whereas politics is democratically legitimated and contains checks and balances 
through the law and other forums, sub-politics—in particular, the sub-politics of 
medicine—checks itself only against its own internal professional standards, thus 
excluding other voices from determining what is researched and funded. In the sub-
politics of medicine Beck argues, “It is the model of an undifferentiated authority to act, 
which does not yet know the separation of powers, and in which social goals only need 
be conceded to the affected parties retrospectively, as secondary consequences that have 
already become a reality” (p. 209). It is this institutional power that scientists and doctors 
hope to retain, without the influence of what they perceive as an uneducated public.  
As Whorton (2002) notes, the conflict between alternative and conventional 
medicine has always been a political struggle: “Indeed, the history of alternative 
medicine is, almost by definition, the story of outsiders fighting the establishment, and, 
awkward though it sounds, there is considerable merit in another of the names that has 
been suggested for unconventional practice: counterhegemonic medicine” (p. 23). 
Whorton’s insight about the counterhegemonic nature of alternative medicine is 
important because it references both the history of conventional medicine’s demonization 
of CAM as well as speaks to those historically associated with CAM—women and 
institutional outsiders who tried to challenge allopathic medicine’s dominance in 
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healthcare. In order to provide a context for the contemporary debate within the medical 
community over CAM, in the following section I discuss the history of the NCCAM  
History of the NCCAM 
The NCCAM was created in 1998, a significant moment in CAM’s integration into 
mainstream medical practice. Wharton (2002) also identifies the creation of the OAM as 
an important political moment that signified the entrée of alternative medicine into the 
mainstream and created controversy within the medical community. “The decision by the 
U.S. Congress in 1991 to establish an Office of Alternative Medicine at the National 
Institutes of Health was, to be sure, a political act, and one that enraged many MDs” 
(Whorton, 2002, p. x). The coverage in the medical journals I examined supports 
Wharton’s claim that the establishment of the Office of Alternative Medicine (OAM), 
and later, the NCCAM, were important developments in the acceptability of CAM (to a 
certain extent) within the medical community. For example, JAMA devoted an entire 
issue to alternative medicine in 1998 and the majority of the editorials written in that 
issue were in favor of the formation of the NCCAMxxxviii. Science included two articles 
on the development of the NCCAM  in 1997 and 1998 respectively. The 1998 article in 
Science was cautiously skeptical. Although both sides of the argument—those who 
favored the creation of the NCCAM as well as those who questioned the political 
motivations behind its becoming a Center—were featured, the article concluded with 
perspectives from scientists who disagreed with the efficacy of alternative therapies and 
claimed that politics trumped science in the creation of the center:  
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Clearly the political push for expanding [the office] into a center didn’t want to 
wait for any critical review,” says Nobel prize-winning biologist Paul Berg of the 
Stanford University School of Medicine. Nevertheless, Berg and Goodenough 
both say they would support rigorous clinical trials of treatments such as 
acupuncture, homeopathy, and herbal therapies. As Varmus puts it: “I think 
there’s a lot to learn; there’s probably a lot to debunk.  (Couzin, 1998, Paragraphs 
11 and 12) 
Ending the article on such a note offers a skeptical view of the NCCAM, a trend that 
continued in Science. Nearly ten years after the publication of this article, the validity of 
the NCCAM is still debated in Science, after an article authored by Donald M. Marcus of 
Baylor College of Medicine and Arthur P. Grollman of the Department of 
Pharmacological Sciences at State University of New York, Stonybrook raised questions 
about the research standards of the NCCAM. In their article, Marcus and Grollman claim 
that the research agenda at the NCCAM is shaped by politics rather than science.  
Positioning science as outside of, and superior to, politics reinforces its 
supposedly ideologically neutral character and reinforces the modernist discourse of 
objectivity, neutrality, and progress that are central concepts informing the scientific 
profession. In addition, as Fairclough (1993) points out, because language is constitutive 
of both identity and knowledge production, there is no knowledge that exists separate 
from the discursive realm. Ideology is thus masked behind a guise of neutrality, 
contributing to the opacity of the links between discourse and society (Fairclough, 1993, 
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p. 135). In my study, most of the authors in the medical journals deny the social 
situatedness of science, positioning it as outside of politics and thus obscuring how 
scientific knowledge is also produced under social circumstances that include the types 
and agendas of organizations funding the research, what outcomes are hoped for or 
expected, and the people who are conducting the experiments (Dubriwny, 2013).  
 In another piece that suggests politics have too much influence on scientific 
practice, a January 2005 article in Science discusses the possibility of Florida State 
University opening the first chiropractic medical school. Author Bhattacharjee (2005) 
notes that FSU is planning on opening the school, because an unnamed Florida senator, 
who is also a chiropractor, urged the Florida legislature to provide $9 million dollars a 
year to fund the school. The article includes quotes from both sides of the debate, but 
ends with a firm assertion against opening the school:  
None of those arguments is enough to convince neuroscientist Marc Freeman, one 
of 40 FSU professors—including Nobel Prize-winning chemist Harry Kroto and 
physicist J. Robert Schrieffer—who have signed a petition against the proposal. 
Apart from the lack of a scientific basis, he says, the chiropractic school is a threat 
to FSU's academic independence. “We cannot have the legislature forcing a 
program on a public university,” he says. (Bhattacharjee, 2005, p. 194) 
A large graphic of a faux university campus map accompanies the article. Illustrated by 
Albert Stiegman, a chemist at FSU, the map shows an oversized chiropractic medicine 
building along with neighboring buildings, including “tarot studies,” a “bigfoot institute,” 
and a “crop circle simulation laboratory” among others. The caption to the map, reads, 
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“This fictitious map of FSU's main campus, by chemist Albert Stiegman, has helped rally 
faculty opposition to a chiropractic school” (Bhattacharjee, 2005, p. 194). Ultimately the 
school did not materialize and so critics of the program, in this case those on the side of 
traditional science, prevailed.  
In a similar vein, the journals I have reviewed also frequently feature critics of the 
NCCAM who claim that its research is without rigorous scientific standards, and, 
therefore, is wasteful of taxpayer dollars. In one debate in Science, prominent critics 
discredit its work citing flawed methodology, biased researchers, and questionable uses 
of funding.  For example, the Marcus and Grollman (2006) article that I mentioned earlier 
is a part of this debate, focusing on their concerns that ten years after the center was 
formed, many of the CAM therapies that have been tested by the NCCAM have been 
proven useless. The authors focus on the NCCAM’s failure to prove that herbal remedies 
have efficacy, including Echinacea (as a cold remedy) and St. John’s Wort (for 
depression), both of which have been proven to be ineffective using conventional testing 
(Marcus & Grollman, 2006). According to a later article published in Nature, because the 
Center has proved these herbal remedies ineffective, the mission of the center is changing 
to focus on the “mind-body connection” and using CAM therapies for pain management 
rather than exploring the apparently unfruitful avenue of discovering the healing potential 
of herbs (Wadman, 2009).  
Wadman’s (2009) article also features quotes from Steven Novella, a neurologist 
at Yale University (who also appears on The Dr. Oz Show as I will discuss in chapter 
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four), and Marcus, both of whom are members of the Institute for Science in Medicine: a 
group of physicians and scientists who fight policies that support alternative medicine. 
Marcus asserts that the NCCAM  has been a waste of money, and suggests that the center 
be dissolved; however, he acknowledges this probably will not happen because, he 
claims, Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA), who authored the bill that formed the NCCAM,  is 
‘too powerful’” (Wadman, 2009, Paragraph 12). The article concludes by validating 
Marcus’ sentiments: “A decade after the NCCAM's birth that power remains on display: 
Harkin and others have inserted provisions in health-reform bills in both houses of 
Congress mandating that insurers reimburse state-licensed alternative medicine 
providers” (Wadman, 2009, Paragraph 13). The medical journal coverage in NEJM, 
Science and Nature suggests that those physicians who support CAM therapies are 
simply pandering to a consumer market and encouraging patients to believe in something 
that is not effective. They see the support for CAM as a political issue, one that 
challenges the legitimacy of the established profession and is framed as a battle that 
conventional science is losing.  
One article in Naturexxxix, however, discusses the public being a possible buffer 
against the infringement of policy on science: “And although fears of the politicization of 
science are easily overblown, the time may come—perhaps it is here already—when 
direct public involvement may be the best protection against politicians who are 
selectively unfriendly to scientific freedoms” (Taylor, 2007, p. 163). Taylor’s article is 
perhaps most sympathetic to the public, and asks the most of scientists. He demands that 
scientists respond to the public’s concerns over the ethical and social implications of 
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research, and encourages independent research regardless of funding sources. However, 
the article’s focus is still on persuading the public to understand the scientific 
community’s position and increase scientists’ credibility with the public.     
Meanwhile, JAMA’s coverage is much more sympathetic to the possibility that 
alternative therapies may be effective in some cases; even so, JAMA still frames the 
debate between CAM and conventional medicine as political. “Despite the popularity of 
alternative medicine, conventional medicine is arguably the politically dominant health 
system with a somewhat circumscribed set of practices that differ from alternative 
therapies” (Sugarman & Burk, 1998, p. 1623). The JAMA editorial highlights therapies 
that have been both proven and disproven, continuously calling for the need to continue 
testing alternative treatments:  
The spectrum of possible responses to alternative medicine is quite broad, 
ranging from an obligation to stifle harmful practices to mere acceptance 
of nonharmful modalities, to encouraging the use of beneficial 
interventions. Obviously, none of these singular approaches is adequate or 
appropriate in all cases. Rather, given the diversity of modalities embraced 
by a broad definition of alternative medicine and medical uncertainties 
regarding safety and efficacy, each approach is at times correct. 
(Sugarman & Burk, 1998, p.1624)  
Sugarman and Burk go on to respond to some of the criticism in the other journals about 
the invalidity of the NCCAM:  
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Despite this argument, some skeptical clinicians may still object, claiming that 
investigating these approaches wastes scarce research dollars and encourages 
patients to invest their money in sources of false hope. Nevertheless, if this 
research is conducted properly, the extent to which alternative medicine therapies 
meet patients' expectations will be clear. Armed with these data, harmful or 
useless practices could be abandoned and clinicians would be better positioned to 
help their patients make informed decisions to reach essential health-related goals. 
(Sugarman & Burk, 1998, p. 1625) 
So, while Sugarman and Burk support alternative health research, they also reassert both 
the primacy of scientific standards and the supremacy of doctors as the ultimate guides 
for patients.  
The introductory editorial in this same issue devoted to alternative medicine, 
supports the NCCAM:  
The activities of the Office of Alternative Medicine and the publication of this 
issue of JAMA illustrate that quality scientific research can be conducted and 
published on alternative medicine topics. It appears that complementary and 
alternative medicine has again "come of age" in the United States. However, the 
rush to embrace a new integration of alternative and conventional medicine 
should be approached with great caution. Alternative medicine, like conventional 
medicine, has pros and cons, promotes bad ideas and good ones, and promises to 
hold both benefits and risks. (Jonas, 1998, p. 1616)  
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Despite this initial support, Sugarman and Burk (1998) and Jonas (1998) make clear that 
rigorous scientific standards must be upheld, and that alternative medicine must be held 
to the same standards as conventional medicine:  
To adopt alternative medicine without developing quality standards for its 
practices, products, and research is to return to a time in medicine when quackery 
and therapeutic confusion prevailed. Modern conventional medicine excels in the 
areas of quality health care and the use of science: alternative medicine must 
change to adopt similar standards (Jonas, 1998, p. 1617). 
Although this is a strong statement for maintaining the primacy of scientific 
methodologies, the article ends by exploring how conventional medicine can learn from 
alternative medicine, including how doctors may be more gentle in administering 
treatments, changing the language of healing to be more appealing to patients, and 
acknowledging the power and possibility of the body to self-heal. Jonas (1998) concludes 
by claiming alternative medicine should not be marginalized but explored in greater 
depth in order to retain practices or therapies that may be beneficial to patients.  
Contrary to some of the skepticism expressed about politicians in the medical 
journals, political supporters of the NCCAM, such as Representative John Porter (R-IL), 
interviewed in a 1998 article in Science, also emphasize the need for rigorous science and 
of the importance of convincing the public of which therapies are beneficial. "’I don't 
think it would be good to have a stream of negative messages’ about the value of such 
treatments that were not based on sound science, says Porter, who chairs the 
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subcommittee that handles NIH's budget. To a public that's supportive of such therapies, 
says Porter, it would ‘seem like a conspiracy [against alternative medicine]’" (Couzin, 
1998, Paragraph 3). So, while doctors who support evidence-based medicine based on the 
RCT suggest that politicians are unable to understand or respect their autonomy this 
quote indicates that politicians who support the NCCAM also support scientific 
methodologies and testing of CAM therapies.  
The Politics of CAM in the Public Sphere  
Although interest in alternative medicine might be considered anti-establishment, as 
Johnston (2004) points out, it is not mainly a politically liberal or politically conservative 
issue. In fact, according to Johnston (2004), the legislators with the most impact in 
expanding the OAM are from both ends of the ideological spectrum: liberal Senator Tom 
Harkin (D-IA) and conservative Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT). Sociologist Michael 
Goldstein argues that alternative medicine serves both liberal and conservative interests 
because liberals espouse the counter-cultural component of alternative medicine that 
emphasizes alternative healing, while social conservatives believe in the element of 
personal responsibility and non-governmental solutions often forwarded by alternative 
practitioners (Johnston, 2004, p. 4).  
Schneirov and Geczik (2004) similarly identify the alternative health movement 
as a social movement that bridges the divide between the political right and left. They 
argue that both come together over their distrust of political and medical authority. In 
their study investigating two groups of people who were interested in CAM—one 
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identified as politically conservative, working-class Christian and the other identified as 
politically liberal with an interest in Eastern philosophy—the authors found that both 
groups shared a common interest in being able to experiment with alternative medical 
treatments without the interference of government. “For example, both groups oppose 
governmental regulations of alternative health products and treatments and believe that 
patients have the right to pursue and even self-administer unconventional treatments that 
have not been approved by the FDA” (Schneirov & Gecznik, 2004, p. 235). Both groups 
also emphasize the importance of individual responsibility in health care. As alternative 
health users, they see themselves as more active and self-educated about their health in 
contrast to being passive patients of the medical establishment (Schneirov & Gecznik, 
2004, p. 236). Similar to how Dubrwiny (2013) describes biosocial communities (or 
those groups organized by sufferers of a particular disease) in pushing for funding and 
advocacy for their cause, CAM proponents may be understood as working together in the 
same way to expand how medical care is practiced in the United States.  
In addition, both liberal and conservative groups share a critique of 
commodification and consumer culture along with a critique of modern medicine’s 
institutions. While the problematic assumption of individualization—for example, how 
mediating health risks is a matter of individual choice (Petersen, 1997, and Robertson, 
2000)—is clearly embedded in the ethos of some forms of alternative medicine, the 
alliance of political right and left groups around the support of alternative medicine 
reflects the type of political linkages that Beck (1992) suggests emerge around some 
issues in the risk society (in his example, environmental pollution); these alliances have 
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the power to challenge dominant methodological systems, such as that of the RCT, which 
are at the root of proving contemporary allopathic medicine as superior to CAM.  
The politics of CAM help to illustrate how the public influences policy as well as 
how government is in conversation with other sources of institutional power, such as 
medicine and the sciences, thus providing an example of Foucault’s power/knowledge 
matrix. In this formation, not only is power operating from multiple sources, but the 
public is actively constructing their own ideas about medicine and health, informed by a 
risk rationality. As Nettleton (1997) notes:  
For example, it is quite evident that knowledge and information about health and 
medicine are not simply formulated by medical experts (clinicians, scientists, etc.) 
and disseminated to a wider audience of health professionals and the public, who 
in turn accept them as a matter of course. Rather, the knowledge that is generated 
in these and other locations provides a valuable tool of government at the levels of 
political discourse, institutions and individuals. Here it may form a valuable 
dimension of the exercise of power (p. 218).  
The power to define what counts as valid medicine is an ongoing, dialectical process. 
Although I argue that scientists and medical doctors still have the monopoly, this may not 
always be the case. As the example of CAM illustrates, the public and the government do 
have a hand in shaping the contours of policy, and this power also has the potential to re-
shape a historically dominant institution, such as conventional medicine.  
 
123 
 
 
Conclusion     
Alternative medicine practices are becoming accepted within the medical community, 
although as the coverage in the medical journals suggests, there is still some staunch 
opposition to incorporating CAM into science based medicine. Within the medical and 
science journals, CAM is constituted as politically meaningful, but paradoxically, CAM’s 
overtly political character marks it as less worthy of funding and scientific attention. Yet, 
despite differing opinions on its incorporation, the reinforcement of institutional 
supremacy is maintained through propping up the RCT as the only means by which to 
test CAM therapies. Finally, alternative medicine is a movement that has political 
significance for both liberal and conservative lay people; thus, forging an alliance on this 
common ground enables a momentary linkage to push alternative medicine as a valid 
means of healing that should be invested in by government funding agencies and insurer 
reimbursements.  
In this chapter, I have shown that the history of alternative health and the politics 
of women’s health have a long relationship. This historical relationship and the rates of 
women who currently use CAM suggest that women today are a public invested in and 
subjected to scrutiny as users of CAM. I have provided a glimpse into the professional 
concerns over the inability of the public, and thus women, to make the correct decision 
about alternative care, and thus illustrate how women are still placed in a relative position 
of subordination in relation to conventional medicine. I have also illustrated how the RCT 
and the ideal of scientific objectivity are constructed as the only means by which CAM 
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therapies should be tested; thus, even within the debate in the medical community over 
whether or not CAM therapies should be accepted, the institutional norms of science and 
objectivity are held up as an ideal that helped to secure medical authority. Finally, I have 
argued that the debate over the incorporation of CAM into mainstream medical practice 
is a political issue within the medical community as well as for politicians and lay people. 
While the journals constitute the public and politicians as anti-science, the ability for the 
public to come together across party lines in favor of changing the medical landscape 
provides a potent example of how solidarity can be achieved within reflexive modernity.  
In the next chapter, I analyze the discursive construction of CAM in women’s 
popular health media and argue that it is subsumed by lifestyle concerns such as beauty 
and weight; thus, at times the discursive construction of CAM reinforces patriarchal 
assumptions about the social importance of outward appearance for women. However, 
CAM is also discursively constructed in these media in ways that challenge the super-thin 
ideal that is consistently represented in women’s popular media. CAM is thus linked to 
both regressive and progressive ideologies in women’s popular health media. 
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Chapter Three: “Beauty, Slimness, and Health: The Discursive Construction of Risk in 
Women’s Popular Health Media”  
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the medical community at large constructs 
CAM—as a phenomenon that must be carefully circumscribed using the institutional and 
methodological frameworks of conventional medicine. In this chapter, I explore how 
women’s popular health media represent CAM in order to understand how it is 
constructed for a wide group of women. This is important in broadening the scope of the 
project and applying it to gender more concretely. In my analysis of women’s popular 
health media, I found that one of the key ways CAM is discursively constructed is by 
connecting appearance to health. In this discourse, beauty is constructed as attainable via 
CAM, in ways that blur the lines between health and appearance: for example, by 
suggesting beauty may be attained through a healthy lifestyle via the use of supplements, 
such as vitamin combinations. In addition, these outlets discuss the pursuit of beauty for 
its own sake as vain and thus a hindrance to personal development. The discursive 
construction of vanity in these media thus obscures the social norms dictating that beauty 
is important for women to possess in American culture. Because women’s popular health 
media construct vanity as a moral shortcoming, their articulation of beauty to health in 
general, and CAM in particular, positions the pursuit of beauty as a valid, central pastime 
in women’s lives, this is achieved through these media’s recommendations that women 
participate in routine, scrutinized self-examinations, thus providing guidelines that 
contribute to disciplinary practices for women and ultimately leads to an intensification 
126 
 
 
of a normalized image of female health (Foucault, 1977). I argue that articulating CAM 
to beauty provides a more stringent set of standards for women than even those 
imperatives from media that frame beauty as a means of empowerment, such as the well-
known L’Oreal ads for cosmetics or hair dye featuring beautiful celebrities expressing 
their signature phrase, “I’m worth it” (Durham, 2009). Moreover, I argue that when 
women’s popular health media articulate physical appearancexl to health (often conflating 
the two), they do so using risk to discursively displace their emphasis on  appearance by 
foregrounding the supposed health benefits and consequences of not monitoring one’s 
physical appearance, including—importantly—slimness.  
In addition, the discourse on weight loss presented in these media tend to 
emphasize diet and exercise as the primary course to good health; thus, the media I 
analyze also convey a biopolitical imperative when they express concerns about obesity 
(which concerns the health of the population) at the same time they encourage personal 
discipline. In order to analyze both the repressive and enabling aspects of weight loss 
discourse, I will draw from the work of Heyes (2007), who argues that disciplinary 
strategies of weight loss, while enabling women’s capacities for change, growth, and 
personal achievement in some ways, ultimately co-opt the freedom and liberation 
promised to women who are highly committed to these practices.  
In this chapter, I thus argue that risk discourses in women’s popular health media 
function in two ways. First, risk discursively secures the dominance of beauty and 
slimness as a cultural value central to femininity, achieved by these media by connecting 
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conventional beauty standards—such as a youthful appearance, smooth nails, and clear 
skin—to health, and connect added weight, skin or nail problems to an absence of 
optimum health or illness. These recommendations therefore encourage disciplinary 
practices that succeed in making women subjects, not through overt force, but through 
observation and normalization (Foucault 1977, p. 170). In addition, the media I analyze 
suggest that living the healthy lifestyle they recommend will mediate health risks and 
thus engage in what Beck (1992) terms risk displacement: a process by which experts 
provide supposed remedies to protect people against the negative consequences of risks.  
On the other hand, women’s popular health media also employ risk discourses as 
a means to critique unhealthy habits—such as fad dieting—because of the supposed 
negative effects on health. Thus, a paradox emerges: these media engage reflexively with 
critiques of the media as perpetuators of a thin body ideal that may motivate fad dieting, 
while, at the same time they reinforce the importance of a normalized version of the 
female body for women. This at times can be problematic, because the media’s stated 
concern with women’s health obscures the normalized relationship between health and 
appearance, thus making that discourse more difficult to counter. 
In the first section of this chapter, I outline the historical cultural relationship 
between beauty, health and virtue, and describe how CAM is articulated to appearance by 
women’s popular health media through encouraging women to participate in examining 
any apparent abnormalities in their appearance. In the next section, I argue that vanity is 
discussed in women’s popular health media as a struggle that women negotiate, thus 
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speaking to the savvy of women audiences who are aware of the unrealistic standards of 
beauty presented in the media. In the third part of the chapter, I discuss how women’s 
popular health media connect weight—particularly overweight and obesity—to health 
using the risk of disease as a motivator to lose weight. Throughout these sections, I 
illustrate how risk discourses are used to justify self-examination and thus reinforce a 
normalized female body; in the last section I illustrate how risk also functions in these 
discourses to provide a critique of fad dieting, with some of this content even discussing 
the problem of doctors discriminating against their overweight female patients. These 
media thus reproduce some aspects of patriarchy while at the same time they critique it.    
CAM, health, and beauty  
I use historian Kathy Peiss’ (1998) definition of “beauty culture” in order to explore how 
beauty has been linked historically to women, health and virtue, and has been a consistent 
trope across time in American history, continuing into the present. Peiss defines beauty 
culture, “…not only as a type of commerce but as a system of meaning that helped 
women navigate the changing conditions of modern social experience” (Peiss, 2008, p. 
6). As she argues, women have not only been subjected to beauty standards, but have also 
used them to actively fashion identities and express rebellion; this process changes 
historically due to changing political and economic realities. For example, during the 19th 
century, women in the U.S. both entering the working world and being entrenched in a 
new “marriage market” (which supplanted traditional forms of courtship) were 
expressions of women’s new social roles. “For women experiencing these social changes, 
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the act of beautifying often became a lightning rod for larger conflicts over female 
autonomy and social roles” (Peiss, 1998, p. 7).  
As a system of meaning, contemporary beauty culture is inflected in women’s 
popular health media with discourses of health and longevity; as I will discuss further at 
the end of this section, it also has an economic imperative (by blending beauty, fashion, 
and health content, media seamlessly create brand identities and present a more unified 
message to their target markets). One of the reasons articulating appearance to health is 
problematic is because beauty standards are cultural constructions that have historically 
functioned to oppress women. As communication health scholar Lebesco (2010) points 
out, those who do not conform to a slim body are subject to moralizing critiques (often 
subtly disguised as public health initiatives) of the overweight as being ignorant, lacking 
self-control or lazy. In addition, because beauty standards have oppressed women, it is 
important to note that connecting appearance with health is not politically neutral and 
necessitates further investigation (Peiss, 1998).  
For example, as Susan Bordo (1993) points out, the embodied woman has 
historically been laden with negative associations attributed to the mind-body dualism 
fundamental to Western philosophical thought. For example, the duality of mind and 
body has been used historically to justify women’s life paths in child-rearing and home-
making, constructed as natural expressions of their reproductive capacities, while men 
were seen as inherently rational and fit for life in the public sphere.  
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This bias in turn has informed the medical profession’s historical assumption that 
women’s bodies are pathological. For example, in addition to women’s bodies being 
constructed as problematic or diseased, medical practitioners and scientists in the 1700s 
and 1800s used phrenology and physiognomy to connect inner states of being or moral 
worth and external appearance. Peiss’ (1998) discussion of how men and women were 
characterized in physiognomy and phrenology according to appearance explains the 
importance beauty held for women. “These pseudosciences classified men in terms of a 
diverse range of occupations and aptitudes. When it came to women, however their 
subject was solely beauty and virtue. Thus physical beauty originated not in visual 
sensation and formal aesthetics but in its ‘representative and correspondent’ relationship 
to goodness” (Peiss, 1998, p. 24). As Peiss points out, beauty was not based on formal 
aesthetics but was simply a construction of those “sciences.” Peiss’ discussion of how 
phrenology and physiognomy “scientifically” discovered how appearance was directly 
connected to inner goodness illustrates how science has been used in the past to justify 
the oppression of  women, minorities, and those with lower class status, and shows how 
scientific findings must always be considered within their cultural and social context.  
Similarly, beauty standards are not static but shift over time (Durham, 2009, 
Wolf, 2002). As Ehrenreich and English (2005) note, connecting beauty to health has 
roots in the Victorian Age, where sickly looking, pallid women were set up as a standard 
of beauty, and a constant state of illness connoted class privilege. Yet, Durham (2009) 
argues that having a full figure until at least the 1830s (right before the advent of the 
Victorian Age) was associated with good habits, temperament and health (Durham, 2009, 
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p. 184). Conversely, today a much thinner form is associated with perceived good health 
and attractiveness.  
Because beauty standards are cultural constructions that change with time; it is 
neither inevitable nor pre-ordained that the stick thin look will always be the standard for 
female beauty or will always stand as a symbol for health. In fact, contemporary critiques 
of waif-thin celebrities seem to be policing the boundaries of thinness and the burgeoning 
field of fat studies (which has recently generated both an edited volume: The Fat Studies 
Reader ([Rothblum & Solovay, 2009] and an academic journal entitled Fat Studies), 
points to shifting sentiments around the issue of weight and what counts as healthy. 
These trends point to resistance against the moralizing discourse of the obesity epidemic. 
These critiques of thinness are illustrative of reflexivity in late modernity among 
both academics (where fat studies is an emerging field) and lay populations (in the fat 
acceptance movements). Despite this reflexive response, the unrealistic beauty and fitness 
standards that women are expected to live up to are reinforced powerfully in the media 
through  self-examination, which works to secure a normalized ideal of what healthy 
women’s bodies should look like. Indeed, as Foucault (1977) argues, self-surveillance, or 
the internalization of particular norms and the subsequent monitoring of these norms by 
subjects (in this case, what counts as visible indicators of health) works to produce 
certain kinds of subjects (in this example, fit and active citizens) that support and expand 
social and governmental imperatives (in this example, the anti-obesity epidemic and an 
emphasis on maintaining youthfulness, both of which promote self-sufficiency).  
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Media Analysis 
In order to provide examples of how women’s popular health media present the practice 
of self-examination as an important indicator from which to assess health, I analyze The 
Dr. Oz Show, Women’s Health Magazine, and Prevention magazine. To analyze Dr. Oz’s 
program, I selected 28 shows from the Fall 2011 season. I chose these shows based on 
title and description, purposely selecting programs that did not deal with beauty or weight 
loss. I did this so that I could assess the general content in shows that appeared to be 
about other topics. I chose not to include CAM as a prerequisite in the description 
because based on my previous experience with the program, CAM elements are 
incorporated into most episodes.  
I also chose to analyze every feature-length (more than two pages) magazine 
article in 2011 from Prevention—which included 12 feature articles (out of 12 issues) 
that dealt with CAM or that associated beauty, weight and health—and Women’s Health, 
which included three articles (out of 10) that dealt with the same topics. In the following 
section, I detail excerpts from the media I analyzed in order to illustrate how self-
examination encourages a disciplinary practice among women and thus constructs a 
normalized image of the female body at the same time it serves biopolitical imperatives.  
Women’s Popular Health Media’s Construction of the Examination 
Media representations that link CAM, health, and appearance often associate a perceived 
flaw in physical appearance, such as acne or discolored nails, as possible indicators of 
underlying health problems or a sign that one is not in optimal health. In order to assess 
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whether or not women may have an underlying illness, these media often recommend 
they perform a self-examination to observe any possible abnormalities in their own 
appearance. However, although finding underlying illnesses is often the stated claim of 
the shows and magazine features I analyze, this coverage typically ends up devolving into 
beauty advice rather than a discussion of illness; thus the examination functions to 
perpetuate a normalized standard of female health.  
This theme is highlighted on The Dr. Oz Show in an episode entitled, “Biggest 
anti-aging hour ever: no makeup show: what’s the real age of your skin?”, supposedly 
devoted to showing how lackluster skin can point to more serious health issues. Oz opens 
the show by trying to sympathize with his female viewers. In front of an empty studio 
audience he addresses the camera: 
Before today’s show starts, I have a confession to make. I’ve been hiding behind 
my makeup. But not today, this is the real me, untouched. Every day before the 
show, I spend at least 15 minutes putting on makeup to hide the dark circles and 
bags under my eyes. Just like you, I cover the signs of aging. Makeup covers the 
flaws you don't want others to see, but as a doctor, I don’t want you to miss what 
your naked face tells you about your health. That’s why today, for the first time 
ever, I’m asking my entire audience to remove their makeup. They don’t know it 
yet; I’m going to tell them. (“Biggest anti-aging hour ever: No makeup show—
What’s the real age of your skin?, Winfrey, 2011)  
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Although Oz tries to portray himself as sympathetic to his female audience members, 
comparing his removal of makeup to that of the women in the audience is clearly not a 
parallel example, due in no small part to the fact that many women apply makeup every 
day and have been socialized to do so for gender specific reasons; men, unless they are 
on television, generally do not use makeup. In this example, the practice of applying 
make-up, which Bartky (1988) argues is a form of discipline, is stripped of its gender-
differentiating context. This is not to say that the practice of applying makeup is 
necessarily felt as disciplinary by the women who perform this ritual; just that as a 
socialized practice, it constructs female bodies differently than male bodies.  
Contrary to Oz’s claims about what analyzing makeup-free skin will reveal about 
health, the “Biggest anti-aging hour ever” episode continues by emphasizing aging skin 
as a problem and suggesting possible remedies for it, rather than discussing health 
problems that may be causing skin to appear dull. In this episode, make-up is removed 
and the examination reveals the “truth” of these women’s appearance and, supposedly, 
health. Oz walks his audience through an examination of their skin and asks his studio 
audience to hold hand mirrors to examine their make-up free faces, asking them questions 
such as, “Are your upper eyelids drooping? Almost touching your lower lashes? [and] Do 
you see smile lines from the corner of your nostrils to the corner of your mouth?” 
(“Biggest anti-aging hour ever,” Winfrey, 2011).  
This process clearly illustrates how the normalization of youth as an indicator of 
health is established through a very detailed examination of the face: 
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It [the examination] established over individuals visibility through which one 
differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of 
discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony 
of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the 
establishment of truth (Foucault, 1977, p. 184). 
As a doctor, Oz has the authority to lead the audience through a series of questions that 
appear to be diagnostic, implying that this exam has some medical relevance to health. In 
addition, sagging skin and wrinkles become deviant variations from an ideal norm, thus 
subtly reinforcing the idea that young looking skin means healthy skin. The medical 
aspect of the topic is also foregrounded by his expert on the show, a dermatologist, who 
reiterates the medical importance of good-looking skin.  She says: 
Well, I think it’s true that your face reflects what’s going on in your body and the 
face is really the thinnest skin in our body, and it’s sometimes where we first see 
changes of health ailments; for some people, [who] might not be getting enough 
sleep, you’re dehydrated, having an allergic reaction, you might see this in your 
eyes as tiredness, bagginess…so the eyes are really an important window into 
your health (“Biggest anti-aging hour ever,” Winfrey, 2011).  
When both of these doctors discuss possible health problems as being apparent on the 
skin, they not only use the examination to reinforce the normalization of an ideal of 
appearance for healthy women, they also use risk as a means to validate the connection 
between the topic and health (since it is being aired on a health talk show). In this 
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example, risk functions as a discursive means to reinforce the idea that appearance of the 
skin or nails could signal a health problem; however, because health problems are never 
really addressed on the episode, there is a clear conflation between youth and health. In 
addition, the recommendations by the doctors on the show also work as a form of risk 
displacement, making the audience feel as if they have some measure of control over 
their health (for example, if their skin looks good, they have no underlying health 
problem). However, this can be dangerous advice: if a woman who consumes popular 
health media is diagnosed with a medical condition, she may feel as if she was not 
vigilant enough in her observance of outward signs of disease.   
The stated purpose of Oz’s episode—that the skin reflects health—reinforces an 
ideology that conflates outward physical appearance with health. In their discussion of 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, Mumby and Mease (2006) point out that consent is 
needed in order for subordinate groups to agree with the ideology of the ruling class; 
once consensus of a subordinate group or groups is attained, ideology becomes masked as 
common sense. In the example above, the women in the audience agree to go along with 
Oz’s experiment because he assures them it is good for their health—they consent to his 
dictate, seemingly accepting it as common sense, emanating as it does from a credible 
source. Thus, not only does the show connect good-looking skin and health, but the 
ideology of beauty being an important feature for women to possess is reinforced. 
Similarly, the act of adeptly performing a skin-care regimen and acquiring knowledge 
about skin, framed within the context of medicine (dermatology), is presented as an 
important form of knowledge about health.  
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In another example of how self-examination functions to promote normality on 
The Dr. Oz Show, Oz notes, “Your fingernails could be sending signals that something is 
wrong inside your body” (“Dr. Oz Takes on the Queen of Southern Cooking,” 2011). Oz 
goes on to discuss how white cracks in the nail or the absence of a crescent in the nail 
could signal a nutritional deficiency and a dark stripe on the nail could indicate 
melanoma. One of the reasons this is problematic is because it illustrates how women’s 
popular health media have constructed an increasingly stringent, normative view of the 
female body to include factors as minute as the shape, pattern, and color of the nails. This 
micro-analysis of specific body parts thus also requires an increase in self-surveillance 
and contributes to a more stringent regime of a normalized, healthy bodyxli.  
When the media articulate health to appearance, the pursuit of beauty assumes a 
more meaningful urgency than when such an articulation is lacking and they encourage 
women simply to look better for aesthetic or self-confidence reasons. Even though much 
of the mainstream media’s coverage on beauty’s connection to health is related to 
cosmetic advice, having health as a justifying force behind it boosts appearance as a more 
credible concern. Indeed, as Wolf (1992) points out, linking beauty with health helped 
justify the work of cosmetic surgeons, who, she argues, have self-servingly changed the 
meaning of health for women by connecting it to cosmetic surgery procedures. As 
cosmetic surgery has become relatively mainstream, women’s concerns over the risks of 
invasive procedures—which have also been highlighted in the media—have made 
noninvasive options such as Botox and Restylene more attractive to female consumers (in 
2011 there were fewer than 500,000 procedures for face lift and rhinoplasty combined, 
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while there were over 5 million Botox procedures) (Rogers & Vanco, 2012).  When 
beauty is articulated to health through CAM, (for example, if eating certain foods will 
make one look younger, and exercise will achieve a particular body type as well as 
mediate the risk of disease), then those disciplinary practices may be more accepted and 
more widely used by women, and contribute to more women fitting the standard. In this 
case then, the advice serves a normalizing function by identifying what counts as healthy 
skin, hair, nails, and figure. “In a sense the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; 
but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, determine levels, to fix 
specialties and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another” (Foucault, 
p. 184). Therefore, the process of self-examination advocated here may be understood as 
disciplinary when refracted through the lens of health.  
Thomsen (2002) argues that health media may be an important factor in how 
women perceive their bodies and health. In his research of college-aged women who 
consumed health media, he found that media was a major sociocultural influence in body 
perception: those who read health and fitness magazines were more concerned with body 
shape and image than those who read fashion media (criticized in the mainstream media 
and by scholars such as Durham [2009] for providing unrealistic body standards for 
women). Thomsen’s research suggests that women find health media more instructive 
about body size and shape than fashion media, which were more closely associated with 
internalizing gender roles: “The specific focus on dieting and body shaping and sculpting 
found in health and fitness magazine articles and photographs may actually encourage 
readers to engage in more frequent and intense body-oriented and specific body-part 
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comparisons…” (p. 1001). This is important because as Fairclough (2001) explains, 
discourse such as this may influence action: “Discourses, genres, and styles are 
interconnected through a dialectic of ‘rematerialization’—they constitute different 
semiotic materialities which are connected by the processes of operationalization [ways 
of acting and interacting], inculcation [as ways of being] and representation [how non-
semiotic elements of social practice are represented as discourses]” (p. 29). In other 
words, Fairclough argues that discourses can affect how people act as well as how they 
discuss their actions. Similarly, Foucault argues that discourse helps to actively construct 
subjectivities. Because women’s popular health media’s representations of women’s 
bodies are instructive to women about body image, it follows that how media articulate 
the body to health may also be instructive to women in interpreting this connection.  
Now that I have discussed how the self-examination works in women’s popular 
health media to encourage disciplinary practices and contribute to the normalization of a 
healthy female body, in the following section, I provide examples from two women’s 
health magazines—Prevention and Women’s Health—and The Dr. Oz Show in order to 
illustrate how risk discourses function in women’s popular health media to mediate 
concerns over vanity. This illustrates that media producers are aware of the feminist and 
widespread agreement among women about the unrealistic representations of women’s 
bodies in the media. Such concern is acknowledged by these media, but primarily 
remains unchallenged.    
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Women’s Popular Health Media’s Construction of Vanity   
By articulating appearance to CAM through the self-examination, women’s popular 
health media are able to frame beauty as a legitimate health topic. These media also help 
to construct beauty as naturally attainable through diet and exercise, rather than 
dependent on applying makeup adeptly or selecting appropriate clothing. In these ways, 
an emphasis on health supersedes a focus on cosmetic issues, thus making beauty 
regimens appear to be less indulgent. This is not to say that women are dupes or unaware 
that beauty regimens endorse a largely unattainable goal of perpetual youth, indeed 
women have become increasingly critical about unrealistic beauty standards in the media. 
For example, the now widespread awareness and critique of magazines’ and advertiser’s 
photo retouching of models to make them appear as if they have no flaws. When the 
media I analyzed featured women expressing concerns over vanity, these media deployed 
risk discourses as a means to mediate those concerns and assure women that beauty 
maintenance was a worthy pursuitxlii. One common way that risk discourse was used to 
mediate vanity in the media I analyzed, was with suggestions to women that outward 
appearance could be a signal of underlying ill health (or at least not optimum health), as I 
argued in the last section.   
 Before I analyze how concerns over vanity are mediated in these forums, I want 
to examine the connection to advertising and branding—a connection that contributes to 
the economic rationale for connecting appearance and health. I will analyze branding 
further in chapter four; however, as I noted in chapter one, all the media I analyze work 
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synergistically with one another to cross promote content, and the magazines I analyze, 
Prevention and Women’s Health both include ads from upscale beauty brands that 
promote themselves as “natural,” such as Aveda. Beauty brands that promote themselves 
as natural and health media tend to share a target audience so integrating their messages 
to that audience contributes to a more cohesive message and thus a more effective and 
lucrative branding strategy for both the beauty brands and the media.  
Women’s Health provides an exemplary illustration of the synergy between health 
and beauty media. Michelle Promaulyako, WH’s executive editor was a former editor at 
Cosmopolitan and has brought her expertise in the fashion and beauty world to the 
publication. In addition to increasing fashion and beauty advertisements since she arrived 
she has helped to create an effective brand image for the magazine (Ives, 2009). She has 
been so successful with this endeavor, that in 2009, WH was named Advertising Age’s, 
“Magazine of the Year.” In their description of its successful branding strategy the site 
notes: 
Most magazines say they’re brands too, but Women’s Health is (power) walking 
the talk. And its other platforms aren’t just extensions—they’re revenue drivers. 
Its free website, for example, leads visitors to two of them, Fit Coach and the Abs 
Diet for Women, which charge membership fees (Ives, 2009, Paragraphs 1 and 2).  
As Promaulayko notes in the article, “We have an aggressive content strategy that starts 
with the magazine and moves across multiple platforms” (Ives, 2009, Paragraph 3). The 
content I analyze in these media thus works to not just reinforce social norms of 
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appearance for women but also to extend the fashion and beauty industry into other 
realms that are only slightly related, such as health; this contributes to a more unified 
series of images and messages that reinforce a particular normalized version of a healthy 
female body. What I want to emphasize here is that the trends I describe are not simply 
ideological; they also point to the creation of an important branding strategy of natural 
products and CAM therapies that advertisers target to a specific consumer niche. Because 
of this connection between beauty and health content, it is important for the media I 
analyze to mediate the concerns of women over the time they spend on beauty regimens, 
by articulating these regimens to health, they are thus constituted as a worthy pursuit.  
Vanity as Vice and the Historical Connection to Race and Class 
In the media I analyze, women who articulate concern about vanity are all white, even 
though the Dr. Oz Show has a good number of visible minorities in his audience. Indeed 
the historical associations with “brazen” make-up application provides a historical 
context for understanding how white, middle-class women view vanity. As Peiss (1998) 
notes: “In the nineteenth century, Americans insisted on a fundamental distinction 
between skin-improving and skin-masking substances” (1998, p. 6). Because of the social 
distinction in the late 1800s between improving one’s appearance subtly and the more 
brazen makeup application of prostitutes and lower class women, make-up use served to 
demarcate women from one another as well as prescribed a particular look of naturalness 
to be achieved with the right products and adept application, a process that was key to 
visibly defining class differences among women. Indeed, being slim and achieving a 
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“natural” look is also linked in contemporary times with social class, as those from the 
working class often have differential access to healthful foods and exercise, as well as 
have different social expectations for body standards (Lupton, 1994, p. 40). Thus, the 
recommendations forwarded on Oz’s show are class-specific, catering to a white, middle-
class standard of beauty. In that sense, these recommendations may be understood as 
postfeminist: the white, middle-class woman is constructed by the media as representing 
all women (Vavrus, 2002). Similarly, targeting this group of women speaks to the 
economic rationale of selling “natural” products across these platforms.  
One reason women express concerns over vanity is that they are increasingly 
aware of the socially constructed nature of beauty norms. In her study that involved 
interviewing 42 individuals about weight loss and beauty, Kwan (2009) found that they 
were aware of, and resistant to, unrealistic beauty standards: “unlike health messages—
which nearly all participants openly embraced—most participants criticized the cultural 
beauty ideal, indicating that it is an unattainable, unrealistic, and airbrushed fiction” (p. 
1226). Feminist scholars Lisa R. Rubin, Carol J. Nemeroff, and Nancy Felipe Russo 
(2004) heard similar responses from women they interviewed who were critical of a 
beauty ideal, but still struggled with feeling as if they were vain. In their study, focus 
groups of women who discussed body image and appearance and also described 
themselves as feminists felt that caving to beauty pressures meant that they were 
inadequate feminists, thus exacerbating their feelings of shame around beauty and body 
image (Rubin, et. al., 2004). “In fact, the participants described feelings of guilt, or 
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shame, for being feminist and still ‘buying into’ cultural and commercial messages about 
beauty ideals” (Rubin, et. al., 2004, p. 35).  
Women expressing concern over being vain seems to be a departure from the 
media discourse that links beauty to empowerment, which has been critiqued by many 
feminist scholars (Gill & Arthurs, 2006, and Lazar, 2006). Although there are still plenty 
of examples in the media of this tendency, expressing concern over appearing vain seems 
to be a novel trend in contemporary media (though as I pointed out earlier, it has clear 
historical precedents). In one illustration of this sentiment on his show, Oz asks a white 
woman in the audience to explain how she struggles with taking off her makeup. She 
says, “Okay, um, I struggled with it. I do not leave the house without makeup, even on 
weekends, and I think, uh it’s more of a self-confidence thing” (“Biggest anti-aging hour 
ever”, Winfrey, 2011). Oz is quick to point out that the women in the audience feel 
embarrassed about their attachment to makeup. He asks the audience, “Do you feel 
shame in the voices of some of the women who are speaking?” (“Biggest anti-aging hour 
ever,” Winfrey, 2011). The woman admits that she does feel embarrassment about her 
attachment to it. “I hate to say it, but I guess I’m a little vain and appearance is important 
to me” (“Biggest anti-aging hour ever,” Winfrey, 2011).   
Once the woman reveals her vanity, Oz responds by claiming that her appearance 
is also important to him, and indicates the medical dimension of lackluster skin: “As a 
doctor I’m looking for different things. That’s what the show’s about today folks. I’ve 
asked you all to remove your makeup for a very specific reason: it’s important for me to 
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see your skin, what it looks like, and I want you to see too, because what we’re going to 
do right now is to teach us about what’s going on, on your face” (“Biggest anti-aging 
hour ever,” Winfrey, 2011). Oz often claims that whereas appearances may be important 
to his guests for cosmetic reasons, as a doctor his concern with their weight loss, and, 
appearance or other cosmetic flaws is purely about health. The program thus marks 
women as vain as it simultaneously marks Oz as benevolent—a physician whose 
concerns are justifiable and in his patients’ best interest. Oz reassures his audience that 
there are reasons to be concerned about appearance, but that health, rather than vanity, 
should be at the root of women’s concerns.  
Connecting beauty with health is also apparently something that the public gleans 
from other media as well. For example, Kwan’s (2009) interview participants said their 
perception of body ideals were attained primarily through the media, and viewed health 
and beauty as intertwined: “That is, cultural representations of beauty, participants felt, 
embody health” (p. 1228). Therefore, popular media help to form part of the picture of 
what a healthy person looks like. When the ideal healthy female body is constructed as 
slim and conventionally attractive, those ideals become even more important to attain.   
The construction of women’s ambivalence over vanity is also expressed in an 
April 2012 issuexliii of Women’s Health magazine, where the letter from the editor 
highlights the contradictory nature of contemporary discourses on vanity. The editor, 
Michele Promaulayko, opens her musings on the “beauty issue” of the magazine by 
saying, “I have a complicated relationship with beauty. More specifically, I wrestle with 
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just how much time and energy I should dedicate to trying to make the package I come in 
look better than what Mother Nature rolled off the assembly line. I’d love to say I’m 
above vanity. I’m not” (Promaulayko, 2012, p. 10). Promaulayko goes on to ponder 
whether she spends sufficient time on her inner self as compared with her beauty 
regimen, and extols the health benefits of beauty maintenance—such as using perfumes 
that influence your brain to give you an edge in your professional life, or getting a hair 
blowout—that may increase confidence. Although pursuing beauty goals to increase self-
confidence is not a new theme in the media’s construction of beauty, highlighting 
research that shows beauty regimens’ potential physiological effects is. She ends the 
letter with a contradictory musing: 
I’m going to stop worrying about the hierarchical importance of beautifying 
versus more erudite tasks. (Besides, fretting causes wrinkles!) Instead, I’m 
embracing the idea that anything you do that makes you feel calmer, sexier, 
happier, more polished—whether it’s hitting the gym or testing out a bold new 
hair hue—is time well spent. Just as long as you’re content with your content 
(Promaulayko, 2012, p. 10)  
In the same paragraph in which she says worrying causes wrinkles (which is clearly a bad 
thing to her), Promaulayko encourages women to go to the gym or dye their hair, but then 
asserts they should be content with how they look, thus contradicting the advice to 
change hair color or physique, as that would seemingly change one’s “content.” Her 
editorial also speaks to how fitness or beauty regimens may be understood as 
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empowering, which clearly at times, women embrace. Yet, as Heyes (2007) emphasizes, 
the pervasiveness of an ideal physical form women are encouraged to conform to serves 
as a background from which it is difficult for women to fully disentangle their enabling 
capacities from how that image is connected with, and contributes to, disciplinary 
practices. In her summation of Foucault’s account of power and freedom, Heyes notes: 
Freedom, on this [Foucault’s] view, is not only a matter of being liberated from 
the grip of sovereign power, thereby increasing one’s autonomy simultaneously 
with one’s capacities. It also consists in grasping a different, much less available 
picture, within which the development of new capacities is explicitly tied to the 
growing grasp of disciplinary power on the subject’s self-conception (2007, p. 
72).   
Therefore, while beauty and fitness practices may be enabling for some women in some 
ways, they are not completely autonomous and liberating. Instead, the image of a healthy 
female body established in popular health media may limit and restrict the range of 
available bodies women may possess at the same time engaging in fitness and beauty 
regimens can be experienced as pleasurable by women.  
In addition, the contradictory nature of Promaulayko’s musings on beauty and the 
ambivalence of Oz’s audience about removing their makeup are representative of how 
women’s popular health media mediate the guilt they suggest women feel when pursuing 
beauty ideals. Because some women feel guilty about being “vain” or spending more 
time on beauty than on other facets of  character development, discussing beauty in the 
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context of health may offer women a way to less self-consciously indulge in beauty 
regimens if there are perceived health, rather than simply cosmetic, benefits.    
In addition to connecting mediating women’s concerns over vanity by connecting 
health to beauty content, the media I analyze also provide remedies to perceived skin, 
hair, and nail flaws; this advice often involves eating healthy foods or exercising, which 
are arguably good for overall health. For example, one Dr. Oz show, features a video of a 
viewer who asks Oz’s advice on how to reduce wrinkles. Oz invites Greta to appear on 
the show, along with Keri Peterson, a contributor to Women’s Health. Peterson instructs 
Greta to eat a diet rich in antioxidants including sweet potatoes, red peppers, and almonds 
and instructs another female viewer to eat a diet high in Omega 3 fatty acids to help make 
her skin “glow.” It is notable that these recommendations to alter diet are based on beauty 
concerns, yet the foods listed also have known health benefits: research shows that foods 
rich in antioxidants may lower the chance of getting cancer (National Cancer Center, 
2004), and Omega 3 fatty acids benefit LDL cholesterol (The Mayo Clinic, 2012). These 
foods are also discussed in stories in women’s popular health media about how to reduce 
the chance of disease or lose weight. Therefore, although the segment focuses on beauty 
concerns, the recommended remedies have total health benefits; in this way, the advice 
escapes charges of frivolity, as well as avoids recommendations to purchase expensive 
products for the sole purpose of “vanity.”  
The nutrition, beauty and weight-loss advice on these shows is also often 
recycled: in one segment it is beauty advice, whereas in another it serves as diet advice, 
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and in yet another segment it may be used in episodes that cover how foods can fight 
disease. Reusing the same content helps editors and show writers easily provide filler for 
episodes without having to pursue new stories. Finally, Oz’s show and the magazines 
overlap and share content with each other. When Oz features editors and contributors 
from Women’s Health and Prevention magazines on his show and then appears on the 
covers of these same and other women’s health magazines, their messages about 
women’s health become reinforced and unified.  
The above examples illustrate how vanity is mediated in women’s popular health 
media through packaging beauty content as health content. In addition, conflating beauty 
matters with health concerns may cause beauty issues to seem more pressing than if they 
were presented absent the health context, while at the same time may relieve women 
from feeling “guilty” about pursuing beauty for its own sake. The concern over vanity 
that women seem to be expressing in both The Dr. Oz Show and Women’s Health is also 
reduced by this conflation, because if being worried about appearance is really being 
worried about one’s health, then it is a worthy pursuit. Indeed, Metzl (2010) makes the 
same assertion about how the link between appearance and health are unproblematically 
linked in popular health magazines:  
Calling such language [health magazine features that emphasize appearance] 
sexism or cultural narcissism would mobilize a particular critique. But calling it 
health allows these and other magazines to seamlessly construct certain bodies as 
desirable while relegating others as obscene. The result explicitly justifies 
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particular corporeal types and practices, while implicitly suggesting that those 
who do not play along suffer from ill health. (Metzl, 2010, p. 3).  
I argue that CAM has been appropriated by this discourse in a fashion similar to what 
Metzl describes; yet the way it is constructed in women’s popular health media is 
difficult to critique due its emphasis on healthful foods, moderate exercise, and an 
alternative form of healing that, as I outlined in chapter one, has explicit historical 
connections to feminist health movements. How might risk discourses function to secure 
the primacy of appearance for women? This may be analyzed using CDA; as Fairclough 
(2001) notes in his description of Stage 3 of the CDA process, one should ask whether 
the “problem”—in this case, articulating CAM with beauty and slimness—has a function 
in the social order: “Consider whether the social order (network of practices) in a sense 
‘needs’ the problem; and whether, therefore, the resolution of the problem entails a 
radical restructuring of the social order” (p. 33). I argue that this articulation has gained 
prominence in an era when women’s social roles within the family are shifting (this is 
frequently pointed out in the news reports that discuss women’s shift to being primary or 
sole breadwinners in the home). Therefore, maintaining beauty and slimness as a central 
value associated with femininity becomes more urgent.  
Due to women’s awareness of the unrealistic standards of beauty represented in 
the media, the discourse on health helps to make the “problem” of cosmetic issues seem 
legitimate. Likewise, women’s knowledge of the unattainability of representations of 
beauty in the media is taken into account by media producers glossing over women’s 
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stated concerns about vanity and situating health as the issue at hand. Finally, the 
economic rationale of branding and cross-promoting beauty, fashion and health content 
makes sense from a marketing perspective and also contributes to a more normalized 
image of what a healthy female body looks like. In the next section, I illustrate how 
women’s popular health media discursively use risk to suggest that being overweight or 
eating unhealthy foods will lead to ill health.  
Diet and Weight Loss  
The diet and weight loss industry is a booming business. According to a 2008 article from 
Bloomberg Business Week, Americans spend $40 billion a year on weight loss programs 
and products (Reisner, 2008). Popular media outlets that frequently feature stories on 
CAM such as The Dr. Oz Show, WH and Prevention, challenge so-called quick fix weight 
loss programs or fad diets, and instead encourage a healthy diet and consistent, moderate 
exercise. In addition, women’s health media increasingly demonize “fad diets,” although 
they continue to present diets as a way to improve appearance. However, they tend to 
frame diets in terms of “lifestyle changes” (such as walking 10,000 steps per day or 
adding vegetables to one’s diet) that can help improve health and mediate the risk of 
diseases by lowering blood pressure, cholesterol, and blood sugar, rather than losing 
weight only to improve appearance. This has resulted in what Lupton (2002) argues is the 
medicalization of food (she notes that the media emphasize the relationship between 
“bad” foods and disastrous health outcomes or the health benefits of eating particular 
foods, which leads to this medicalization). This tendency is not new, having roots in the 
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early twentieth century. For example, in her discussion of how physicians of the time 
considered food to be an important factor in fighting tuberculosis, Craddock (2001) 
explains, “The point was clear that women needed to make sure their families got the 
right kinds of foods everyday as one important prevention tactic” (p. 341).  
When women’s popular health media discuss each bite of food and step made as a 
form of health maintenance, they become active in supporting a disciplinary regime that 
contributes to national and state initiatives aimed at public weight loss and fitness. For 
example, the National Institute of Health’s (NIH) Obesity Education Initiative (OEI) 
explains that its primary goal is to, “encourage the adoption of heart healthy eating 
patterns and physical activity habits that will not only help prevent and reduce the 
prevalence of overweight and obesity and their related CHD [coronary heart disease] risk 
factors along with sleep apnea, but also help reduce morbidity and mortality from CHD” 
(2013, Paragraph 6). The OEI’s mission to reduce obesity related deaths clearly aligns 
with a biopolitical imperative aimed at the maximization of life, and the reduction of 
chronic diseases that drive health care costs up (CDC, 2012) and work productivity down 
(Rodbard, Fox, & Grandy, 2009).  
Yet, women may also use the diet and weight loss advice featured in women’s 
popular health media as a motivator to achieve fitness, health, and appearance goals, thus, 
the discourse I am discussing here is not monolithically oppressive but is also productive. 
Dieting, beauty, and exercise regimens discipline bodies at the same time they produce 
new and desired subjectivities for women. As Heyes (2007) suggests, “To understand 
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dieting as enabling is also to understand that we have reason to embrace the increases in 
capacities it permits without acceding to the intensification of disciplinary power it 
currently requires” (p. 64). Thus, women’s popular health media’s intensification of 
norms works to both enable more stringent standards as well as help women realize 
personal desired outcomes through their enactment of surveillance.  
I argue that discourses in women’s popular health media that encourage healthy 
eating and exercise habits is also reliant on risk discourses that highlight the preventive 
features of healthy food and exercise in maintaining health and preventing disease. The 
critique of fad dieting found in women’s popular health media also illustrates how 
reflexivity functions to condemn unhealthy habits at the same time it reinforces diet and 
exercise requirements for women.   
Within women’s popular health media, losing weight to improve health is 
constructed as an all-encompassing activity, one that demands a particular lifestyle that 
mediates the risk of illness or premature death through engaging in particular exercise 
habits, eating certain foods, attaining a certain amount of sleep, and maintaining a certain 
level of happiness, all in the quest to increase longevity. “The stimulation provided by 
mediated images hints at confrontations with existential terrors, through for the most part 
in such small, ‘safe’ doses, and so commonly juxtaposed with resolutions—promises of 
safety, heroism or rescue—that the viewer can sleep sweetly at night” (Seale, 2002, p. 
67). Again, because a long life of good quality is posed by women’s popular health media 
as what is at stake, weight loss as a result of these habits is merely framed as a positive 
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side effect rather than a goal in itself (these outlets also feature articles that discuss how 
getting enough sleep and exercising, and even happiness, are all important facets in 
maintaining or achieving a “healthy” weight). This does not mean that this advice is 
necessarily repressive, indeed some of the recommendations may help women achieve 
personal goals; yet the close connection between the regulation of such often 
uncontrollable factors in life (such as amount of sleep and level of happiness) and health 
may place an undue amount of pressure on women to meet these sometimes arbitrary 
guidelines. I am not arguing that there is no more media coverage dedicated to weight 
loss alone, because that type of content certainly abounds. What I am analyzing here is 
how various women’s health media present the quest for longevity and overall health and 
well-being as one of the most important goals in life—achievable through diet and 
exercise—while weight loss benefits are presented as a pleasant side effect in the quest to 
extend life (Heyes, 2007 argues that Weight Watchers members often make similar 
assertions). To illustrate how the focus on “health” is superseding the focus on slimness 
in women’s popular culture, I address how weight loss is discussed in terms of risk 
discourses that highlight longevity, the fight against obesity, and other chronic diseases 
related to being overweight and how those discourses frame “choice” as a simple and 
straightforward solution to becoming healthy.  
The “Problem” of Obesity and Overweight 
The shift in women’s popular health media from an emphasis on losing weight for 
appearance to a focus on losing weight to maintain or improve health is not surprising 
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given the wide scope and publicity of the “obesity epidemic.” Critical health scholars 
such as Oliver (2006) and Gard and Wright (2005) have noted that the obesity epidemic 
has been cast by public health officials and the medical profession as a public health 
problem, resulting in the stigmatization of individuals who are overweight—particularly 
women. This stigmatization of overweight women is reflected in medical research that 
reinforces problematic assumptions about women’s social roles and their weight. One 
particularly disturbing article published in PLOS One, suggests that a lack of housework, 
laundry, and cooking in contemporary society is the reason for increasing obesity 
amongst women (Archer, Shook, Thomas, Church, Katzmarzyk, Hebert, McIver, Hand, 
Lavie & Blair, 2013)xliv. This article, published in a peer-reviewed journal that features 
research from the sciences and medicine, received some heat in the popular media for 
being sexist, but even the existence of such a study authored by doctors and public health 
officials illustrates how medicine is socially and culturally contextual. For example, the 
main point of the study is that women lead more sedentary lifestyles than in the past, and 
although both sexes used to walk more, women in particular had to engage as well in the 
physical labor of housework, work that no doubt contributed to calorie-burning. 
However, the focus on domestic work is problematic because it might be used to support 
an argument that women should either do more housework (while continuing to work) or 
that their proper place is in the home. Although overweight men are socially stigmatized 
(as I discuss at the end of this chapter), doctors stigmatize overweight women even when 
a woman is only slightly overweight; this same stigma does not kick in for men until they 
are significantly overweight (Brown, 2011).  
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Gard and Wright (2005) point out that such biases towards the overweight (and 
generally lower class) also are manifested in doctors’ and public health officials’ 
recommendations to women about how to solve the problem: “the idea that a ‘healthy 
body weight’ is a simple matter of people making ‘simple’ and ‘correct’ choices is also 
widespread in the scientific literature” (Gard & Wright, 2005, p. 160). This class-specific 
recommendation also ignores the difficulty with which even those who have the time and 
money to exercise and eat well may find this advice difficult to implement.  
The medical community’s discursive construction of weight and health likewise 
influences the cultural construction of obesity in the wider world, including the media. 
Therefore the connection between obesity and overweight to health and disease that is 
clearly articulated in the medical literature and in government initiatives designed to get 
citizens to lose weight (such as the OEI) is refracted through the media, thus the media 
contributes to these biopolitical imperatives, that blur the lines between health and 
weight. While obesity and overweight have been shown to be a risk factor for many 
diseases, it is important to note that there has been little research that shows a cause and 
effect relationship between being overweight and disease. As Heyes (2007) points out:  
But the great reduction of this debate [effects of overweight and obesity on 
health] is the assumption that weight itself is a stand-in for health, with the 
corollary false beliefs that losing weight automatically solves health problems, 
and that gaining weight (or being heavier than a stipulated maximum all along) 
automatically creates them (p. 68).  
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For example, the connection between being overweight and disease may be more closely 
related to the consequences of a sedentary lifestyle and the consumption of high sugar 
and fat foods (which contribute to being overweight) but how they work to cause or 
influence disease is poorly understood; as Heyes (2007) points out, this does not account 
for overweight individuals who might otherwise lead a healthy, active lifestyle and may 
also be overweight. For example, according to the National Cancer Institute (2012), most 
associations between cancer and obesity are based on observational studies, not RCTs. As 
I argued in the last chapter, just because a study does not use the RCT does not mean that 
a given treatment is ineffective, but it illustrates how one issue based on observational 
studies (such as the relationship between being overweight and disease) may be accepted 
as common sense within the medical community while CAM therapies based on such 
studies are routinely subject to greater scrutiny. What I am trying to illustrate here is that 
there are social and political, rather than purely objective reasons for some health issues 
being framed as legitimate by doctors and the media while others are not.  
The connection between being overweight and health in the media also seems to 
influence how people who are seeking to lose weight understand their rationale for 
weight loss. In her semi-structured interviews of 42 individuals who wanted to lose 
weight, Kwan (2009) found that participants overwhelmingly cited health along with 
reducing the risk of disease or premature death as a reason to lose weight: “Thus, when 
asked why they desired weight loss, nearly all participants, regardless of race, gender, or 
weight category, cited health as a key motivator. Recurring themes included the fear of 
early death or developing heart disease, along with an awareness that diabetes or some 
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other health concern ‘runs in the family’—an oft used phrase” (p. 1225). In Kwan’s 
analysis, the discourses about the obesity epidemic circulated by the medical community 
and the media have influenced how those who want to lose weight discursively construct 
their own experience of weight loss (Heyes 2007, makes a similar assertion about how 
Weight Watchers members named health as a key factor for losing weight).  
Heyes (2007) also argues that a focus on health and longevity in relation to weight 
loss is now more fashionable than simply wanting to look better; indeed, as she points 
out, there is something about expressing a desire to lose weight simply in order to look 
good that she notes may sound political alarm bells to some feminists. Meanwhile, 
weight loss organizations (and the media I analyze as well) focus on what women are 
enabled to do when they lose weight, such as being more active with family members or 
improving self-esteem. Thus, the discourse on health that emphasizes enabling capacities 
seems more enlightened, empowering, and even feminist to women. Through the 
expansion of choice, weight loss discourses expand women’s freedoms, inviting women 
to be agents of personal development, self-improvement, and health. However, these 
behaviors also construct certain types of bodies that fit within the biopolitical rationality 
of the public health discourse of the obesity epidemic at the same time they construct a 
normalized version of what a healthy woman should look like.  
In the following section, I will outline how women’s popular health media use 
“choice” as a solution to losing weight and eating better, thus suggesting women choose 
whether to be healthy or not. Framing health as a choice achievable through diet and 
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exercise means that making choices about diet and exercise may be empowering at the 
same time they may make women feel as if they have an illusory sense of control over 
their health.    
Individual Choice as a Mediator of Health Risks 
The media frequently emphasize individual choices as the solution to weight loss, and 
thus, better health. For example, in a show entitled, “Defy your age diet,” Oz addresses 
mid-life weight gain as a phenomenon that is destroying women’s lives; at first he 
absolves women of responsibility for it by attributing extra weight in mid-life to 
declining estrogen, thus displacing individual choice as the most important factor in 
weight gain. He opens the show with a bold statement, “Today, I am taking on the thing 
that frightens you most: mid-life weight gain” (“Defy your age diet,” Winfrey, 2011). His 
narration of women’s apparent greatest fear is not only patronizing, but also exacerbates 
this manufactured crisis around aging and possible weight gain. Oz then offers advice for 
weight loss for every “middle-aged” decade, which includes the 30s, 40s, and 50s. The 
segment opens with a video montage of women from each of the aforementioned decades 
discussing their struggles to combat weight gain as they age.  
The first woman, Lisa, is 53-years old, white, and not slim by conventional media 
standards. The video shows Lisa in her home surrounded by family, standing on a scale 
and preparing food, as she says, “I can handle the mood swings and the hot flashes, but 
not this weight gain! Once I turned 50, it is impossible to lose weight. I’m tired of 
depriving myself and exercising when I’m tired. Maybe I should just be content; it is 
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what it is” (“Defy your age diet,” Winfrey, 2011). Following the montage, Lisa appears 
with Oz, who encourages her not to be satisfied with her current weight. Oz shows Lisa 
and the audience how their bodies burn 200 fewer calories per day when they are in their 
50s as when they were in their 30s. Lisa accompanies Oz to a large screen simulation 
where he shows her a graphic of the ovaries and how their decreased production of 
estrogen leads to less efficient calorie burning over the course of a woman’s life. While 
this part of the segment displaces personal responsibility for weight gain, it also serves to 
further medicalize aging and contributes to an ideology that makes youth a necessary 
component of women’s attractiveness.  
In addition, it relies on the rhetoric of choice, because in the next segment Oz’s 
emphasis is on how women can take control of weight gain by supplementing their diet 
with alternative forms of estrogen. Notably, instead of recommending a pharmacological 
remedy—which has been the subject of controversy since the findings of the negative 
effects of HRT therapy—Oz instructs Lisa and the viewers to consume flax seeds. He 
proceeds to demonstrate how to make a “sinless” watermelon split, which consists of 
watermelon, Greek yogurt (instead of ice cream), and the miracle ingredient: flax seeds. 
Ultimately, Oz’s recommendation does not significantly challenge the rhetoric of 
individual choice to lose weight; but the biomedical reasoning he uses suggests that 
losing weight may be harder for some individuals than others due to hormones: a factor 
difficult to control. While Oz encourages Lisa to not be “content” with her weight, his 
description of decreased calorie-burning as she ages also means that as women get older 
they must continuously restrict food or increase exercise to maintain the same weight. 
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Thus, the disciplinary practices enacted to control weight may not be experienced as 
freeing, but rather as one more form of restriction.  
For example, in one such segment on fatty liver disease, Dr. Oz emphasizes the 
risk of unhealthy foods to a black female audience member as not just cosmetic, but 
potentially fatal. He tells the woman that she should not eat doughnuts, and suggests to 
her that she think of eating doughnuts as a potentially catastrophic blow to her health. “So 
don’t think about it as just a little bit of fat on your thighs. Think about it as a toxic event 
in your liver that will change your life,” (“Defy your age diet,” Winfrey, 2011). When Oz 
tells her that she should think of eating a doughnut as killing her liver, he is not only 
undermining a balanced approach to eating (because in most balanced eating plans it is 
okay to occasionally eat a “bad” food), but he is also instructing viewers on how they 
should think about which choices they make about food: namely, that choosing the wrong 
foods may be catastrophic to health. In her explanation of how dieting may be enabling at 
the same time it is repressive for women, Heyes (2007) points out: 
There can be plenty of joy in eating the “healthy” foods that are too often 
consumed out of a sense of duty, and the ubiquity of (and pressures to consume) 
poor quality food in the oversupplied Western countries represent their own 
challenge to cultural, economic, and social practices. Ultimately, however, dieting 
is of necessity preoccupied with the refusal of certain foods, or the combinations 
or quantities of food that please and satiate; it is a practice of self-surveillance that 
may in one sense improve one’s eating habits, but must also defer some of the 
162 
 
 
harmless pleasures of food and drink in favor of projected slenderness. There is 
no recklessness, no abandon, and no playfulness here. That is not to say that 
gluttony is a feminist virtue, but as long as the denial of pleasure is so deeply 
inscribed in the cultural meanings of Western femininity, we should be very 
skeptical about attempts to further limit what women may enjoy (p. 86-87).  
Some foods are thus constructed as “risky” (like doughnuts), while some are safe, 
contributing to the experience of self-denial that Heyes (2007) argues women have so 
commonly experienced as dieters seeking to conform to a slender standard.  
 Again, Oz’s construction of being overweight as a health crisis works to reinforce 
dominant media standards of slimness at the same time it reinforces medical and 
scientific reasoning for eating certain foods. In this segment, Oz also does not sufficiently 
discuss the risks of fatty liver disease to the audience, as not everyone is equally at risk 
(The Mayo Clinic, 2012). In fact, according to the Mayo Clinic, one of the risk factors for 
nonalcoholic fatty liver disease is losing weight too quickly. Although Oz is not 
endorsing quick-fix weight loss, there is an irony in the way that he has selected 
overeating as the primary issue of concern, while ignoring other important risk factors for 
the problem.  
Regardless of any viewer’s risk factor for disease, the message to always choose 
healthy foods and exercise provides an illusory sense of control over one’s health. As 
Kirkland (2010) asserts, totally alleviating health risks is impossible, as even those who 
always make health decisions based on expert advice may still fall ill; thus Oz (and other 
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popular women’s health media) paints risk both as highly manageable, but also, 
conversely, unpredictable—something that can strike anyone at any timexlv. Kirkland 
comments: “Total self-care and independence is an illusion, inflating the sense of 
entitlement of those who think they have achieved it, causing unbearable stress on those 
who can barely achieve it, and leaving only second-class citizenship for those who cannot 
achieve it at all” (Kirkland, 2010, p. 199). Thus, popular women’s health media 
contribute both to discourses that suggest risk may be managed as a means to promote 
health, and conversely, to discourses that highlight stories of those who fall ill with no 
risk factors (Brody, 2012), and that remind us no one is safe from health risks (Chen, 
2011).  
One article that highlights the paradox of living a healthy lifestyle while still 
being at risk is featured in Prevention. The article, entitled “Lose Weight, No Sweat,” 
discusses exercise as a means not just to slim down (as the title implies), but as a means 
to boost longevity. The article’s introduction highlights the possible scary consequences 
of inactivity:  
The biggest health hazard you're up against just might be a chair--or a couch or 
recliner--and all the time you spend sitting in it. Desk jobs, long commutes, too 
much TV time--all that inactivity our daily routines dictate--is about as bad for us 
and as fattening as a steady diet of bacon and bread. And despite what you might 
think, slipping on sneaks for daily sweat sessions alone isn't enough to combat the 
slow slide toward sickness. According to a study published in the American 
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Journal of Epidemiology, women who sat for more than 6 hours each day had a 
37% increased risk of premature death, compared with women who sat for less 
than 3—regardless of how often they hopped on a treadmill. Nearly all of us are at 
risk. The average American spends more than 8 hours each day with his or her 
rear glued to a desk chair, car seat, or couch, according to the American College 
of Sports Medicine. (Cassity, 2011, Paragraph 1) 
The article goes on to state that being sedentary not only slows metabolism, but increases 
blood sugar and cholesterol and can lead to diabetes, heart disease and a variety of 
cancers. The article highlights the importance of both routinely exercising and changing  
lifestyles to decrease the risk of death, and, as a side benefit, to lose weight:  
It requires you to rethink all your habits and find new, more active ways to get 
through your day, like walking into Starbucks instead of sitting in the drive-
thru. If you move enough, you can offset the danger of all the sitting you can't 
avoid. Bonus: You can burn up to 1,000 calories a day, without ever setting foot 
in the gym. (Cassity, 2011, Paragraph 4).  
This article is typical of the way that stories on weight loss are framed in these media: not 
just as losing weight for its own sake, but as a way to potentially save your life—with 
weight loss as an added perk. However, the article also highlights that regardless of how 
often you exercise, it is never enough to mediate the risk of disease or death. Risk thus 
functions in this example to suggest hidden factors could be undermining health, even if 
one tries to be healthy by exercising or eating healthfully.  
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Such health risks are thus framed by women’s popular health media as an ever 
present danger, one that must be controlledxlvi. Therefore, suggestions to eat healthfully 
and exercise, like in the discourse on beauty, serve as a means of risk displacement—a 
way to help the audience feel as if they have some measure of control—at the same time 
they encourage women to be active agents in this process by providing tips on diet and 
exercise that may help women feel empowered if they achieve personal weight loss goals. 
Finally, this advice is also profoundly classed. Both Dubrwiny (2013) and Wolf (1999) 
point out the choices that women make are not equally accessible to all women. In the 
case of food, this extends to the cost of getting healthful foods, the time needed to prepare 
healthful meals, and the social acceptance of such foods within one’s community.  
The above example illustrates how risk is deployed as a major trope in women’s 
health media, by discussing weight-loss as a means to save lives and lessen disease risk. 
While Beck published his risk society thesis in 1992, and health scholars have been 
talking about risk discourses in health communication since at least the mid to late 1990s 
(Skolbekken, 1995 and Petersen, 1997), perhaps its influence was not quite as widespread 
in women’s popular health media before this time. For example, in one article virtually 
identical to the one I discussed above and, published nearly 10 years earlier in 
Prevention, the author approaches the topic from a much different perspective, 
exclusively focusing on losing weight as the goal:  
Remember when you had to walk into the gas station to pay? When delivery pizza 
wasn't an option? When you mowed your own lawn? When you had to get off the 
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couch to change the channel? These are just a few of the tasks that are becoming 
obsolete and depriving us of physical activity.  If you add up all the extra calories 
you could burn just from doing a few things that involve actually moving, you 
could lose up to 38 lbs. in a year! (Krucoff, 2002, Paragraph 2)  
Although both articles focus on the problem of a sedentary lifestyle, the more recent 
article uses language that discusses being active in life and death terms, whereas the 
second article much more airily describes being active as a means to lose weight. 
Comparing these passages illustrates not only how risk proliferates as an informing 
component of health discourse, but also alludes to how new markets are created for the 
“lifestyle” problems of modernity:  
Far from being just critique, the demonstration of the hazards and risks of 
modernization is also an economic development factor of the first rank. This 
becomes all too clear in the development of the various branches of the economy, 
and equally in the increasing public expenditures for environmental protection, 
for combating the diseases of civilization and so forth. (Beck, 1992, p. 56)  
Beck’s insight is important here because one of the “diseases of civilization” he alludes 
to, I would argue, includes obesity and sedentary lifestyle. Two interrelated problems that 
have received a large amount of media attention, generated government initiativesxlvii, 
and commentary from the medical communityxlviii, thus creating new markets for disease 
mediation. In addition to creating these new markets, this discourse also emphasizes the 
importance of being hyper-vigilant about the apparent health risks of a sedentary 
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lifestyle. For example, one may look slim but at the same time be harboring potential 
diseases beneath the surface of the skin. Thus, the discourse of health risks encompasses 
increasing areas of contemporary life, as Rose (2001) argues.  
In the next section, I discuss how women’s popular health media respond to fad 
dieting and gender discrimination among overweight women in health care to illustrate 
that the discourses that emphasize slimness are not monolithic. Instead women’s popular 
health media critique these unrealistic standards thus illustrating that they engage with 
women’s awareness of the social stigma of being overweight.   
Reflexivity in Women’s Popular Health Media  
Although the emphasis on disciplined eating is a hallmark of the women’s media I 
analyzed, investigation and debunking of fad diets also appear therexlix. In fact, an 
ongoing segment in Prevention debunks or finds the “truth” about the efficacy of new 
diet plans by analyzing a diet’s claim, and then countering it with a commentary on the 
diet from a spokesperson from the American Dietetic Association. One such segment, 
featured in an August, 2011, issue reviews a book entitled, “17 Days until Skinny: A 
Simple Plan That Targets Both Belly Fat and Visceral Fat and Produces Fast Results That 
Last!"” by Dr. Mike Moreno. The focus of the review is to challenge Dr. Moreno’s claim 
that severely restricting calories will confuse the metabolism into working more 
efficiently. The diet claim is countered by what is labeled as “fact” from an American 
Dietetic Association spokesperson, who claims that Dr. Moreno’s plan is unhealthy. In 
another July 2011 segment, another “fad diet” is exposed as fraudulent. A high-protein 
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diet designed by French doctor Pierre Dukan is tested by the American Dietetic 
Association and found to be unhealthy; the ADA spokesperson notes that any diet that 
lacks produce and whole grains—which we need to “ward off diseases, including 
cancer,”—is not a good plan to follow. The spokesperson’s final word on the diet is that 
following it will give you “constipation, low energy, brain fog, and bad breath” 
(Manning, 2011, Paragraph 3).  
These articles, as well as features on The Dr. Oz Show, repeatedly highlight the 
inefficiency and danger of quick fix plans. In addition, risk discourses about fad diets also 
encourage  a moderate approach to lifestyle and weight loss instead of diets (because they 
can be risky to health) and may be positive in that they encourage a more balanced 
approach to eating that does not involve severe food restriction. However, these 
recommendations tend to include eating foods and taking supplements that are difficult to 
find or are unaffordable for many people. Although Dr. Oz makes an effort to consider 
his audience’s budget (for example, he has done shows exclusively devoted to how to eat 
healthfully on a budget) and often recommends affordable alternatives to expensive 
treatments or products, he still recommends a staggering amount of supplements for 
minor supposed physical flaws such as wrinkles, dull hair, or weight loss; if audience 
members followed all of his advice, they would be taking an extremely large volume of 
supplements and spending an exorbitant amount of money on them.      
Although constructing weight loss that results from lifestyle changes rather than 
extreme dieting may have some benefits for women by challenging stringent and 
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ineffective dieting recommendations, overweight women are still discussed rather 
ambivalently in women’s popular health media. One article that explores a movement 
called HAES (Health at Every Size)—a health focused program that excludes weight as a 
consideration of health—profiles it as “controversial.” In the August 2011 Prevention 
feature story, the author describes the HAES movement as one that encourages 
overweight women to eat intuitively and focus on overall health rather than weight loss. 
Although the article offers some positive feedback about the program, its introduction 
paints a comical picture of the women who participate in it. “The pulse of tribal 
drumming fills the air. Jeannie Troy, 48 and 220 pounds, dances wildly, pogo-ing like a 
punk rocker at a Green Day concert and shaking her sweaty hair. All around her, women-
-whose body sizes range from average to well over 300 pounds--grin as they get their 
groove on” (Ingall, 2011, Paragraph 1). This portrait of overweight women dancing with 
abandon is followed up by a stern warning by a doctor from Columbia University that 
being overweight does, in fact, increase risk for several diseases, and thus the HAES 
program is doing little for the health of the participants. Yet, while the article discusses 
the “controversy” over whether people should subscribe to the program, it centers the 
debate on weight loss as a health benefit rather than a beauty concern, thus making a 
strong connection between health and weight.  
The women’s health media coverage that I have detailed so far has illustrated the 
increasingly central place that beauty and being slim or normal weight occupy—and 
particularly  when it is articulated to health, and, importantly, to CAM as well. However, 
one article in my sample offered a critique of institutionalized medicine by highlighting 
170 
 
 
the fact that women who are overweight are often discriminated against by their doctors. 
This article, from the July 2011 issue of Prevention, addresses how doctors’ negative 
perceptions of their overweight patients could potentially affect women’s healthcare. The 
article’s exposé tone seems contradictory given the heavy emphasis in women’s health 
media about the ways in which extra fat is detrimental to health. The article begins by 
detailing an overweight patient’s experience in a doctor’s office where a twisted ankle 
was attributed to her extra weight. Although the woman tried to tell her doctor that her 
twisted ankle was not due to her weight, she was simply written off; Brown asserts that, 
“Her experience is shockingly common” (2011, Paragraph 3). The article notes that 
“weight stigma” is on the rise in America, and that “ironically” it is deeply rooted among 
health care providers. A study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania cited in the 
article showed that more than half of 620 primary care physicians studied labeled their 
obese patients as “‘awkward,’ unattractive,’ ‘ugly,’ and ‘noncompliant’” to their 
recommendations (Brown, 2011, Paragraph 3). However, given the emphasis on weight 
as an indicator of health in both the medical community and the popular media, the 
responses given are consistent with the wider discourses on obesity.  
The article goes on to discuss gender discrimination as a factor in doctors’ 
prejudices, and cites a study from Yale University that found that physicians started to 
negatively characterize female patients when they were as few as 13 pounds overweight, 
whereas the weight bias for men didn’t activate until the men were around 75 pounds 
overweight. This article illustrates reflexivity, as well as speaks to the flexibility of 
hegemony:  
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…a particular social structuring of semiotic difference may become hegemonic, 
become part of the legitimizing common sense which sustains relations of 
domination, but hegemony will always be contested to a greater or lesser extent, 
in hegemonic struggle. An order of discourse is not a closed or rigid system, but 
rather an open one, which can be put at risk by what happens in actual 
interactions. (Fairclough, 2001, p. 29)  
The experience of the woman patient who was discriminated against, and the biases of 
the doctors featured in this article therefore, work to illuminate the ideology of slimness 
as important for women to possess; however, the ideology of slimness in relation to 
health is also reinforced through this publication, thus working to perpetuate this 
ideology. This example illustrates that although all coverage in the popular media is not 
uncritical, the rare article that shows a critical slant does not necessarily displace the 
dominant perspective. The article on weight and gender discrimination does highlight 
discrepancies in care for women and those who are overweight; however, because the 
main emphasis in popular discourses on health focus on how being overweight is 
unhealthy, it is not surprising that doctors harbor a bias against overweight patients.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have argued that women’s popular health media’s articulation of CAM 
to appearance and weight loss provides a stringent, normalizing ideal that women are 
expected to meet in order to look and feel as if they are “healthy”. These discourses 
emphasize health and use risk discourses to suggest that health risks mays be mediated by 
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weight loss or diet, a concept that also has historical roots in the early twentieth century. 
Therefore, making the right choices about food and exercise becomes an increasingly 
important choice for women to make.  
The coverage that emphasizes women’s concerns about being vain because they 
subscribe to conventional beauty standards is mediated through beauty’s articulation to 
health, which may allow women to feel they can indulge in subscribing to beauty 
standards without feeling guilty about it. In addition, these media outlets illustrate 
reflexivity; this reflexivity is illustrated through media producers’ awareness of  
unrealistic media beauty standards, articulated as “vanity,” which they then confront and 
accommodate by linking beauty with health, thereby retaining beauty as an important 
feature for women. In addition, they engage reflexively with critiques of institutional 
medicine through their coverage of gender discrimination in healthcare, thus illustrating a 
fluid and contradictory ideology about women’s appearance and health.  
 I have also argued that discourses on weight loss are much more closely 
articulated to health than to weight loss for its own sake, in part because of the recent 
media coverage on the obesity epidemic. The coverage on weight loss expresses a 
biopolitical imperative by emphasizing longevity and the mediation of risk rather than 
personal or appearance-based reasons to lose weight. The media I analyzed also 
emphasize moderate eating and exercise habits and use the discourse of risk as a means to 
warn women against fad dieting and its attendant health dangers. Although such 
loosening of stringent dieting plans for women may be a positive outcome for women’s 
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health, the assertion that a small amount of extra weight is a potential health crisis serves 
as a strong, gendered disciplinary force.  
However, these discourses also offer points of resistance, particularly the articles 
on gender discrimination in healthcare and on debunking fad diets; these illustrate that 
women’s popular health media can critique patriarchal structures, but will only go so 
far—and no further—in doing so. These threads do not fundamentally alter the 
patriarchal assumptions that underlie the articulation of beauty and slimness to health, but 
instead provide insight into how the popular media offer relevant critiques of institutional 
inequities (though whether these stories displace the ideology of beauty and slimness as 
centrally important to the social acceptance of women is questionable). In the next 
chapter, I will explore this question more fully by uncovering moments of reflexivity in 
women’s popular health media that challenge the patriarchy of conventional medicine. I 
will also show how this reflexivity is, in part, a result of the public’s critique of 
conventional doctors. Then, I will discuss how Dr. Oz uses this critique to respond to 
patient concerns, thus bolstering his brand at the same time his show provides a forum for 
critiquing conventional medicine.    
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Chapter Four: Reflexive Modernity and Social Change in Women’s Popular Health 
Media 
Feminist media scholars have critiqued the individualistic and consumer-oriented focus 
of women’s popular media (Gill, 2007) and how they objectify women (Durham, 2009). 
Other media scholars have questioned the ability of mass media to provide any 
meaningful social critique (Bagdikian, 2004). However, Beck (1992) situates the media 
as important sites for instigating social change. He argues that while the media exist in a 
profit-motivated structure they also participate in challenging dominant social institutions 
such as science and medicine, and thus create forums where social critiques are voiced 
(Beck, 1992). The site I analyze—women’s popular health media—is no different. I 
argue that there are moments in which these media critique the dominant values and 
patriarchal ideologies of conventional medicine by articulating concerns about how 
patriarchy functions in healthcare, for example, in their coverage of gender 
discrimination. These critiques somewhat displace the individualistic focus that is both a 
hallmark of health information circulated in the media (Dubriwny, 2013) and what Beck 
(1992) argues, is precisely what allows for reflexivity in late modernityl.  
In the previous chapters, I established that the way risk functions discursively in 
medical journals and the media fosters problematic assumptions about women and also 
focuses on individual action to the exclusion of social action in order to mediate health 
risks. This trend is an overarching problem with women’s health policy and the 
representations of women’s health issues in general (Dubriwny, 2013). However, 
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women’s popular health media also provide examples of reflexivity toward dominant 
institutions such as medicine and challenge some of this individualized focus as well as 
the unquestioned expertise of doctors. Yet, reflexivity is also used by Dr. Oz to enhance 
his brand; this helps to situate Oz as a hero doctor, which is problematic given that his 
program contributes to the conflation of health with outward appearance. In this chapter, 
I cover three examples in women’s popular health media that illustrate reflexivity: 1) 
women’s popular health media’s discussion of the placebo effect; 2) The Dr. Oz Show’s 
coverage of chronic pain, where gender oppression in medicine is openly discussed; and 
3) Dr. Oz’s giving guidance to audience members on how to be reflexive, critical, and 
skeptical of conventional doctors and medicine. In the latter example, this reflexivity also 
serves to reinforce his brand: a caring, compassionate, CAM-friendly, and accessible 
doctor, qualities that run counter to the construction of a cold, disconnected expert that 
has been critiqued by the mass media. I argue that these media stories that are skeptical of 
science and medicine feed public distrust of these institutions and thus exemplify one 
reason why CAM is experiencing such popularity at this time. Finally, I explore how Oz 
engages with his audience in the position of both expert and patient advocate, thus 
securing a place of authority that is difficult to challenge. Before I proceed, I first briefly 
revisit reflexivity (which I defined in the introduction) more extensively with a focus on 
how it functions in the media.  
Reflexivity and Media  
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Beck (1992) does not extensively theorize how reflexivity functions in the media (Cottle, 
1998), yet he does argue the media are important sites for illuminating the contingency of 
knowledge in late modernity. Thus, as Cottle (1998) suggests, media scholars should use 
his work more extensively with grounded studies to further elaborate Beck’s broad 
theoretical contribution.  
However, critics of Beck’s (1992) and Gidden’s (1999) theory of reflexivity argue 
that this concept is not new, but simply modernist, and takes for granted that humans are 
agential subjects in knowledge production (Han, 2010 discusses this in the context of new 
media such as blogs). These critiques do not displace the argument I am making: I agree 
with Beck that late modernity is an appropriate framework from which to examine health 
information in the media. Similarly, television and magazines are materially different 
from new media and still operate in a somewhat stable format (though they are 
supplemented and informed by how users engage with interactive media content on their 
websites). Finally, I do not wish to dispense with the notion of agency because the stakes 
in communicating health demand that agency be theorized. Likewise, in this chapter, I 
show how agency is enacted by women who articulate critiques of conventional medicine 
in women’s popular health media.  
Although I argue that the media are important forums for voicing reflexivity, I do 
not claim that when the media engage in this critique that this fundamentally alters social 
knowledge. Instead, I agree with van Loon (2000):  
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With the information overload and the growing speed of events, we have already 
been displaced by an ensemble of apparatuses which select and control the risks 
we should attend to. Reflexivity in a virtual reality is thus not a matter of 
comprehension (reflectivity) but of selectively connecting to “matters”, to make 
and keep them “present”, even if only for an instant. (van Loon, 2000, p. 173)  
Van Loon’s observation illuminates an important point: stories in the media that express 
skepticism about medicine may be—and often are—replaced quickly with a new and 
different take. However, they do make present, at least for a moment, important social 
issues and may leave a mark on the institutions they critique.  
Yet it is difficult for the media to adequately report on risks meaningfully and 
then suggest actions to be taken to prevent them, given the competing knowledge claims 
by medical experts and scientists. Van Loon elaborates on this point below:  
In the language of risk, chaos and complexity function as problems which in turn 
can be used to mobilize resources to reduce their (unknown) predicaments. 
However, the relationship between the unknown predications and the identified 
‘need’ to control or limit them, is paradoxical if not contradictory. For how can 
something be controlled if it is not known? Consequently, information and 
communication technologies mobilized to render the unknown more visible have 
been instrumental in the very proliferation of risks. The uncertainty of futures 
marked by chaos and complexity thus results in a techno-social configuration in 
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which the human is increasingly displaced by his/her own instrumentalism and 
desire for mastery. (2000, p. 173)  
Van Loon’s astute observation helps to illuminate the problems I touched on in previous 
chapters about the difficulty of sufficiently communicating knowledge about risks. 
However, in the following sections I argue not that reflexivity displaces the contingency 
of knowledge in the risk society, but that at particular moments reflexive criticism of 
powerful institutions such as conventional medicine, calls into question the dominance of 
scientific knowledge and the power position of doctors. Whether or not these critiques 
materialize as social movements, and whether those social movements achieve 
meaningful change remains to be seen. However, the fact that these resistances are there 
means that they could incite social change and in some cases media stories about health 
risks have resulted in change. For example, stories in the media on Bisphenol-A (BPA) a 
chemical found in plastics that can cause health problems in humans has resulted in 
proposed legislation to label all packages with products that contain the chemical (Kerlin, 
2013). In addition, many children’s bottles and food packages no longer contain itli.  
Women’s Talk Media and Social Change  
Although The Dr. Oz Show may not seem to be a logical place for the public to engage 
with health politics, as Jane Shattuc’s (1999) article on talk shows and the public sphere 
suggests, talk television has become a common place from which politics are broached. 
Ouellette (2012) also points out the importance of television in addressing and mobilizing 
change for social problems: “commercial television has emerged as a visible platform for 
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mobilizing resources and activating capacities to solve problems from homelessness to 
environmental destruction” (2012, p. 57).  
Talk television is no less valid a format for advancing social change than more 
elite forms of communication about politics such as reading newspapers. Shattuc notes 
that the popular press often waxes nostalgic for a public sphere ideal that is untainted by 
“commercial pressures for ‘entertainment’” (Shattuc 1999, 170). However, in the current 
political climate the line between politics and entertainment is increasingly blurred as 
debates between candidates become more focused on their personal lives and candidates 
increasingly use marketing language to describe their campaigns. According to a May 
2012 article in an issue of the Atlantic Magazine entitled “The Culture Issue,” editor 
James Bennet describes this phenomenon:  
From mass marketing it was a short hop along Madison Avenue to politics. 
Politicians and their strategists now talk freely about a candidate’s “brand,” with 
no notion that they might sound as if they are selling soap, and with no detail too 
trivial to need attention. (‘My brand is hair up, isn’t it,” Sarah Palin asked John 
McCain’s media strategist in 2008, according to the book Game Change). 
(Bennet, 2012, p. 8)lii  
Yet, rather than cheapen the political process, incorporating politics into popular culture 
may allow it to be more readily accessible to a wider range of audiences, including the 
working class and women. For example, feminist critics have historically been suspicious 
of the public sphere—private sphere divide that trivializes the private because it has 
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traditionally been associated with women (Shattuc, 1999, p. 171). Likewise, I argue that 
women’s popular health media such as The Dr. Oz Show, Women’s Health and 
Prevention magazine, should be considered viable platforms for contributing to social 
change in health and medicine. In the next section, I provide an example of how women’s 
popular health media engage in reflexive critique of scientific methodologies through 
their discussion of the placebo effect (two of the magazines I analyzed discussed it). One 
article also includes a critique of pharmaceutical corporations, which is echoed on The 
Dr. Oz Show. These examples illustrate media producer’s skepticism of medical 
institutions and medical methodologies, which, when circulated in a widely available 
public format, then become a part of mainstream discourse.  
The Placebo Effect 
In chapter two, I detailed how medical journals protect institutional authority and position 
conventional medicine as superior to alternative medicine through their discussion of the 
Randomized Control Trial (RCT) in testing all medical therapies, including CAM. A 
good part of this discussion touched on the placebo effect. In these articles authors tended 
to argue that the placebo effect was “proof” that a problem was psychological rather than 
physical, thus invalidating its importance. However, in women’s popular health media, I 
found that the placebo effect was dealt with more complexly; both articles advanced 
CAM as important to women’s health and one article questioned scientific assumptions 
about the placebo effect. In this section I analyze articles that discuss the placebo effectliii 
from both Women’s Health and Prevention magazine and argue that their discussion 
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provides important insight into how women’s health media challenge conventional 
medicine and center subjective experience as important in healing.  
While some proponents of CAM in the medical journals I analyzed argue that 
those therapies that show evidence only of the placebo effect should be abandoned 
(Fontanarosa & Lundberg, 1998), supporters in the journals find no problem with the 
possibility that the placebo effect plays some role in the efficacy of CAM therapies 
(Chan, 2008). To these supporters, the fact that the placebo effect works proves a strong 
mind-body connection in the process of healing and thus challenges conventional ways of 
practicing medicine that focus on the absence of disease (Lock, 1998). The placebo effect 
does not just play a role in CAM, but has been proven powerfully effective in 
conventional treatments as well (Welch, 2003), a fact not sufficiently explored in the 
medical and scientific journals I analyzed in this dissertation.  
The popular media I reviewed were more open to exploring the placebo effect. A 
WH article that explores the topic, for example, explicates how it works and argues that if 
the placebo effect improves outcomes for patients, it is indeed a valid treatment. In the 
article, entitled, “Fake Pill, Real power,” the author claims that WH has unlocked the 
mystery of the placebo effect and will help readers harness their mental abilities to 
manage pain. The article traces the history of the placebo effect beginning with Scottish 
physician, Dr. William Cullen, who in the 1700s was working with patients suffering 
from smallpox and typhoid. The article claims the power of the placebo effect was 
established as “scientific fact” when a surgeon in 1955, Henry Beecher, proved that a 
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third of patients could be cured by it. The article also provides additional evidence to 
prove its claims, citing a “famous study” (Dold & Marton, 2011, Paragraph 7) that 
showed neither the herbal supplement St. John’s Wort nor Pfizer’s antidepressant Zoloft 
was as effective in treating depression as the placebo effect. By claiming the placebo 
effect is more powerful than either CAM or conventional treatments the article succeeds 
in shifting the terms of debate from those circumscribed by the medical journals to an 
emphasis on the interdependence of body and mind in health. This view is particularly 
important for women’s health as women have been historically subjected to allegations of 
inventing illnesses that have no physical verifiability (Ehrenreich & English, 2005).  
Although this WH article on the placebo effect supports it as a valid means of 
healing, it still references science as the gold standard by which to measure results. For 
example, the claim that Beecher proved the efficacy of the placebo effect was “scientific 
fact” uses the word “science” rhetorically to bolster authority for its own claim—namely 
that the placebo effect is efficacious and clinically significant; however, this conclusion is 
one that most medical scientists disagree with, according to my research. This is 
consistent with Beck’s (1992) observation about reflexive scientization: in reflexive 
modernity science is used against itself to promote counter arguments: “Forms of 
‘alternative’ and ‘advocacy science’ come into being that relate the entire ‘hocus-pocus 
of science’ to different principles and different interests—and therefore reach exactly the 
opposite conclusions” (p. 161). The demystification of the sciences thus results in the loss 
of universal claims on “truth” that science has historically enjoyed (Beck, 1992). When 
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women’s popular media engage with reflexive scientization they are therefore 
participating in the popularization of this demystification.  
 Although this article does challenge the assumptions of medical science, it does 
not fully explicate the complexity of the placebo effect. For example, it is careful to 
differentiate between conditions the placebo effect “works” for (cramps) and those it does 
not (a broken leg), thus providing discrete effectiveness categories that simplifies the 
complexity of the mind-body connection. For example, in the broken leg scenario, the 
placebo effect would not “cure” the broken leg but could contribute to quicker healing 
(Kaptchuk, 1998).  
The article also provides a side bar to illustrate things the placebo effect works 
for, which all happen to be conditions that affect women much more than men. These 
include irritable bowel syndrome (which affects women more than twice as much as men, 
14% versus 6.6% [Wilson, et. al., 2004]), depression (which affects women about twice 
as much as men [Mayo Clinic Staff, 2013]), migraine (18% of women versus 8% of men 
[The Migraine Trust, 2012]), and chronic fatigue syndrome (which affects women four 
times more than men [CFIDS, 2011]). Yet, the gender disparities in the incidence of these 
diseases is never mentioned in the article. Perhaps the selection of these conditions was 
due to the fact that they affect women more than men; however, these are diseases that 
are difficult to diagnose, have little to no effective treatment options, and, because they 
are women’s diseases, may be more closely linked in important ways to structural 
oppression (the Mayo Clinic makes this assertion in at least part of its description of why 
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women suffer from depression more than men). By arguing the placebo effect is useful in 
illnesses specific to women, a link is made connecting women’s mental state to physical 
illness, an assumption which has been historically used to oppress women (Ehrenreich & 
English, 2005). This article could therefore benefit from a more complex gender-specific 
analysis of the placebo effect and its history.  
In the other article I analyzed that discussed the placebo effect—this one featured 
in Prevention—the editorial perspective was pro-CAM, yet addressed its efficacy within 
the circumscribed debate of the medical community: either the placebo effect is at play 
(meaning the treatment is not efficacious) or it’s not (meaning the treatment works). The 
article on acupuncture entitled, “An End to Pain,” explores the supposed benefits of 
acupuncture as well as analyzes the controversy among Western practitioners who see the 
benefits as merely from the placebo effect:  
But for Western doctors and researchers, this explanation does not rise to the level 
of objective proof. As a result, "there has been an explosion of study on the bio-
mechanisms of acupuncture over the last ten years, showing complex, verifiable 
responses in the brain, nervous system, and connective tissue," says Arya Nielsen, 
PhD, senior attending acupuncturist in the department of Integrative Medicine at 
Beth Israel Medical Center in New York City. One recent review named more 
than 20 scientifically established benefits of acupuncture, from increasing the 
effects of painkilling endorphins to boosting immune function to releasing anti-
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inflammatories (which reduce swelling and help healing). (Tarkan, 2011, 
Paragraph 7)  
This article does not challenge the medical community’s views on testing efficacy, but 
instead tries to prove that acupuncture is effective beyond the placebo effect using 
existing scientific standards. Thus, while the article is pro-CAM, it still falls within the 
debate circumscribed by medical journals: namely, that if a treatment is to be proven 
effective it must be done through scientifically verifiable routes and that proof of the 
placebo effect means that a treatment basically has no efficacy. However, the article does 
suggest, as do some pro-CAM doctors in the medical journals I analyzed, that 
acupuncture may not be amenable to testing via the RCT because fake acupuncture is 
difficult to simulate.  
This last example is illustrative of much of the coverage in women’s popular 
health media: it is generally pro-CAM and tends to frame the debate on the placebo effect 
similar to how conventional medicine sees it (i.e. if a treatment does not work outside the 
context of the placebo effect it is not effective). However, the first article illustrates that 
occasionally these outlets challenge fundamental assumptions of medical science, such as 
the value of the placebo effect in contributing to healing. Although the first article failed 
to adequately explain the gender disparities in the illnesses described and also did not 
discuss the structural causes of disease, such as women’s oppression, these critiques in 
women’s popular health media illustrate that popular media have the potential to provide 
a starting point for the critique of biomedicine.  
186 
 
 
Both the WH article on the placebo effect as well as one of the Dr. Oz Show 
episodes I analyzed critiqued pharmaceutical companies. It is important to note that these 
criticisms were not expressed in articles about pharmaceutical companies; instead they 
are discussing different issues, the placebo effect and Dr. Andrew Weil’s new book 
Spontaneous Happiness respectively. The fact that these critiques are mentioned in 
passing suggest that media producers have taken for granted the corruptness of at least 
one facet of the modern medical institution, as the passage below from WH illustrates:  
Yet placebo is still sometimes considered a dirty word. Pharma companies go to 
expensive lengths to show that their meds outperform inert pills, and drug trials 
are often dismissed for having ‘just a placebo effect.’ For a consumer, though, the 
most fascinating thing about faux treatments (yes, including stuff like Cullen's 
mint water) is what they reveal about the healing power of the mind. (Dold & 
Marton, 2011, Paragraph 3) 
In this example, the magazine posits consumer interests against those of pharmaceutical 
companies, situating them in an antagonistic relationship by highlighting how money 
corrupts the drug production system and disadvantages medical consumers.  
On The Dr. Oz Show, Weil also comments about the corruptness of 
pharmaceutical companies. In his discussion of what he perceives to be the problem of 
the overmedication of Americans with antidepressants, Weil notes:  
This [the number of Americans taking antidepressants] cries out for explanation. 
Why is one in 10 Americans taking antidepressant medications? Well, two big 
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possibilities to consider: the first is that a significant portion of this has been 
created by the medical pharmaceutical complex, and I think there’s no question 
about that. We have been sold a bill of goods telling us that ordinary stints of 
sadness are chemical imbalances of the brain that have to be treated by taking 
drugs. Now, I don’t think that’s true in many cases, so some fraction of this 
depression epidemic is manufactured. I don’t know what it is maybe a third?  If 
you take that away, it still leaves us with a lot of depression to be explained. 
(“The Ultimate Happiness Plan,” Winfrey, 2011)   
Weil voices a critique made by many health scholars who have studied the marketing 
tactics of pharmaceutical companies and argued that they are attempting to expand 
disease categories for financial gainliv. It is telling that both WH and The Dr. Oz Show 
discuss pharmaceutical corporations’ corruption in passinglv, as if the corruptness of 
pharmaceutical companies is a given—another bit of common sense that needs no further 
proof. These examples illustrate how the popular media’s skepticism of institutional 
medicine has become so widespread, that it has become almost common sense.  
A popular women’s magazine such as Women’s Health and a talk show program 
such as The Dr. Oz Show, thus function discursively to contribute to the social shift 
occurring within conventional medicine today: from a view of alternative medicine as 
quackery, to engaging with patient interest in, and demand for, these therapies. Indeed, 
this language illustrates, “how semiosis figures within processes of change” (Fairclough, 
2001, p. 28). The new common sense that articulates pharmaceutical companies to 
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corruption thus encourages consumer skepticism of pharmaceutical products, thus 
possibly affecting people’s health decisions. The consequences of these decisions 
reverberate through the medical system both in the increase of capital being spent on 
CAM, instead of, or in addition to, conventional drugs, as well as may change how 
people view the reputability of conventional medicine. This is a problem physicians are 
well aware of and is, to a certain extent, the reason why they do not want to publicize 
their own research flaws: 
Already feeling that they’re fighting to keep patients from turning to alternative 
medical treatments such as homeopathy, or misdiagnosing themselves on the 
Internet, or simply neglecting medical treatment altogether, many researchers and 
physicians aren’t eager to provide even more reason to be skeptical of what 
doctors do—not to mention how public disenchantment with medicine could 
affect research funding (Freedman, 2010, page 2, Paragraph 18).  
The media do not just fault pharmaceutical companies for corruption, their critique 
extends to conventional doctors. In the next section, I discuss how the media’s 
construction of conventional doctors as cold, disconnected, and impersonal, provides an 
ideal space from which Oz is able to construct himself (and thus his brand) as the polar 
opposite: a caring doctor, one who advocates patient empowerment at the same time he 
educates the audience. I also show how he encourages the audience to engage in 
reflexivity by teaching them to be both critical of doctors and active participants in 
maintaining their health. Because he does not take the role of all-knowing practitioner he 
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makes his position as expert difficult to critique at the same time he enhances his own 
credibility and promotes his brand.   
Patient Criticism and the Construction of Expertise on “The Dr. Oz Show” 
As I established in the introduction, experts are necessary in the risk society to construct 
knowledge, yet are increasingly called into question in the media because of public 
skepticism of institutional authority (Beck, 1992). This is also true for medical expertise. 
In one New York Times column on how patient-doctor relationships are increasingly 
strained, Parker-Pope (2008) cites a study conducted by Johns Hopkins and published in 
the journal Medicine that shows one in four patients believe their doctor has exposed 
them to unnecessary risk. The risks of conventional medicine presented in the media have 
contributed to this perception:  
The reasons for all this frustration [patients being frustrated with doctors] are 
complex. Doctors, facing declining reimbursements and higher costs, have only 
minutes to spend with each patient. News reports about medical errors and drug 
industry influence have increased patients’ distrust. And the rise of direct-to-
consumer advertising and medical Web sites have taught patients to research their 
own medical issues and made them more skeptical and inquisitive. (Parker-Pope, 
2008, Paragraph 9)   
This quote illustrates Beck’s (1992) argument that in late modernity risk is based on a 
knowledge economy that is dependent upon, yet skeptical of, experts; thus individuals 
take it upon themselves to research their own medical conditions, gleaning information 
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from multiple sources and engaging continuously in reflexivity. This quote also 
highlights the importance of media in influencing public skepticism through stories that 
cover medical errors and the corruption of modern medicine.  
Women’s popular health media clearly provide a forum for, as well as contribute 
to, women’s skepticism of doctors. In one WH article entitled, “Don’t Get Surgery in 
July,” the risk of medical mistakes is posed to readers as exceedingly common, 
accounting for 98,000 deaths per year. Other feature articles detail the importance of 
women doing their own research because of doctor misdiagnoses (Moore, 2010). In 
addition, the WH article on the placebo effect points out the importance of the patient-
doctor relationship in healing, “A Harvard University study found that the effectiveness 
of a placebo treatment rose from 44 percent to 62 percent when the doctor treated patients 
with warmth, attention, and confidence” (Dold & Marton, 2011, Paragraph 11). 
Discussing the placebo effect in terms of the relationship to the practitioner hints at how 
important the patient-doctor interaction is to patients’ perceptions of healthcare.  
Oz, like other doctors (Parker-Pope, 2008), seems to be aware of this public 
skepticism and makes a good attempt at winning over female viewers by sympathizing 
with them while simultaneously accepting blame for himself and other doctors not 
adequately attending to women patients’ needs. His attempt to differentiate himself from 
other doctors has created ire among some of the opponents of CAM that I identified in 
the medical journals. For example, in one interview, Dr. Paul Offit, chief of infectious 
diseases at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia and vaccine advocate (also the author 
191 
 
 
of one of my “negative” articles from JAMA) calls Dr. Oz to task for supporting 
alternative medicine and featuring alternative practitioners such as Joe Mercola on his 
program, “’He [Dr. Oz] gives a lot of good advice,’ including advice about diet and 
exercise, Offit says. ‘But he mixes that in with a lot of terrible advice’” (Szabo, 2013, 
Paragraph 80). Similarly, in an April 26, 2011lvi episode of The Dr. Oz Show, Dr. Steven 
Novella (a source included in another of my “negative” articles on CAM) appears to 
defend his view that alternative medicine is not efficacious because it is not based on 
science. Novella, an academic clinical neurologist at Yale University, argues with Oz that 
the therapies Oz endorses such as supplements and homeopathy have no efficacy. After 
his appearance, Novella authored an article about his experience on Science-Based 
Medicine, a website he created, featuring the views of doctors who believe they need to 
advance science because they are being overrun by proponents of alternative medicine. 
Novella notes of his experience, “But proponents of modalities that are not backed by 
evidence, like Dr. Oz, desperately want to make the debate about something else. So they 
invent issues that don’t exist, such as being afraid” (Novella, 2011, Paragraph 7). These 
examples illustrate media synergy between medical journals and popular health media. 
Prestigious doctors who critique CAM engage with Dr. Oz in the mass media and discuss 
Oz’s influence on forums such as Novella’s blog, therefore contributing to a robust 
counter-criticism of the CAM practices Oz endorses. In addition, their critiques bolster 
Oz’s credibility among audience members, thus apparently aligning him more closely 
with patients’ interests. Oz knows this, and even foregrounds his sometimes “outsider” 
status by noting that he has been attacked by some of his colleagues for pushing 
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alternative medicine, claiming that he has put his reputation on the line. Therefore, he not 
only constructs himself in opposition to other doctors, other doctors help to enhance his 
rogue status by critiquing him across various media platforms.  
The above media examples illustrate that the doctors who author the articles in the 
medical journals I analyzed are not disconnected from the popular media. They engage 
with it, and make sure their points are also part of the public discourse. Not only are they 
interviewed in news contexts, they appear on talk television, such as Oz’s show, 
illustrating that they understand the importance of popular media in constructing what 
counts as an appropriate approach to medicine. When Oz has Novella on the show, he 
asks him confrontational questions that challenge the assumptions of conventional 
medicine, ones that perhaps patients want to ask, but given time constraints, or the power 
dynamic in the patient-doctor relationship, do not. For example, Oz frames the discussion 
on CAM using statistics that show that many patients do not share their alternative 
medicine use with their doctors. He states: 
Do you know what I think the big problem is? Do you know why people aren’t 
talking to their doctors? Because they don’t think their doctors know anything 
about it [alternative medicine]. Is that close to on target folks? So if I can give you 
my take, alternative medicine I think is at the grassroots level. And because of 
that, nobody owns it. Now that stated, I think we got our homework to do. I think 
alternative medicine empowers us…and if it works for you then trust me do not 
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let anybody take it away from you” (“Controversial Medicine: Alternative 
Health,” Winfrey, 2011).  
In this example, Oz articulates the patient’s position for them. He also connects CAM 
with a grassroots movement that assumes a counter-cultural component, while 
positioning conventional doctors as domineering, by asserting that some conventional 
doctors may be trying to take CAM away from patients. He thus reinforces the dichotomy 
between patient and doctor, while also reinforcing his brand as patient advocate. 
Interestingly, one of the ways the Novella tries to discredit CAM is by using the term, 
“brand” rhetorically to refer to how alternative medicine has become popular with 
consumers. He suggests that alternative medicine is “branded” as natural, and thus 
assumed safe, when it may have negative effects similar to conventional remedies. By 
using the language of branding, Novella concisely asserts that CAM is a hoax, 
constructed as superior to conventional medicine through the deceitful practices of 
marketers.  
In this section, I argued that Dr. Oz engages with critiques that have been made 
by women of conventional medicine in the past, including being written off by doctors as 
hysterics and feeling as if doctors don’t respond to them on a personal level. Through his 
acknowledgment of these critiques and his self-construction as both understanding and 
open to other’s opinions, including alternative practitioners and audience members, Oz 
creates a self-brand that connects with the elements women patients tend to seek from 
CAM and thus becomes a trusted authority figure for women. In the following section, I 
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elaborate on Oz’s brand, and discuss how his endorsement of CAM has contributed to its 
widespread popularity.  
Brand “Oz”: Conventional and Alternative Medicine Expert  
Oz has the credentials that make him an expert in both conventional and complementary 
medicine. The star of the show, Dr. Mehmet Oz, is a Harvard and University of 
Pennsylvania trained cardiac surgeon who, along with his television hosting position, is 
also vice-chair and professor of surgery at Columbia University and Director of the 
Cardiovascular Institute and Complementary Medicine Program at New York 
Presbyterian Hospital. He has had a career not only in medicine, but in the media as well. 
Prior to the launch of his show in 2009, he was a recurring guest on The Oprah Winfrey 
Show, appearing in 55 episodes as a medical expert. He is also a frequent guest on the 
talk show circuit and has served as a medical consultant to Discovery Communications. 
He has even served as medical director for major Hollywood films such as John Q, a 
2002 film starring Denzel Washington. In addition to his television media presence, Oz 
has authored seven New York Times bestsellers, entitled the “You” series that cover topics 
such as You: being a smart patient, You: being on a diet, You: being beautiful, and You: 
staying young. According to his website, he also contributes regular columns to Time 
Magazine, AARP, Esquire, and O: The Oprah Magazine. Oz is also the host of a daily 
talk show on Oprah’s Sirius XM radio station. Clearly Oz’s media presence is ubiquitous 
and the media industry recognizes him as influential: along with receiving two Emmy 
awards for The Dr. Oz Show, he has been named Forbes’ #3 (2010, 2011) most 
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influential celebrity as well as been named to one of Time Magazine’s most influential 
people (2008).  
Oz is well positioned both in medical knowledge and in his media know-how to 
be a trusting figure for television audiences. The way he constructs his persona on 
television highlights his conventional medical expertise at the same time he forwards a 
caring, compassionate, doctor—one who aligns more closely with what patients seek in 
alternative practitioners (Ernst, Resch, & Hill, 1997). In this way he constructs himself as 
a sort of hybrid of the two—a doctor who has medical expertise and a caring touch. 
Therefore, Oz’s brand is a media-savvy doctor, one who, like his patients, shares an 
interest in, and appreciation for, CAM.  
Thinking of Oz as a “brand,” helps to situate his multiple mediated ventures into a 
coherent framework and foregrounds the shared audience of women consumers that 
health magazines and his program cater to. Banet-Weiser (2012) defines a brand as, “the 
intersecting relationship between marketing, a product, and consumers” (p. 4). Oz’s 
brand contributes to the political push for CAM to be accepted within conventional 
medicine, yet it is worth noting here that his brand also contributes to how CAM is 
branded. CAM is a bit different from Banet-Weiser’s description of brands. She discusses 
both consumer products such as Coca-Cola as well as certain organizations, like the 
Mormon Church. Unlike these examples, CAM is not one product or encompassed by 
any one organization; therefore, it is more akin to how she describes New Age Eastern 
spirituality: as a movement that has been branded in a particular way and has thus been 
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articulated to a certain set of meanings. The New Age Eastern spirituality example she 
uses provides a similar example of how CAM has been branded. For example, in her 
discussion of yoga (which also falls under the rubric of CAM), Banet-Weisesr discusses 
how it has been almost completely disarticulated from its spiritual roots in Hinduism, and 
instead has come to stand in for a somewhat benign, pseudo-spiritual, whitewashed 
practice of upper-middle class Americans. Similarly, as I discussed in the introduction, 
CAM is also generally used by upper middle-class consumers, thus it is also associated 
with a particular form of wellness constructed by privileged consumers.   
As a CAM endorser, Oz enhances this meaning at the same time he creates his 
own brand as closely interrelated with CAM. As both Banet-Weiser (2012) and Ouellette 
(2012) point out, influential celebrity figures can be important in connecting causes with 
particular meanings. For example, Ouellette (2012) argues that Sarah Palin’s “brand” 
helped reinvigorate the Republican Party by creating a sense of authenticity and 
folksiness. Oz similarly provides a strong endorsement for CAM being incorporated into 
conventional medicine, positioning it as both counter-cultural and empowering. In this 
way, his brand functions in the interest of advancing CAM in the medical community; 
but by focusing on CAM as counter-cultural and empowering, he also associates it with 
an empowerment only open to some middle-class patientslvii. Now that I have discussed 
Oz’s brand, I will provide specific illustrations of how he brands himself as a caring, 
compassionate doctor in opposition to the cold, disconnected medical expert.  
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In one show that exemplifies how Oz blends his conventional expertise with his 
image as a caring doctor, cooking star Paula Deen appears as a guest to discuss her 
struggle to quit smoking. Oz references his expertise as a surgeon to encourage her to 
quit, “You’re such a role model but the story you’re telling me I hear all the time. I’m a 
heart surgeon as you know. Did you know that I have never operated on a smoker in my 
life?” (“Dr. Oz Takes on the Queen of Southern Cooking, Paula Deen, and Paula Deen’s 
Shocking Health Confession, Winfrey, 2011). When Deen asks him why, he replies, 
“Because I love them too much. If I operate on a smoker, I’ve given up my own chance 
to get them to stop. So I tell them when they come to my office that I appreciate their 
trust, I know I can help them, I know I can get them to live a long time but I wait to do it 
until they stop” (“Dr. Oz Takes on the Queen of Southern Cooking,” Winfrey, 2011). Oz 
asserts his affection towards Deen and other guests or audience members in a similar way 
by saying that he “loves them,” thus his care for people is foregrounded rather than his 
seeing them as patients only.  
Through his self-construction as a caring doctor Oz challenges the traditional 
norm of the patient-doctor power differential. In his discussion of the dominant ways in 
which patients and doctors interact, Fairclough (2001) notes, “The dominant way 
probably still maintains social distance between doctors and patients along with the 
authority of the doctor over the way interaction proceeds; but there are other ways which 
are more ‘democratic’, in which doctors play down their authority” (p. 29). This is 
exactly what Dr. Oz does on his show. He frequently plays up the expertise of other 
doctors (both conventional and alternative), and sometimes his audience, and encourages 
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patients to take an active-role in challenging their doctors’ recommendations, including 
his own. As I will show in the following examples, Oz’s brand is counter-hegemonic to 
the dominant ways in which patients and doctors have typically interacted. Oz’s show in 
some ways presents a more “democratic” sort of relationship between doctor and patient, 
resulting in the idealization of Oz and leading to difficulty in countering the sometimes 
patriarchal and patronizing elements of his showlviii. 
Patient Empowerment and Audience Education in Reflexivity 
When Oz straddles the line between expert and patient advocate, he engages with and 
even intensifies public sentiment that has expressed dissatisfaction with conventional 
care. Engaging the topic on the show illustrates a step away from the model of doctor as 
unquestionable expert and presents doctors as real people with biases and judgments, just 
like anyone else, thus Oz participates to a certain extent in the demystification of the 
profession. In his discussion of Beck’s and Gidden’s view of public distrust of experts, 
Irwin (1994) notes:  
Where once there was certainty there is now radical doubt. Faith in expertise has 
given way to a more reflexive process of criticism and ontological anxiety. 
Citizens are aware of the choices which exist—above all, about how to live—and 
that there is no single answer to life’s challenges. (p. 174)  
Similarly, Oz counters the superiority of scientific knowledge claims as the only truth, 
and doctors as the arbiters of it, by, for example, carefully counterbalancing his medical 
advice to the audience with a message of empowerment designed to encourage women to 
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question their doctors and be proactive in their healthcare. In one 2011 interview in 
Prevention, Oz states that patient empowerment is one of the main goals of his show:  
The Prevention readers are the eyes and ears for us. If they can understand that 
they have the responsibility to be that vanguard, to be the patriotic person--
because it is patriotic to be the one who challenges their doctor by requesting a 
second opinion, asking to see their records, asking about alternative medicine--
they're forcing their doctors to learn something they didn't know before, which 
means every other patient they see after them will benefit because they were 
willing to be first. (Caploe, 2011, Paragraph 16) 
It is telling that Oz refers to patients getting a second opinion as “patriotic” suggesting his 
show becomes political (while reinforcing his counter-hegemonic brand) by participating 
in the struggle over the acceptability of CAM within the medical community. In this 
example, Oz is on the audience’s side and provides validation for, as well as promotes, 
alternative therapies.  
Suggesting that patients can force doctors into acknowledging the value of 
alternative medicine also challenges the traditional patient-doctor relationship. Yet Oz 
straddles a fine line between encouraging patient empowerment and asserting that 
patients have a responsibility to question their doctors. By putting the responsibility on 
finding good health care on patients, Oz is holding them accountable for the quality of 
care (or lack thereof) that they receive, as well as advancing his own agenda through 
audience members, hoping their doctors will respond. This example also illustrates a 
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neoliberal slant in the emphasis it puts on personal responsibility, which is also one of the 
central tenets of contemporary health discourse (Dubrwiny, 2013).  
Yet, occasionally Oz also allows his audience to be in the position of “expert.” 
For example, women on the show are sometimes featured in small segments to share their 
tips on topics like how to add lasting weight loss techniques to daily life. In one segment 
featuring several female viewers sharing major weight loss achievements, Oz asks the 
women to give the audience their tips for losing weight and keeping it off. The women 
share recipes for marinades, propose alternatives to peanut butter, and offer various ways 
to prepare cottage cheese in order to keep unhealthy food cravings in check. Oz closes the 
segment by praising the audience’s ingenuity, “That’s what I love about our audience: 
you guys figure out such smart and simple ways from very simple ones, some cutting 
edge ones, but they’re all there” (Winfrey, 2011). For the most part, this type of show that 
allows audience members a position of expertise is relatively rare; but it does allow for 
some voice among female audience members.  
Calling on audience members as sources of expertise is one of the reasons 
feminist media scholars such as Shattuc (1999) and Mellencamp (1999) have asserted 
that talk shows are so popular among women and potentially valuable for women. In her 
discussion of television talk shows, Mellencamp notes, “And while rational thought—in 
the form of the outside expert or analyst speaking from the distanced third person of 
scholarship (usually hawking a new book around which the topic is arranged)—is 
included, first-person accounts, stagings of affect, count more than intellect or third-
201 
 
 
person analyses. The hierarchy between mind and body, between thought and feeling, is 
dissolved, with the latter, traditionally aligned with women, emerging as most valued” 
(Mellencamp,1990, p.214). While The Dr. Oz Show does not usually privilege audience 
members’ views over experts, he does ask audience members to be active in maintaining 
and improving their health, and frequently validates their subjective experiences of health 
and medicine. On Oz’s show strict reliance on expertise is never sufficient for the kind of 
health empowerment that Oz endorses on his program. Thus, he not only allows his 
audience to be experts at times, he also educates them about how to be reflexive.  
 As I discussed in chapter three, in the risk society, individualization, or the 
necessity to make one’s own choices in late modernity, seems to be necessitated by the 
multiplicity of risks and competing knowledge claims that characterizes the risk society; 
Oz participates in teaching his audience to be reflexive as a means of dealing with the 
multiple profusion of risks. Therefore, to a certain degree, he exercises what Foucault 
terms, “pastoral power.” This form of power is not repressive, but rather productive. It 
requires that the expert know intimately the subject in question and then help guide them 
in making the correct decisions (Nettleton, 1997). Oz does this by encouraging self-
reliance while at the same time providing instructions for how to make the correct health 
decisions. For example, in one episode that focuses on detecting health scams, Oz asserts 
that supplements may be contaminated with heavy metals or other additives that can 
harm consumers’ health. He tries to reconcile his frequent recommendations to take 
supplements with this danger by directing audience members to a pay website, 
consumerlab.com, that does independent testing of different companies’ supplements and 
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rates them for purity. He then offers his audience a free 24-hour access passcode to the 
site so that they know which brands to purchase and their level of purity.  
In this episode, Oz shows women that they should be skeptical about which 
alternative therapies they choose as well as how to be skeptical. For example, he details a 
list of supplements that he believes consumers should be wary of and describes how some 
companies, following his endorsement of African mango, have used his image to promote 
their supplements. Oz undertakes a sting operation by creating his own fake product, 
complete with a website, to see if he can dupe consumers into believing that it’s real. The 
show then features one woman who was fooled by the site. When he asks her how she 
felt when she found out that the site and product was a sham, her response illustrates the 
influence Oz has on some viewers: “I felt duped. I thought I was getting a miracle weight 
loss product by you, so it was my fault. I run out and buy everything you say” (“The Top 
Seven Health Scams: Are You Being Duped Now?,” Winfrey, 2011). After this 
interaction Oz tries to downplay his authority by encouraging the audience to be critical, 
“I want you to hear me clearly…when I see you buying something that my picture is on it 
concerns me; it’s not that I don’t want you to trust me. I want you to trust me, but the 
truth is in you, it’s in all of us. The wisdom and the insight to be able to make decisions 
that govern our health has to always be in us” (“The Top Seven Health Scams,” Winfrey, 
2011). Yet, it’s not surprising that the woman would believe Oz given his influence. This 
episode illustrates how Oz tries to balance women’s abilities to trust the experts and their 
own need to trust themselves as a means to discern the best decisions for their own, and 
often their families’ healthlix. This example highlights the tenuous line women must 
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negotiate in late modernity between trust and skepticism in a health market that is flooded 
with contradictory evidence and thus makes decision-making about health increasingly 
difficult, making the reliance on a trusted expert even more valuable for consumers.  
In this supplement scam episode, Oz participates in educating his audience about 
how not to be duped by online fraud. In order to teach the audience how to determine 
“real” from “fake” products, Oz features an online scam expert. Similar to the medical 
journals, the show thus frames women as an audience that must be educated about how to 
negotiate healthcare decisions; in Foucauldian terms, they become subjects in need of 
governance. However, unlike the coverage in the medical journals, Oz not only assumes 
the public can make their own decisions, he demands they do. In Oz’s program, women 
can rely on experts—including Oz himself—but only so much.    
Women being empowered to take control of their health is of course, important, 
but there are critics of the all-encompassing discourse of health empowerment (e.g. 
Dubriwny, 2013, Gastaldo, 1997 and Petersen, 1997) who describe health management as 
a form of disciplining the self. In this sense health empowerment is restrictive because it 
places a sense of responsibility on individuals to continually monitor their health, even in 
the absence of any clear illness. Although Oz’s imperative that patients take 
responsibility may be burdensome at times, there are moments on his show that 
illuminate social and structural issues that affect health, such as the lack of insurance for 
all Americans and gender discrimination in healthcare. These critiques thus take his show 
out of the context of framing health as strictly individualistic. In episodes that discuss 
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how the U.S. medical insurance system is unjust, or how male doctors discriminate 
against female patients, Oz is able to highlight some important structural influences on 
health.  
In this section, I have argued that Dr. Oz participates in reflexive critique of 
institutional medicine and conventional doctors by constructing himself, and thus his 
brand, as self-reflexive and counter-cultural. I have also argued that his taking into 
account other expert sources including female audience members, allows for women to 
have a voice. Finally, I have shown that his show serves as a vehicle for patient 
education, designed to teach audience members how to be reflexive, thus illustrating how 
he participates in administering pastoral power. In the following section, I analyze one 
episode in which Dr. Oz addresses social problems in medicine in his discussion of 
gender discrimination in healthcare in the context of chronic pain. In this episode, he not 
only discusses women’s chronic pain in the context of gender discrimination, but 
continuously shores up his own credibility by critiquing doctors and providing an 
alternative view to their patronizing assumptions about female patients.   
Chronic Pain: A Woman’s Problem  
The selection of chronic pain as a focus of a Dr. Oz Show episode is important for 
women’s health: 80-90% of sufferers of fibromyalgia, or chronic pain, are women 
(CFIDS, 2011), and some doctors question whether this illness exists at all (Berenson, 
2008). In his exploration of the topic, Oz begins the segment right away by positioning 
himself in opposition to other doctors: “There are a lot of doctors who are going to be 
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really angry about what I’m talking about today… 116 million of you suffer from chronic 
pain and I’m ashamed to say that we doctors haven’t been taking your pain seriously 
enough” (“Why Your Doctor Thinks You’re Crazy!: Is Your Chronic Pain a Disease,” 
Winfrey, 2011). At the same time he positions himself in opposition to doctors whom he 
will make angry, he also accepts blame by saying that he is “ashamed” that “we doctors” 
haven’t been taking women’s chronic pain seriously enough.  
Oz foregrounds gender at the beginning of the episode by featuring three women 
who have been suffering from chronic pain for years, all of them with stories about how 
their doctors either did not believe that they were suffering from pain or told them that 
their problems were psychological. After the video montage featuring the women, Oz 
interviews Sheila, a black woman who appears to be in her 40s or 50s, asking her how it  
made her feel that her doctors thought her problem was mental rather than physical. 
Sheila says that it made her angry; as Oz holds her hand, she claims that because the 
doctor could not figure out the problem he was trying to make it into something mental. 
Oz agrees with her, “that’s a great insight; sometimes we can’t figure it out so we put the 
guilt back on you” (“Why Your Doctor Thinks You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). Here, 
Oz listens and responds to, Sheila, validating her subjective experience of pain as real and 
situating doctors as at fault.  
 Another woman Oz profiles, Hillary, claims that her chronic pain, which she has 
been experiencing since sixth grade, has kept her from being the kind of mother she 
hopes to be. She says that she has seen ten neurologists and that they just want to give her 
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drugs, “I’ve never really been touched [the sentiment seems to refer to the doctors just 
wanting to medicate her rather than listen to her closely],” (“Why Your Doctor Thinks 
You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). Distancing himself from her cold practitioners, Oz 
holds her hand thus providing the human “touch” that she was seeking from her doctors. 
His comment following her statement emphasizes this role, “I was taught by a teacher 
very early on that just looking at someone in their eyes and knowing that they’re [doctor 
and patient] together for each other makes a big difference” (“Why Your Doctor Thinks 
You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). In these examples, Oz again carefully constructs 
himself as a caring, more humane doctor and also as more interested in patients than the 
critiques of doctors being voiced in popular media.  
 Along with featuring the women in the videos, on this show all of Oz’s audience 
members are also chronic pain sufferers and he interviews some of them as well. One 
white woman  from the audience named Susan claimed that when suffering chronic pain 
after leg surgery she was told by her doctor to go home and “have more sex” with her 
husband (“Why Your Doctor Thinks You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). Oz is appalled, and 
picks Susan’s example of blatant gender discrimination in diagnosis to open up the topic 
of gender discrimination in medical care. Before convening a panel of experts on chronic 
pain, Oz talks to another woman in the audience who similarly describes being prescribed 
medication that she did not want to take and when she had problematic side effects was 
told by her doctor that she would get used to them. When Oz asks her how that made her 
feel, she says, “dismissed,” (“Why Your Doctor Thinks You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). 
Oz affirms her sentiment and asks his audience how many of them felt dismissed by their 
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caregivers; most of the audience raises their hands. When Oz incorporates his audience 
through both interviews and as a collective group that has experienced discrimination at 
the hands of their doctors, he engages in a sort of consciousness-raising moment, 
reminiscent of the practices engaged by women’s health activists in the 1970s, for 
example in the Boston Women’s Health Collective (Morgen, 2002). Thus, his show 
appears to be somewhat feminist at brief junctures.  
Before he delves into the reasons why doctors think chronic pain sufferers are 
“crazy,” Oz begins with a bold challenge to many doctors:  
I’m going to let the audience in on a little secret here that no one’s going to admit 
until now… and it’s going to shock a lot of folks, and it’s going to piss a lot of 
doctors off, so I’m just going to get it out there, cause when I hear these stories, it 
frustrates me. But it’s hard to get proper treatment because in my opinion doctors 
do think you’re crazy; they think the pain is all in your head (“Why Your Doctor 
Thinks You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011).  
In this example, his position as a doctor allows him insight into doctor “secrets,” such as 
their apparent suspicion that chronic pain sufferers are crazy. Thus, he participates in the 
active critique of the profession, encouraging women audience members to do the same.  
Some doctors appear to be aware that patients who suffer from chronic pain 
generally have a negative perception of their doctors and tend to seek out CAM therapies 
as a result of this dissatisfaction. For example, in one recent NEJM article, Pizzo (2012) 
notes, “Physicians’ referral of patients to other health care professionals, including 
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nurses, chiropractors, and practitioners of complementary medicine, and patients’ 
willingness to seek such care, can be influenced by bias, unclear data, and the availability 
of care. Sadly, many people with chronic pain see physicians as poor listeners” 
(Paragraph 2). Oz’s acknowledgment of this problem and his apology for himself and 
other doctors makes him an idealistic version of what doctors should be: more caring, 
understanding, and accepting of patient’s subjective experiences at the same time he 
reinforces his brand of rogue compassionate doctor. Similar to how Sarah Palin 
constructed herself against elite politicians and the media, (Oullette, 2012) Oz similarly 
constructs himself as a rogue. He is more understanding than doctors, real, and not 
disconnected from his patients’ experiences.  
Among the four reasons Oz provides for why other doctors think that chronic pain 
sufferers are crazy is that they can’t see pain, and therefore believe that it is not present. 
To further explain this point Oz features a guest who is a member of the committee at the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) that investigates chronic pain, Dr. Shawn Mackey. Mackey 
claims changing the way that doctors conceptualize pain—that it is in fact “real” and can 
permanently change your nervous system—is a “cultural revolution” (“Why Your Doctor 
Thinks You’re Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). The use of the word “revolution,” associates 
new research on pain with radically changing the medical establishment’s prior views; in 
addition, because the show references gender, “revolution” also implicitly refers to the 
women’s revolution, or at the very least, a women’s revolution in receiving adequate care 
for chronic pain. Finally, by using the word “cultural,” Mackey situates medicine 
squarely within culture, not outside it, as science and medicine have historically imagined 
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themselves, and as the doctors and scientists in the medical journals I analyzed tended to 
discuss it. The use of the words “cultural” and “revolution” creates an oppositional 
discourse to how chronic pain has traditionally been described in the medical community. 
This segment also shows that those within the medical profession, such as Oz and the 
other doctors on the episode he interviews, are participating in shifting medical culture 
from doctor-centered to more patient-involved.   
Among the other three reasons why, according to Oz, doctors think chronic pain 
sufferers are crazy, are that they do not have much pain management training and that 
they think patients are trying to abuse prescription medications. Finally, Oz presents his 
fourth reason, which he claims is the most “shocking” reason your doctor thinks you’re 
crazy: pain sufferers are mostly women. This statement is shocking in the context of mass 
media, where gender discrimination in the context of medical attention has received scant 
attention. After he reveals this reason the audience gasps and Oz asks his expert on 
women’s health to explain why that is the case. Unfortunately, the female physician on 
the panel, Dr. Donnica Moore, does not provide an institutional explanation for why 
gender discrimination in medical care happens and instead provides a personal example 
about when she was seeking help for chronic pain. Moore explains that she went to see 
top male doctors in the country and although she herself was a doctor, they spoke only to 
her husband who was with her, telling him that she was suffering from postpartum 
depression. Moore then describes seeing a female doctor who was six months pregnant 
herself who quickly confirmed Moore’s pain as “real” with a blood test and an MRI. 
Unfortunately, not only does Moore’s example fail to highlight structural biases in the 
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medical profession, she also falls back on accepted screening methods within the medical 
community that are able to “prove” something is wrong. Although these diagnostic 
techniques may provide insight into identifying a potential illness, leaving her discussion 
there makes it seem as if tests that are inconclusive or do not show a visible image on the 
screen, invalidate those patient’s experiences and therefore undermines the argument that 
pain that is not visible may still be real. In addition, by discussing her interaction with a 
female practitioner who immediately validated her pain, she is forwarding a gender 
essentialist view that suggests that only a woman would be able to correctly diagnose her 
problem.  
Oz doesn’t offer much commentary on the topic himself, likely because he is a 
male doctor who is asking female patients and audience members to trust him; but he 
does concede that gender discrimination in diagnosis is “shocking.” Oz finishes the 
segment by describing how chronic pain can now be considered a “disease” and offers 
the audience questions they can ask their doctor about chronic pain, “If someone’s telling 
you to have more sex, or you’re depressed…No, I mean it’s tragic, we laugh about it, but 
it’s tragic, or they think it’s all in your head, those are telltale signs. You don’t have to 
ask those four questions—just keep moving” (“Why Your Doctor Thinks You’re 
Crazy!,” Winfrey, 2011). Similar to the previous episodes I analyzed, Oz’s combination 
of rogue compassionate doctor and medical expert allow him the authority to gently 
guide women’s health information seeking behaviors, legitimate women’s subjective 
experiences of health, and also open up a space to honor their experience as real. By 
including it as a problem on the show, Oz makes a statement about the differential 
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treatment of female patients via their experience with chronic diseases that primarily 
affect women. In addition, by providing a forum for women’s health both by addressing 
women’s health issues and featuring cross-promotional segments with the women’s 
magazines I analyzed, Oz enhances his marketability to his audience.  
The examples that I have discussed in this chapter illustrate that women’s popular 
health media at times do extend beyond a focus on individualism to point out social 
issues in healthcare as well as actively participate in the critique of medicine. I am not 
arguing that these narratives totally challenge the landscape of individually focused 
healthcare; in fact, much of what I am arguing throughout this dissertation is that women 
are expected to participate in a great deal of individual labor in order to be educated 
health consumers. However, the critique of doctors, pharmaceutical companies, and 
structural discrimination in healthcare articulated by the mass media reflects, and 
contributes to, a level of popular awareness that points to a source of illness located other 
than at the level of the individual and this public awareness is a step in the right direction 
for changing medical care for women.  
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have argued that women’s popular health media provide a forum for the 
expression of reflexive critique and therefore have the potential to help instigate social 
change in medicine. I have discussed how the placebo effect is dealt with more 
complexly in women’s magazines than in medical journals and how The Dr. Oz Show 
provides a platform for women to express their experiences of gender discrimination in 
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healthcare. I have also shown that these discussions could be improved, for example in 
the acknowledgment of women-dominated diseases in Women’s Health and more fully 
exploring the reason for gender discrimination in healthcare on The Dr. Oz Show. I have 
also shown that Oz constructs himself as a sympathetic figure to female audiences by 
engaging reflexively with critiques of conventional doctors made by the public and serves 
as a sort of mediator between patients and doctors. In this way, he sets a standard for 
what patients should expect from doctors, while enhancing his brand and expanding the 
market for women’s popular health media. Finally, I have shown a specific example of 
how the representation of risks in popular media provide insight into the shifting 
relationship between the general public and experts in late modernitylx. The examples I 
analyzed illustrates how popular media can shape the contours of medicine by calling 
into question everything from the patient doctor interaction to scientific medicine itself.   
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
On June 18, 2013, my Google alert that had been set up for a few years to provide me 
news on CAM, pulled stories from CNN.com, USA Today, and NBCNews.com featuring 
opinions on CAM by doctor Paul Offit, whom I mentioned in chapter four and who has 
authored a new book entitled, “Do you believe in magic? The sense and nonsense of 
alternative medicine” (2013). One of his claims is that CAM (particularly the supplement 
industry) is a sometimes exploitative business. Because supplements do not need FDA 
approval, he argues consumers are being duped and at times subjected to dangerous side 
effects from these treatments.  
While Offit makes an argument typical of the critics of CAM that I surveyed in 
the medical journals, he does make one important point: CAM is not necessarily more 
efficacious or better than conventional medicine. I thought it pertinent to visit this point 
before I conclude because I am not arguing for CAM’s superiority to conventional 
medicine. In fact, in my own use of health care services I admit I am somewhat more 
skeptical of CAM than of conventional medicine. However, I am arguing that CAM can 
contribute to conventional medicine in two ways: 1) it can provide alternative ways of 
understanding health as holistic by fully exploring the mind-body connection, and 2) it 
can help broaden medical knowledge through the use of alternative methodologies to test 
CAM therapies. This does not mean disavowing the value of scientifically based 
medicine; it merely involves displacing science and the scientific method as the sole 
arbiter of “truth.” For example, as I have argued throughout, sometimes the results 
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science produces change months or years later when a different study is conducted using 
different methods or asking different questions. Therefore, it is important that scientific 
results are also scrutinized and not accepted as “fact” until they have been tested through 
time and experience. It’s important to keep in mind as Ioannidis points out, “’Science is a 
noble endeavor, but it’s also a low-yield endeavor’” (Freedman, 2010, page 2, Paragraph 
20). Therefore, science also deserves to be scrutinized to the same extent as CAM.  
CAM as a Part of Conventional Medicine 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that incorporating CAM into mainstream 
medicine challenges medical-scientific methodologies. I have also argued that CAM has 
historically been more friendly to, and accepting of, women than conventional medicine 
has, both in valuing their subjective experiences of their bodies as well as allowing them 
to practice alternative medicine. However, critics argue that CAM may be understood as 
more disciplinary than conventional medicine as it focuses on holism and total wellness, 
thus seemingly demanding constant self-surveillance and discipline.   
 Critics of the discourse of health empowerment (e.g. Gastaldo,1997 and Petersen, 
1997), use a Foucauldian lens to describe health management as an all-encompassing 
form of disciplining the self. In this sense health empowerment is limiting and restrictive 
because it places a sense of responsibility on individuals to continually monitor their 
health, even in the absence of any clear disease. It could be argued that the paradigm of 
holistic health and CAM may place more pressure on individuals to maintain and 
optimize health at all times. Similarly, Dubrwiny (2013) critiques the ethos of self-
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empowerment as it is currently deployed in health discourse. These authors show that a 
critique of individualism and self-empowerment in CAM discourses is necessary. For 
example, as I pointed out in chapter three, individualism is one of the negative ideals that 
CAM is associated with in women’s popular health media. Yet, I also illustrated in 
chapter four that this discourse is not monolithic.     
Although Gastaldo’s (1997) and Petersen’s (1997) critiques offer insight into the 
context of how alternative medicine may be (and sometimes is) practiced in a neoliberal 
society, for example, it may be used to emphasize individual behaviors such as diet and 
exercise as opposed to finding structural factors for illness. I argue that it is not health 
empowerment or holism per se that is disciplinary; rather it is the current organization of 
neoliberal American society which emphasizes individualism and personal success that 
provides the context within which holistic health can be read as disciplinary. 
Neoliberalism also provides a social context for those who produce information about 
CAM and may result in advice by those practitioners that reflects those values. Yet, like 
religion (Hall, 1989), CAM is not inherently repressive—it becomes repressive only 
when it is articulated to self-empowerment or individualism in a particular way: for 
example, by suggesting, as some of the media I analyze do, that one has a great deal of 
control over one’s health through making healthy lifestyle choices.  
But the articulation between CAM and individualism is not static. As Grossberg 
(1992) points out, “Articulation is the construction of one set of relations out of another; 
it often involves delinking or disarticulating connections in order to link or rearticulate 
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others…Articulation is both the practice of history and its critical reconstruction, 
displacement and renewal” (p. 54). What Grossberg points to in this quote, is that 
articulating ideas together, such as mastery over health and CAM, may be disarticulated 
and re-articulated into a formation that may be positive for women’s health (because 
those associations are already there, as I have shown). One example might be articulating 
CAM to a collective women’s movement that questions gender oppression in institutional 
medicine and interrogates social and structural causes of illness.  
 The media continue to perpetuate neoliberal ideas about choice and empowerment 
for women and this will likely not completely change any time soon (Vavrus, 2007). 
Similar to how Vavrus (2007) discusses stories in the news media that covered mothers 
opting out of the workforce to stay home with children, the popular press’s coverage of 
CAM gives the same patriarchal neoliberal treatment. However, CAM is at times dealt 
with more complexly in women’s popular health media; for example, by exploring the 
placebo effect in ways that challenge the methodological assumptions of scientific 
medicine, or by discussing gender oppression in medicine. This coverage does not go far 
enough however. By obscuring the historical oppression of women by the medical 
profession, gender discrimination in healthcare becomes a “shocking” topic on the Dr. Oz 
Show rather than being framed as an extension of an ideology that has permeated 
conventional medicine for hundreds of years. Yet, the media consistently participate in 
the active critique of conventional medicine as an institution, thus showing how their 
coverage at the very least broaches the topic of changes that need to be made within the 
system.   
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Reflexivity and Social Change  
I have argued that critiques of medicine voiced in the popular media are illustrative of 
Beck’s concept of reflexivity, and that the media can be used to provide influential 
platforms for social change within medical institutions. However, critics who analyze the 
“new public health” (which is marked by an increasing skepticism of medical institutions 
and community organizing around green and environmentally friendly causes), argue 
these trends support public health initiatives and serve a disciplinary function that implies 
citizenship responsibilities ultimately serving as a means for exclusion (Petersen, 1997, p. 
204). For example, Petersen argues that green movements tend to be organized by 
middle-class citizens, thus a lack of participation in such movements may lead to 
judgment of those who do not participate in such activities.  
Although I agree that these imperatives may serve a regulatory function in some 
cases (by, for example, requiring active participation in interrogating the current 
healthcare structure), this thesis does not fully address the possibility of positive change 
that such organizing may provide for health justice. Undoubtedly power is operating on 
multiple levels—through the government, corporations, non-profits and varying 
experts—yet power constituted through social organizing around a communal goal 
cannot simply be written off as an example of a technique of power in action. For the 
purposes of action, it seems counterproductive to juxtapose state rationalities against the 
will of individuals. Certainly the desires of the state and its individual citizens are 
inextricably linked, and analyzing the power dynamics inherent in that relationship is a 
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valuable goal for analyzing how power operates; but because the goal of this project is to 
understand how progressive action may be incited through popular media, it remains 
imperative for me as a feminist health communication researcher to focus on how to 
understand how to act within the social constraints of society. Yet I do retain  a reflexive 
perspective, acknowledging for example, how reflexivity is used negatively to 
incorporate  sexist discourses into movements such as CAM that are often framed by the 
media as “progressive,” thus masking the patriarchal ideologies that inform how that 
issue is covered.   
In addition, it is important to remember that how the media discursively construct 
health has consequences not just for individual health actions but for policy outcomes. 
For example, women’s health was a central issue in the 2012 presidential race. President 
Obama’s Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare,” was a central point of contention 
between Democrats and Republicans—most notably in the realm of women’s health due 
to its provision that health insurance companies include free contraception for women. 
This provision has been challenged in states such as Colorado, where Hobby Lobby has 
refused to offer free contraception for employees, apparently because of the religious 
beliefs of its founder, David Green (N.A., 2013). In this divisive political climate, the 
battle being waged over women’s health is symptomatic of larger cultural schisms about 
healthcare and individual rights; this discourse is central to understanding and 
constructing meaningful arguments that can help assist health policies that are good for 
women. For example, in her discussion of how women’s health activism has been 
coopted by a neoliberal ethos, Dubriwny argues that the biomedicalization critique that 
219 
 
 
was present in the women’s health movement of the 1960s and 1970s has been subsumed 
by an emphasis on choice in healthcare options. She argues that many women’s health 
organizations such as the Komen Foundation can no longer be considered “feminist” due 
to their entanglement with the medical industry. Dubriwny (2013) notes, “The absence of 
an overtly critical perspective of some professional women’s health organizations is a 
significant part of the new health care landscape that promotes postfeminist, neoliberal 
messages about women’s health” (p. 148). The problems Dubrwiny identifies with the 
current healthcare environment certainly hold true; however, I also argue that critique of 
the medical industry is present in women’s popular media, and thus represents an 
example of how resistances to those discourses are influencing the changing healthcare 
landscape.   
For example, as I have described throughout this dissertation CAM is making 
major inroads in becoming legitimatized within institutional medicine. This is a 
development that would have been surprising to consider a mere 50 years ago. Along 
with the creation of the NCCAM in 1998, the ACA also has a provision included that will 
likely result in more insurance companies covering alternative medicine. Clause, 2706, 
authored by CAM advocate, Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), “requires that insurance 
companies ‘shall not discriminate’ against any health provider with a state recognized 
license. That means a licensed chiropractor treating a patient for back pain, for instance, 
must be reimbursed the same as medical doctors” (Rao, 2013). To me, this development 
shows that while change is slow, it can happen, providing a specific example of how 
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reflexivity at multiple levels—media, government, and medicine—may incite change 
around an issue such as health and healing.   
Can “risk” be productively deployed in discussions of health?  
As I have just discussed, the discursive use of risk may be positive in that it can bring 
about reflexivity. However, I have also detailed the negative ways in which risk is 
deployed in discourse in medical journals and the media. So how should “risk” be used in 
media discussions of health? Is there an appropriate way in which to use the term as an 
organizing concept? I ask this question because it is almost impossible to talk about 
health without at some level, addressing risk. I believe the answer is that there is a place 
for the term to be used, but its discursive construction must be used in ways that discuss 
risks more contextually, without the certainty (or conversely, the complete 
unpredictability) with which it is currently discussed in the media (which often do not 
reflect the studies cited). Because risk is not ideologically neutral, and works to advance 
certain views of health over others—for example by conflating women’s health with their 
physical appearance—new ways of imagining health can thereby change how risk is 
deployed in discussions of health; as Fairclough notes, discourse can be an important part 
of changing the social agenda (2001). Therefore, risk may be discussed in other ways, for 
example, to highlight the incredibly complex etiology of diseases by providing more 
nuanced coverage of health studies that concretize the difficulty of generalizing risk 
across populations. However, given the problems with validity of medical research itself, 
scientists and medical researchers must also acknowledge their biases and welcome 
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public deliberation about their work. Providing for a more complex discursive 
construction of risk in the media may provide more available narratives from which to 
understand health and illness, a task that will be important for women’s health. As 
Dubriwny (2013) argues, “Our understandings of ourselves and our lives are developed 
in concert with the narratives that populate public discourse” (p. 176). Therefore, as she 
suggests, new narratives about health can lead to the improvement of women’s health.  
Health in the Media and Suggestions for Future Research  
Health stories will continue to permeate the media. Indeed they proliferate. Many news 
organizations such as CNN and The New York Times use news categories exclusively 
dedicated to health, and this is not necessarily a problem. The public has a right to 
understand and assess health research and new findings, but often this task, even for an 
educated public, requires quite a bit of outside research to locate, read, and make sense of 
the various studies’ findings in the journals where they appear. Even when one goes right 
to the source, the picture may not be complete as the journals are not immune to 
ideological bias, and, in some cases, financial influence (Freedman, 2010 and Fugh-
Berman, 2010).  
 Yet there is hope. My goal is not just to critique the ideological biases in medical 
journals and popular media, but to provide suggestions for ways in which these biases 
may be challenged. There is at least some progress on this front. One website, 
HealthNewsReview.org, founded by former journalist and journalism professor at the 
University of Minnesota, Gary Schwitzer (sp), provides independent reviews of health 
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news stories, asking questions such as, “how strong is the evidence?,” “is this condition 
exaggerated?,” and “do they have a conflict of interest,” (Health News Review, 2013) 
among others. Of course, the site is not able to review all the health news stories, but it 
does a good job of guiding users through questions to ask themselves when they read 
medical stories and provides examples of good and bad reporting on health.    
 Schwitzer’s website illustrates that some working in journalism and medicine 
understand the problem of communicating health information in the media; yet how 
ideology functions in media discourses still needs to be addressed. After all, their stories 
are not generated from a vacuum: “rather than blaming the media for distorted, alarmist, 
and unnecessarily convoluted reporting, a sociological view of media discourse on risk 
suggests that any contradictions, alarm, and complexity in news accounts reflect by and 
large what journalists hear from various claims-makers, stakeholders, and other expert 
news sources,” (Stallings 1990, 91). It is therefore essential to interrogate discourse in the 
medical profession as well to uncover the wider context, ideological assumptions, and 
ways of viewing health and women that are operating in the social world. This is 
important because not only is medical information often misrepresented in the media, it is 
presented in a way that connects patriarchal assumptions about women to health; this has 
material consequences for women’s lives from the way they view health to how they 
interact and are treated in healthcare encounters. As Dubriwny (2013) points out, “If 
public discourse about women’s health is taken for granted, we miss our opportunity to 
ask questions about what meanings are being made for women’s health and what material 
consequences those meanings might have” (p. 4).  
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 Future critical media research into the use of risk in health discourses should be 
investigated in the context of new media. In addition, conversations generated by women 
on health, for example, on health blogs, or in how they interact with health media, will be 
helpful to providing insight into how women interact with this media and how their 
beliefs and practices shape, and are shaped by, these media. In addition, further research 
is needed on how medical doctors interact with medial information in the media and how 
they work with patients who have beliefs about health generated partially from media 
stories or from their own research using online health resources. Ultimately, the task at 
hand is for critical health communication scholars to continuously engage with reflexivity 
(both self and social) in order to illuminate paths of resistance, achieving small steps for 
the improvement of women’s health.  
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i
 Stories covering the topic were featured in prominent media outlets such as Time and New York 
magazines. 
ii
 Dimas was supposedly the good thief crucified next to Jesus who repented for his sins before he died.  
iii
 I explain this more in-depth in the next chapter.  
iv
 They specify Pilates and Rolfing Structural Integration. 
v
 Breathing exercises and guided imagery are specified.  
vi
 In other places Beck (2003) uses late modernity in the same way as “second modernity.”  
vii
 While the influence of family obligations was not as important in American life as in the European 
context, individuals were still expected to adhere to certain familial and social norms such as not marrying 
outside one’s religion or race. This changed substantially following the countercultural movements of the 
1960s and 70s.  
viii
 I provide critiques of this liberation aspect of individualization later in the chapter.  
ix
 Rose (2007) refers to patient advocacy using a term he calls biological citizenship, in which people come 
together over a shared disease or injury to lobby for medical research or governmental compensation. This 
concept is useful for thinking about organizing as a citizenship practice. However, I am interested in 
teasing out how criticism of medical institutions is articulated in the media and what the outcomes of those 
moments are, rather than identifying what sorts of citizenship practices they define.  
x
 Beck usually references reflexive modernity as if it is a tendency of late modernity.  
xi
 Beck is alluding here to the loss of metanarratives an example would be the postmodern turn in academia.  
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xii
 The middle class point is my assertion, not Beck’s.  
xiii
 See Entwistle and Sheldon (1999).  
xiv
 I am not arguing that modern medicine is “bad” or necessarily “repressive,” but as an institution it has 
participated in the oppression of women. Therefore, it is important that medicine be critically analyzed so 
that it may be improved. 
xv
 Conventional usage of “articulated,” not Stuart Hall’s term.  
xvi
 My study did not find significant differences in race, although according to the NCCAM, by prevalence 
Native Americans use CAM the most, followed by Whites, and Asians.  
xvii
 This refers to how women subscribe rigorously to risk mediation during pregnancy, such as abstaining 
from eating certain foods and drinking alcohol, etc.  
xviii
 When I use the term “health context,” I refer to how theory is discussed in relation to women’s health.  
xix
 Dubriwny (2013) makes a similar assertion.  
xx
 See Petersen and Bunton’s (Eds.), (1997) Foucault, Health and Medicine. 
xxi
 Their approach also encompasses part of Dubriwny’s (2013) “intersectional” approach to women’s 
health, or, “focusing on social structures, understanding power as relational, and emerging from the 
perspective of individuals outside the dominant group” (p. 170).  
xxii
 I use late modernity instead of postmodernity because I want to retain a strong sense of the inequities in 
access to health care and information.  
xxiii
 Hence the term CAM: complementary indicates as a supplement to conventional care, while alternative 
indicates foregoing conventional care in favor of other methods. 
xxiv
 I describe the history of women’s subordination to the medical community in the introduction as well as 
in chapter three. 
xxv
 See Sampson, W. (2005), Betancourt, J. (2004), and Straus, S. (2002), Abbott, A. (2005).  
 
xxvi
 Indeed, there is a slippage between healthful eating and exercise as falling under the purview of both 
conventional and alternative medicine. I will discuss this further in chapter three.  
 
xxvii
 According to Eugene Garfield, who created the term in 1955 with Irving H. Sher. The journals I chose 
deal with general medicine rather than specialty topics such as immunology or cancer. 
 
xxviii
 I also searched the term “quackery” (which was what alternative medicine used to be called) for each 
journal, which returned a number of results. These perspectives on alternative medicine align with the 
historical construction of CAM in the medical community that I discuss in the next section.   
 
xxix
 These are termed “Perspective,” in the NEJM. There is an editorial section there, but there is no 
editorial coverage on CAM, though the “Perspective” is similar in nature.  
 
xxx
 These include news stories that have a noticeable slant.  
 
xxxi
 I determined articles to be positive if they wholeheartedly accepted the acceptance of CAM into 
conventional medicine, Negative if they included a majority of strong criticisms about CAM, and mixed, if 
they explored the positive and negative consequences of CAM in relation to conventional medicine.  
 
xxxii
 There were slightly more negative stories—eight—compared with positive stories: five.  
xxxiii
 “The new human genetics involves an alliance of global capital (notably the biotechnology industry), 
clinicans and scientisits from an array of disciplinary and national backgrounds, and politicians and social 
policy-makers concerned by the growing cost of health and welfare provision,” (Kerr & Cunningham-
Burley, 2000, p. 284). It also deals with genetic testing designed to help people decide whether to have 
children or undergo preventive medical procedures to avoid a genetic disease.  
 
xxxiv
 This was the only pro-CAM piece on its movement into medical education.  
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xxxv
 See Dubrwiny (2013) for further discussion.  
xxxvi
 She makes this statement because of the vast underrepresentation of women in the sciences. This is 
not part of my sample, but I included it because it illustrates how women in the sciences are aware of a 
patriarchal bias.  
xxxvii
 A recent article published in the UK’s Telegraph that studied how much time mothers and fathers 
spent caring for their children in 21 industrialized countries, including the U.S., found that women not only 
spent more time with their children than fathers but more time on care-taking activities including physical 
care and medical care.  
In another article in The Journal of Adolescent Health, research found that both boys and girls talked to 
their mothers more about sex than their fathers or their friends. Because Gardasil is a vaccine for an STD, 
the chances that mothers may be more involved in the conversation about sex in relation to the vaccine are 
higher.  
 
xxxviii
 See editorials by Sugarman (1998), Jonas (1998) and Eskinazi (1998).   
 
xxxix
 This is not included in my data set because it was not about CAM, but about public engagement in 
science.  
 
xl
 I use appearance and beauty interchangeably because there is a slippage with how conventional beauty 
standards, such as clear skin, shiny hair, and manicured nails are seen as indicators of health, while at the 
same time fitting into conventional standards of beauty. 
xli
 This normalization is somewhat challenged by how women discuss their feelings about unrealistic beauty 
standards discussed in these media. I elaborate on this further in the next section.  
xlii
 In one of my examples, a magazine editor expressed feelings of anxiety about being “vain”, thus 
suggesting media producers also feel ambivalent about the place of beauty in women’s lives. 
xliii
 This is article is not included in my data set, but since I wasn’t analyzing articles to look for discourses 
on vanity, I used a more recent example that I found.  
xliv
 The study compares the amount of house management activities and energy expended performing these 
activities by women between 1965 and 2010. 
xlv
 I don’t go into detail on the idea that anyone is subject to health threats but this is frequently covered in 
mass media, where a person has no risk factor for a disease, and then suddenly falls ill.  
xlvi
 See Petersen (1997) and Harding (1997) for an in-depth discussion on the constant presence of risk.  
xlvii
 See the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service website at: 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/eatsmartplayhardhealthylifestyle/default.html.  
xlviii
 See the American Heart Association website: 
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/GettingHealthy/PhysicalActivity/Physical-
Activity_UCM_001080_SubHomePage.jsp.  
xlix
 The articles on fad dieting are not included in my data set because they are not feature articles. 
l
 However, as I have asserted throughout, I do not argue that individualization is beneficial, as Beck at 
times does.  
li
 I provided a similar story pertaining to phthalates in the introduction.  
lii
 Indeed, as I will elaborate later in the chapter, branding is essential to the media I analyze—Oz’s brand in 
particular is important to CAM proponents. 
liii
 One is about the placebo effect, the other discusses it in the context of medical research on CAM.  
liv
  See Applbaum 2006, Calfee 2002, and Macias, Pashupati, and Stavchansky, L.L. 2007 
lv
 The Dr. Oz episode was about how to manage depression naturally, not about pharmaceutical companies. 
lvi
 This was not part of my sample of programs. 
lvii
 See Dubriwny (2013) for a discussion of how middle-class women are empowered in their health 
choices in ways in which lower-class women are not.  
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lviii
 One such example is a show in which Oz asks female audience members to go on a “prehistoric diet.” 
The women volunteer to be locked in a public zoo for two days with nothing to eat but what the animals 
would get.  
lix
 See Dubriwny 2013 for a discussion of how women are constructed as responsible for their family’s 
health in contemporary risk constructions.  
lx
 Rose (1992) provides an interesting discussion of the shifting relationship between experts and the lay 
population.  
